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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the risk management of insurance companies. It consists of 
three essays, which study the risk management of property and casualty (P/C) insurance 
companies. 
The first essay examines the impact of board diversity on firms’ risk-taking strategies using 
Canadian P/C insurance companies. The findings show that board ethnic diversity significantly 
decreases company risk as measured by reinsurance, asset risk, and leverage risk. Ethnic 
background values of the board members could be the reason behind this effect, board members 
with ethnic backgrounds from countries with high (low) Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) 
decrease (increase) the risk. Results also show that in a diversified business environment, the 
ethnic diversity of directors has a less critical role in implementing risk-reducing strategies. Also, 
we show that board ethnic diversity improves company performance.  
In the second essay, we examine whether the personal background of decision-makers 
affects accounting estimates. We use cultural origin and gender of actuaries and CEOs as a proxy 
of personal background and test their effect on the accuracy of loss reserves. Our results show 
evidence that the cultural origin of actuaries, but not CEOs, are significantly associated with the 
accuracy of loss reserves. We show that cultural values of Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Power Distance and Individualism could explain the effect of cultural origin on the accuracy of 
loss reserves. We find evidence that cultural values that promote greater (lower) uncertainty, 
greater (lower) overconfidence, and more (less) risky attitudes are associated with lower (greater) 
accuracy of loss reserves. In addition, we show that actuary gender is significantly associated with 
the accuracy of loss reserves upon under-reserving only. 
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The third essay studies the time variation of the market price of Catastrophe bonds for the 
period 1999-2016. While we find an overall decreasing trend in the price of expected loss risk, 
large catastrophes increase this price by an order of 34% on average. Our empirical tests show that 
the latter effect is temporary and unlikely to be the byproduct of behavioral changes in investors’ 
perceptions about catastrophic risk as previously argued. Instead, we find evidence that the 
changes in the price of expected loss risk may be explained by changes in investor effective risk 
aversion, initiated by catastrophic events triggering Cat bond losses that could bring investors 
closer to their habit consumption levels and lead to a hard reinsurance market environment.  
Contagion effects from the reinsurance markets are more relevant after main catastrophes given 
the levels of liquidity in the markets. Furthermore, contagion effects from financial markets are 
minor and only relevant during the subprime financial crisis as documented in previous studies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The core business of insurance companies is to manage risk. Insurance companies manage 
the risks of their clients’ lives. Insurance is a promise made by insurers to pay for future claims 
incurred by policyholders. The market can only operate if policyholders believe that the insurer 
will make good on these future promises. If an insurance company fails to manage its risks, it will 
fail to control the clients’ risks and meet its payment obligations. Thus, risk management is crucial 
for an insurance company. In my dissertation, I analyze the risk management of insurance 
companies from the perspectives of corporate governance, financial reporting, and risk hedging. I 
study the effect of personal background and diversity of decision-makers (actuaries and board 
members) on decisions related to risk. Additionally, I analyze the evolution of innovative tools 
(Catastrophe bonds) used for hedging losses.   
First, by studying the effect of board ethnic diversity on risk strategies, I approach risk 
management from a corporate governance perspective. Over 60% of failures of Canadian 
property/casualty (P/C) insurance companies can be associated with risk strategy decisions 
(Leadbetter and Stodolak, 2008). The risk strategy decisions are affected by the personal values of 
the board of directors, shaped by their ethnicity (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). My research 
examines the effect of the ethnic diversity of the board of directors on the riskiness of insurance 
companies. I find that board ethnic diversity significantly decreases company risk as measured by 
reinsurance, asset risk, and leverage risk. I find that the differences in ethnic values of the board 
members could be the reason behind this effect, where board members with ethnic backgrounds 
from countries with high Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) decrease the risk, and those with 
ethnic backgrounds from countries with low UAI increase the risk. I also find that in a diversified 
business environment, the ethnic diversity of directors has a less critical role in implementing risk-
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reducing strategies. Also, I show that board ethnic diversity improves company performance. 
Using a dataset of Canadian P/C insurance companies allows me to differentiate risk and 
profitability strategies, measure the moderating effect of the contextual environment, and cover 
private companies and financial institutions, which corporate studies usually exclude. 
Second, I analyze the risk management of insurance companies from an accounting 
perspective by testing the effect of personal background on the accuracy of loss reserves. Adequate 
reserving is one of the primary causes of insurer insolvency in the U.S.; thus, understanding how 
individual biases and backgrounds can influence reserving decisions can help regulators 
effectively assess whether a firm has adequate reserves. I use cultural origin and gender of actuaries 
and CEOs as a proxy of personal background and test their effect on the accuracy of loss reserves. 
My results show evidence that the cultural origin of actuaries, but not CEOs, are significantly 
associated with the accuracy of loss reserves. I show that cultural values of Masculinity, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance and Individualism could explain the effect of cultural 
origin on the accuracy of loss reserves. I find evidence that cultural values that promote greater 
(lower) uncertainty, greater (lower) overconfidence, and more (less) risky attitudes are associated 
with lower (greater) accuracy of loss reserves both for under-reserving and over-reserving 
directions of loss reserves. In addition, I show that actuary gender is significantly associated with 
the accuracy of loss reserves upon under-reserving only. 
Third, I study the evolution of innovative tools (Catastrophe bonds) used by insurance 
companies for hedging their catastrophe related losses. Catastrophe (Cat) bonds replace 
reinsurance and allow for greater access to capital in the insurance markets in case of significant 
catastrophe-related losses. Many countries, as well as utility and other non-insurance companies, 
have also started using these bonds as they are susceptible to substantial losses due to natural 
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catastrophes. My third essay studies the time variation of the market price of Catastrophe bonds 
for the period 1999-2016. While I find an overall decreasing trend in the price of expected loss 
risk, large catastrophes increase this price by order of 34% on average. The empirical tests show 
that the latter effect is temporary and unlikely to be the byproduct of behavioral changes in 
investors’ perceptions about catastrophic risk, as previously argued. Instead, changes in investor 
effective risk aversion explain the changes in the price of expected loss risk. The changes in 
investor effective risk aversion happen due to investors reaching their habit consumption level 
when catastrophe losses trigger Cat bond losses. My findings also show that contagion effects from 
the reinsurance markets are more relevant after main catastrophes given the levels of liquidity in 
the markets. Furthermore, contagion effects from financial markets are minor and only relevant 
during the subprime financial crisis. 
Hence, the three essays in my dissertation approach the risk management of insurance 
companies covering multiple facets of it, strategic, operational, and financial. My dissertation 
contributes to the advancement of behavioral aspects of risk management decision making and the 
use of innovative hedging tools. The samples in my essays cover both Canadian and U.S. property 
and casualty insurance companies, as well as an international sample of Catastrophe bonds issued.  
The findings in my dissertation, promote scholarly research on the effect of personal 
management characteristics on corporate decisions. It contributes to the inconclusive literature on 
the impact of gender and how cultural values affect corporate decision making, where the latter 
has received little attention in financial literature (Karolyi, 2016). My work also adds to the 
economic and psychology literature that examines team diversity moderating group decisions 
(Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969) and the effect of diversity for financial decisions (e.g., Bernile et 
al., 2018, Giannetti & Zhao, 2019). Furthermore, it contributes to the specific emerging literature 
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in insurance, which studies the effect of personal characteristics and diversity on performance, 
risk, and loss reserves (e.g., Berry-Stolzle et al., 2018; Liebenberg & Che, 2019). 
The findings on the catastrophe bonds promote research on econometric approaches that 
study the pricing of catastrophe bonds (e.g., Braun, 2016; Gürtler, Hibbeln, & Winkelvos, 2014) 
and enhance our understanding of this important asset class. 
All three essays are of benefit not only to the scholarly advancement but also for regulators, 
stakeholders, and legislators. The research on the effect of personal characteristics on risk 
strategies and loss reserves provides legislators and stakeholders with scientific evidence of how 
ethnic and gender diversity could affect corporate decisions. Such evidence is necessary to show 
the importance of diversity and its possible sources in light of the increasing pressure and spending 
on improving it. My research shows that cultural values are persistent and significantly affect 
decisions. I find evidence that companies could achieve diversity by sourcing managers from 
different cultural origins. The research on catastrophe bonds helps financial managers better 
understand these tools and instill confidence in investing and using them for portfolio 
diversification and hedging losses. 
The rest of my dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter I covers the first essay of my 
dissertation titled “Board Ethnic Diversity and Risk Strategies.” Chapter II is the second essay 
titled “Personal Background and Accounting Estimates: Cultural Origin, Gender, and Reported 
Loss Reserves.” Chapter III is the third essay titled “Pricing Dynamics in the Market for 
Catastrophe Bonds.” The last section concludes with a summary of the three essays and discusses 
potential future work that could stem from my three essays included in this dissertation. 
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1 BOARD ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND RISK STRATEGIES  
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Boards are under increasing pressure from lawmakers, regulators, stakeholders, and the 
media to improve their diversity. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed 
the “Improving Corporate Governance through Diversity Act of 2019”,1 which requires companies 
to annually disclose gender, race, and ethnicity of their directors, nominees, and senior executive 
officers. Similarly, since 2018 Canada Bill C-25 requires corporations to report information 
regarding the ethnic diversity of directors and the members of senior management.  Despite such 
recent attention on board diversity, little is known on how changes in ethnic diversity among board 
members affect corporate decisions; since most related studies have focused mainly on the effects 
of gender diversity.2 This paper addresses this issue by studying the effect of board ethnic diversity 
on corporate risk management. We also investigate the sources for such effect and the conditions 
which could moderate this effect. 
Why should board ethnic diversity influence a firm’s corporate policy?  According to the 
upper echelon theory, board members’ values, shaped by ethnicity, are reflected in the firm’s 
strategic decisions, including risk management (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Canella, Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 2008). Our empirical results support the upper echelon theory by showing that board 
ethnic diversity influences the risk management and performance of companies. Our findings also 
support the upper echelon theory on board members, specifically by showing that in more certain 
environments decisions do not reflect board values as they do in uncertain environments. 
We base our empirical tests on a sample of 2069 firm-year observations of insurance 
companies. The use of insurance companies allows us to focus on financial institutions and private 
                                                 
1 U.S. House Financial Services Committee, 116th Congress passed, on July 11, 2019, H.R. 1018 
2 In finance literature see for example: Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Adams and Ragunathan, 2015; Berger, 
Kick, & Shaeck, 2018; Sila, Gonzalez, and Hagendorff 2016. 
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companies, which corporate literature usually excludes. Studying financial institutions is important 
because the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis brought up the need to look over their corporate 
governance.  Also, the use of insurance companies’ data allows us to examine direct measures of 
risk, such as reinsurance, asset risk, and leverage risk. It also allows us to study in detail the 
moderating effect of the contextual environment as related to the complexity of the business, 
organizational structure, and uncertainty of the environment. Such rich data is available only for 
insurance companies due to a highly regulated disclosure requirement and the business of 
insurance companies focusing on risk management. We measure board diversity by the negative 
ethnic diversity Herfindahl Index, where the ethnicity of a group of people refers to presumed 
common genealogy or ancestry or on similarities such as common language or dialect, history, 
society, culture, or nation (Peoples & Bailey, 2012).  
Our main results imply that boards with greater ethnic diversity implement less risky 
strategies where a one standard deviation increase in board ethnic diversity decreases leverage and 
asset risk by 3.1 and 3.2 percent, respectively, and increases reinsurance by 5.6 percent.  
So, why ethnic board diversity may affect companies’ risk strategies? In his study of 
leadership characteristics in different cultures, Hofstede (1985) identified that cultural 
characteristics such as uncertainty avoidance are evident in the leadership style of company 
leaders.  Hofstede (1985) proposed an index that measures country-level uncertainty avoidance. A 
low score on the uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) indicates that the people in the country are 
more comfortable with ambiguity, more entrepreneurial, more likely to take risks, and less 
dependent on structure rules. Countries with high UAI value desire more stability, more structured 
regulations and social norms, and are less comfortable with taking risks. We use the UAI as a 
proxy for cultural values and categorize the ethnic groups into two categories: those from countries 
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that have high UAI and low UAI. We find evidence that boards with a higher percentage of 
members with an ethnic background from countries with high UAI decrease the companies’ risk, 
and those with ethnic backgrounds from countries with low UAI increase the risk. Which confirms 
that the differences in the cultural values of the board members could be the reason why ethnic 
diversity affects risk. We also use the UAI to proxy for CEO cultural values and control for a 
possible interaction effect of CEO cultural values and board ethnic diversity on risk. We show that 
CEOs' cultural values do not significantly change the decreasing effect of board ethnic diversity 
on risk. 
As for whether the company’s contextual environment could moderate the board diversity 
effect on risk strategies, the upper echelon theory suggests that a more uncertain environment 
would allow the board to be more involved. This could suggest that a firm operating in a more 
complex business environment could have a significantly different association between board 
diversity and risk than a firm operating in a less complex environment. We find that ethnic 
diversity does not have a significant effect on risk for firms with greater business diversity. In 
insurance, underwriting more diverse lines of business can act as a risk diversification mechanism 
while at the same time, it increases complexity. Our results could imply that in a more complex 
environment, board diversity does not significantly affect risk strategies. We propose a reason for 
that being that the diversity of business acts as a risk management mechanism and hence does not 
necessitate additional board involvement to implement other risk strategies to mitigate risk.  
To complement the effect of board ethnic diversity on risk, we test whether it affects 
performance. We benefit from insurance companies’ richness of data that allows us to study the 
effect on two primary sources of their income (underwriting and investment) and the overall 
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performance measure. We find that board ethnic diversity improves return on revenue and 
investment yield.  
Our study is closely related to that of Giannetti and Zhao (2019), who find that the ancestral 
diversity of board members increases performance volatility and results in less predictable 
decisions due to differences among directors. They exclude financial institutions and focus on 
public firms only. Our results, on the other hand, show that board ethnic diversity decreases the 
riskiness of the company due to the differences in cultural values of directors, test the moderating 
effect of the contextual environment, control for CEO cultural values and studies the effect on 
performance. In addition, our study extends the findings of Frijns, Dodd, and Cimenova (2016) of 
board cultural diversity on firm performance and shows its effect on risk. Also, our results support 
the findings of Pan, Siegel, and Wang (2017) on the effect of cultural values on the riskiness of 
companies.  
Furthermore, by highlighting the importance of directors’ values, as shaped by ethnic 
background, we contribute to the literature that explores how directors’ characteristics affect 
corporate decisions.3 Also, touching on the emergence of cultural values in the corporate decision 
making, which has received little attention in financial literature (Karolyi, 2016), we show that the 
cultural values of the ethnic background reflect on the risk decisions of the company. Our work 
also adds to the economic and psychology literature that suggests team diversity moderating group 
decisions (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969) by showing that corporate decisions reflect board 
members’ cultural values. Our results also add to the literature which studies the costs and benefits 
                                                 
3 See Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) for a survey of this literature. 
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of ethnic diversity and economic outcomes4 by specifically studying how ethnic diversity of board 
members affects the riskiness of companies. 
 We also contribute to the literature which studies board diversity in its broad context 
(Anderson, Reeb, Upadhyay & Zhao, 2011; Bernile, Bhagwat & Yoker, 2018). We add to this 
literature by scrutinizing how and in what direction ethnic diversity affects the riskiness of 
regulated public and private companies, which corporate studies usually exclude. We add to the 
papers of Giannetti and Zhao (2019) and Nguyen, Hagendorff, and Eshraghi (2018) on the effect 
of the cultural diversity of top management and directors by directly addressing risk strategies as 
reinsurance, asset risk, and leverage and testing the moderating effect of the contextual 
environment.  
Finally, there is no research, to our knowledge, on the impact of board member diversity 
on the riskiness of insurance companies. Although academic literature has examined aspects of 
insurance company governance, such as share ownership, board characteristics, and committees, 
(Cheng, Elyasiani, & Jia, 2011; Eling & Marek, 2013; Ho, Lai & Lee, 2013), this paper is the first 
to look at the ethnic background of the board members of insurance companies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. After the introduction, we continue with the hypothesis 
formulation. Then, we discuss the data and methodology, which includes how we constructed the 
sample, what variables used to estimate risk, and what regressions run to perform tests and present 
summary statistics. Continuing, we present the empirical results, testing our hypotheses, followed 
by robustness checks. Last is the conclusion.   
 
                                                 
4 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey of literature on the positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic 
policies and outcomes. 
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1.2 HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
The upper echelon theory proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984) relates the strategic 
decision of a company to the personal values of the firm’s top management. This hypothesis is 
extended to the values of the board of directors’ effect on the strategic decisions of the companies 
as well (Canella et al., 2008). Among those strategic decisions is risk management and, hence, the 
riskiness of the company. 
Hofstede (1985) found that an organization’s values reflect the founder and dominant elite. 
Moreover, Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that the socioeconomic background of the upper 
echelons affects the variability of growth and profit of the firm. Literature studying the effect of 
the cultural diversity of leaders concerning companies’ riskiness is scarce and limited to a few 
papers.5 Giannetti and Zhao (2019) found no evidence that firms with diverse boards take more 
risk, have higher leverage, or invest more. However, they did identify that these firms have higher 
return volatilities. 
Meanwhile, Nguyen et al. (2018), studying the relationship between CEO ancestral origins 
and the risk of a company, reported that CEOs with ancestral backgrounds in cultures whose values 
emphasize uncertainty avoidance display lower risk. Both of these studies excluded financial 
institutions and only included public firms. Thus, the effect of ethnic diversity and the proposition 
of Hambrick and Mason (1984) as related to board members remains an underexplored empirical 
research question. Thereby, the following hypothesis tests our perspective of board diversity as 
measured by ethnic diversity: 
H1: The ethnic diversity of board members is significantly associated with the riskiness of the 
company. 
                                                 
5 See for example: Frijns et al. (2016), Gianetti and Zhao (2019), Nguyen et al. (2018), and Pan et al. (2017).  
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The upper echelon theory extended to the board of directors by Canella et al. (2008) 
proposes that the contextual environment in which the board of directors operates will affect their 
involvement and the vigilance of strategic decisions. They suggested that the more uncertain the 
environment, the more involved boards are in strategic decisions. Multiple empirical studies 
investigating the effect of board diversity on performance or risk found that the effect does differ 
in different environments. Bernile et al. (2018), studying a broad spectrum of diversity, noted that 
board diversity is less effective when uncertainty in the more general environment increases, and 
a nimbler decision process may be needed. They also identified that the strength of the link 
between board diversity and the firm’s risk depends on the circumstances that should affect the 
optimal composition of the board and the effectiveness of its monitoring role. 
Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2011) reported that firms with more complex operating 
environments have more diverse boards. For firms that operate in complex environments, board 
diversity improves performance, whereas the opposite is true for firms that operate in less complex 
environments. The authors constructed a diversity index that includes education, experience, age, 
gender, and ethnicity, similar to Bernile et al. (2018). They found that in firms with complex 
operating environments, performance improves as boards become increasingly heterogeneous. 
However, they also found that in firms with less complex operating environments, board 
heterogeneity exhibits a negative relation to firm performance. 
Moreover, Frijns et al. (2016) found that firms that operate in more than three business 
segments, performance is not affected by cultural diversity. In contrast, for non-complex firms that 
operate in three or fewer business segments, performance is negatively affected. They also 
identified that in firms with a strong presence in foreign markets, as measured by the proportion 
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of foreign sales or assets, the negative relation between performance and cultural diversity 
disappears.  
Therefore, the upper echelon theory and the empirical literature suggest that the effect of 
board diversity might depend on the type and complexity of operations. Thus, we test whether the 
business complexity of a company could affect the association between board diversity and the 
risk of a company. The upper echelon theory implies that a more uncertain environment would 
allow the board to be more involved, thus, suggesting a firm operating in a more complex business 
environment would have a greater association between board diversity and risk. We test this 
empirically by measuring the business complexity using the greater type of business and 
geographical diversity of lines of business. 
H2: Firms that have more diverse lines of business have a significantly stronger association 
between board diversity and risk than those that have less diverse lines of business. 
Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) purported that board gender diversity’s effect on firm 
performance is positive and significant in legal person-controlled firms but insignificant in state-
controlled firms. For insurance companies’ ownership structure,6 Lamm-Tennant and Starks 
(1993) reported that stock insurers have more risk than mutual insurers. They also found that stock 
insurers write relatively more business than do mutual insurers in lines and states having a higher 
risk. Ho et al. (2013) stated that mutual insurers, relative to stock insurers, with larger boards, have 
a higher underwriting risk, and those with CEO duality have a lower leverage risk. These findings 
suggest the ownership structure (stock vs. mutual) could act as a significant contextual 
environment that could affect how board diversity affects risk. We thereby test whether board 
                                                 
6 Insurance companies’ ownership structure can be stock (owned by shareholders and can be public or private) or mutual (owned 
by policy holders and only private by construct). 
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diversity in stock insurance companies is significantly associated with risk compared to mutual 
insurers.  
H3: Board diversity association with risk is greater when the insurance company is a stock insurer 
compared to when the insurance company is a mutual insurer. 
1.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1.3.1 Sample construction 
We hand-collected data on boards of directors and officers from the company profiles of 
MSA research annual reports and A.M. Best annual reports. The MSA research reports cover the 
period from 2004 until 2017. Prior to 2003, A.M. Best covered the annual reports of the Canadian 
insurance companies. Therefore, we collected 1999-2003 data from the A.M. Best reports.7 In 
2003, A.M. Best did not fully cover the company profiles, so we collected additional officers’ data 
from the General Insurance Registry.8 We interpolated the missing boards of directors’ members 
by assuming a director was a member of the board in 2003 if this director was also a member both 
in 2002 and 2004.  
We collected all of the yearly financial data of the property and casualty (P/C) insurance 
companies from the MSA research reports from 1999 until 2017. There were 418 unique insurance 
companies covered by MSA research, and 200 of them reported board members in their company 
profiles in at least one year. We excluded observations with errors in reporting, having reported 
values after being indicated as ceased, and firms with negative net premiums written and total 
assets. We winsorized financial variables at 1% and 99% to control for any outliers. Furthermore, 
we removed any observations with missing values for any particular variable needed for our tests. 
We were left with 2,069 insurer-year observations with 187 unique insurance companies.  
                                                 
7 We thank Anne Kleffner for kindly sharing A.M. Best 2003 reports.  
8 We thank Amra Porobic and Insurance Bureau of Canada for facilitating access to the General Insurance Registry data. 
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As for the boards of directors’ characteristics, we used several approaches. First, we 
identified whether a board member was an insider if this board member was ever an officer of the 
company. Second, using the titles of the board members, we identified if the chair was also a CEO. 
Third, a board member was classified as male or female based on their first name.9 Fourth and last, 
to ascertain the ethnicity of the board member, we used their last names. To do this, we used four 
sources to identify the origin of the family names. Using Forebears.com, we identified the current 
prevalent country where the family name occurs. We then used the Dictionary of American Family 
Names to determine the origin of the family name, and we used Onomap, a project proceeding 
completed by the department of geography at University College London, to identify the ethnic 
group of the last name. We compared the results of those three databases, and if they matched, we 
assigned the family name to one of the twelve ethnic groups described in the GLOBE project 
(House et al., 2014). If the origin of the family name did not match across the three databases, we 
used Ancestry.com (a commercial database). Ancestry.com contains the census of Canada and the 
U.S. and the registers of ships arriving at the U.S. and Canada shores; these official sources helped 
us identify from which country a specific family name came in the U.S. or Canada and resolve the 
discrepancy between the initial three databases. If we found the family name origin using 
Ancestry.com, and it matched one of the previous databases, we assigned an ethnic group to it 
accordingly. If we could not identify the origin using Ancestry.com, we assigned the family name 
to an ethnic group based on the current prevalent country as per Forebears.com. For each board 
member, based on the origin of the family name identified, we assigned a group per the divisions 
in the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004): Anglo, South Pacific, Germanic Europe, Latin Europe, 
                                                 
9 Some names had only initials and family names, or the first names could be either a male or a female name. In this case, we 
referred to annual reports, photos, and contacting the companies directly to identify the gender of the board members whose first 
names were not clearly stated in the company profile. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Confucian Asia, Southern Asia, Latin America, 
and Nordic Europe. Countries grouped into cultural clusters share characteristics such as 
geographic proximity, climate zone, mass migration, ethnic social capital, religious roots, and 
linguistic roots (House et al., 2004). The GLOBE project did not cover all of the countries of origin 
of the directors in our sample (e.g., Belgium, Ukraine, Poland), and, in those cases, we followed 
the shared characteristics with the corresponding groups and placed the country into the closest 
group by characteristics. The countries of origin of the boards of directors and their corresponding 
groups are summarized in Table 1-1. 
Table 1-1: Division of Countries of Board Member Origins by Groups 
This table lists the countries of origin of the board members in my sample and the division of those countries by groups as divided in the 
GLOBE project (2014). Some countries are not covered by the GLOBE project, I followed a close analogue procedure and assigned those 
countries into corresponding groups based on similar characteristics such as language, geographic location, and history 
Anglo 
Eastern 
Europe 
Germanic Europe Latin Europe Middle East Southern Asia 
Australia Armenia Austria France  Algeria Bangladesh 
Canada Bulgaria Belgium Italy  Egypt India 
England Croatia Germany Portugal Morocco Pakistan 
Iceland Czech Rep. Netherlands Spain Turkey Philippines 
Ireland Greece Switzerland   Sri Lanka 
Scotland Hungary Confucian Asia Latin America Nordic Europe Africa 
South Africa Latvia China Brazil Denmark Cameroon 
United States Poland Japan Dominican Rep. Norway Ghana 
 Russia Taiwan Mexico Sweden Mozambique 
 Serbia  Vietnam Puerto Rico  
 Slovenia     
  Ukraine      
 
To study the effect of the ethnic diversity of board members on company risk, we used the 
epidemiological approach as described by Fernandez (2011). This approach has been recently used 
in economics literature to study the effect of ethnic origins. It is based on the idea that immigrants 
pass their cultural beliefs and values to their descendants. Several studies used the last names to 
identify the ethnic origin of individuals of interest. For instance, Pan et al. (2018) used this 
approach to identify the cultural origin of top management. Liu (2016) identified the ethnic origins 
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of insiders using their last name to relate those insiders’ origin to corporate corruption. Bengston 
and Hsu (2015) also studied the effect of co-ethnicity, which was identified based on last names, 
between the entrepreneurial founders and the venture capitalists concerning investment likelihood 
and its further performance. Moreover, Merkley, Michaely, and Pacelli (2020) used the family 
names of analysts to study how cultural diversity affects the quality of the consensus forecasts that 
analysts produce. Giannetti and Zhao (2019) identified board members’ ethnicities through their 
last names to study the effect of cultural diversity on the predictability of decisions and firm 
volatility. 
1.3.2 Methodology 
Ho et al. (2013), studying the effects of the P/C insurance company structure and board 
characteristics on risk, reported that different types of risks are affected differently and advised 
studying the distinct types when assessing the risk-taking behavior of an insurance company. 
Therefore, we examine the effect of board ethnic diversity on risk-taking measures – reinsurance, 
asset risk, and leverage risk (summarized in Table 1-2).  
Table 1-2: Measures of Risk 
This table represents a summary of the measures of risk used in my study and how it relates to the interpretation of the riskiness of 
the company. Where TA stands for Total Assets and CS for Common Shares. 
Measures of Risk Relation to the riskiness of the 
firm 
Leverage Risk 
1 −
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠
𝑇𝐴
 
Positive 
Reinsurance 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 
 
Negative 
Asset Risk 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝐴
 
Positive 
 We measured reinsurance as the proportion of premiums written ceded of the sum of direct 
and assumed premiums written. Studying reinsurance allows us to directly assess how much 
insurance the company would want to carry to protect itself. Reinsurance in the insurance industry 
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acts as insurance for any other entity. It is the only practically controllable mechanism available 
for an insurance company to directly control its underwriting risk (the risk from the policies’ it 
underwrites). Reinsurance is a proxy of the risk strategy of a company toward managing its 
business risk.  
Asset risk was measured, following Che and Liebenberg (2017), as the ratio of common 
shares plus junk bonds divided by total assets. The junk bonds are all bonds that are below 
investment-grade rating, unrated, or classified as other. Investment income is the second source of 
income for an insurance company and it is the complement to its underwriting income. Thus, 
having more risky investments as common stock and junk bonds would pose a greater risk on the 
company’s income and further ability to compensate for any losses arising from underwriting 
business. Hence using asset risk as a second measure of risk would allow testing companies’ 
appetite for risky investments and the ability to manage its second facet of income. As well, asset 
risk enables the company to compensate for any losses incurred from the first facet (underwriting). 
Noting that asset risk can be quickly controlled and changed while other measures might require 
some time to be implemented.  
Leverage risk was calculated as one minus the surplus divided by total assets, where the 
surplus is a measure of the total shareholders’ equity. Leverage risk is a traditional measure of 
corporate financing choices, the purpose of using this measure is that when a company with higher 
leverage incurs a negative shock, the impact on its net profitability will be greater. Thus, posing a 
risk of meeting its obligations and running into higher default probability. We also used net 
premiums written over surplus as an additional control for risk in the company that could have a 
significant effect on the other risk measures. 
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Our main variable of interest is board ethnic diversity which was measured by the 
Herfindahl Index as in Model 1. To calculate ethnic diversity, we used the number of directors of 
ten (represented in our sample) ethnic groups (described in Table 1-2) divided by the total number 
of directors. Because a higher Herfindahl Index indicates a decrease in diversity, we used the 
negative of our measure in all regressions for ease of interpretation. Thus, our measure ethnic 
diversity, being the negative value of the diversity Herfindahl Index calculated in Equation 1, has 
a positive relation to board ethnic diversity. As shown in Table 1-3, the average 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 
was 0.638, which is comparable to Giannetti and Zhao’s (2019) fractionalization measure of 0.725 
and 0.561 using the Oxford Dictionary to measure the ancestral diversity of directors based on 
their last name country of origin.  
𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = − ∑ (
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 
)2101      (1) 
We estimated the model specified below (Equation 2) using OLS and instrumental 
variables regressions to study the effect of ethnic diversity on various types of risk, where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 
is any type of risk described in Table 1-2. We controlled for board characteristics (𝑍𝑖,𝑡), firm 
characteristics (𝑉𝑖,𝑡), and year and province fixed effects (𝛼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 and 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒).
10 Additionally, 
we controlled for all the risk measures (𝑊𝑖,𝑡)  used in our right-hand side and further used net 
premiums written over surplus as additional controls for risk in the company that could have a 
significant effect on our measures of risks. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛.𝑑𝑖𝑣.𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡   
(2) 
                                                 
10 Because some of my control variables were fixed (PC1) for each specific company, with very little change for some of them 
(mutual or group), and had a significant role in affecting risk for insurance companies, we only confirm that our main results still 
hold significant using a fixed effects model but do not use fixed effects model for the rest of the analysis. 
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Adams and Funk (2012) and Berger et al. (2014) found that female representation on board 
can have a significant effect on company outcomes. Thus, we control for gender diversity which 
was estimated as the proportion of female members on the board divided by the total number of 
board members. The female ratio of the board size constituted an average of 16.5% with a 
maximum of 67% (Table 2-3). Ho et al. (2013) found that a higher percentage of insiders is 
associated with higher total risk, therefore, we controlled for insider proportion, which was 
calculated as the total number of board members who were officers of the corresponding insurance 
company divided by the total number of board members. The percentage of insiders on the board 
in our sample was 29%, which is slightly lower than that in Ho, et al.’s (2013) sample, most 
probably because our data is more recent; currently, there is a lower trend in having more insiders 
on the board.11 We also included the total number of board members and CEO duality, which was 
a dummy variable that took the value of 1 for a board chair who was also a CEO. Ho et al. (2013) 
claimed that this CEO-chairperson duality increases the leverage risk and that firms with larger 
boards have a higher total risk and leverage risk but a lower investment risk.  
Furthermore, larger insurance firms might be able to absorb more risk due to greater 
expertise, as suggested by Pottier (2007); thus, we controlled for firm size using the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Long tail was measured as unpaid claims and adjustment expenses 
divided by total liabilities. GeoHHI is the geographic Herfindahl Index, in which the geographic 
diversification considered is among the provinces of Canada. Each province has its insurance 
regulations, which makes geographic diversity comparable to international geographic diversity. 
Further, LOBHHI is the line of business Herfindahl Index, in which five lines of business are 
defined: 1) auto; 2) personal property; 3) commercial property, marine, boiler and machinery, and 
                                                 
11 Based on EY (2018) report: “In 2000, 65% of S&P 1500 directors were considered independent vs. 83% in 2018”. 
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hail; 4) liability; and 5) surety and other. Che and Liebenberg (2017) showed that the group 
indicator positively and significantly affects asset risk, so we introduced a dummy variable that 
was equal to 1 if a firm was part of a group or zero otherwise. We also controlled for the firm being 
domestic or a foreign branch, where the dummy variable PC1 takes the value of one if the firm 
was a federally or provincially licensed domestic company or zero if the company was a federally 
licensed foreign branch. It is also possible that the performance of the company, as measured by 
Return on Assets (ROA) and various risk measures affected each of the risk strategies that we 
tested. Therefore, we include ROA, the ratio of Net Premiums Written (NPW) over surplus, 
reinsurance, asset risk, and leverage risk as control variables as well. 
Table 1-3: Summary Statistics 
This table represents the summary statistics of the variables in the sample starting 1999 until 2017.The variables are as 
described in Table 1-A1. All financial variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Board Characteristics: 
Ethnic Diversity -0.638 -0.603 0.185 -1.000 -0.250 2069 
Chair/CEO duality 0.062 0.000 0.241 0.000 1.000 2069 
Insider Ratio 0.286 0.250 0.221 0.000 1.000 2069 
Board Size 9.367 9.000 3.058 2.000 29.000 2069 
Female Ratio 0.165 0.143 0.130 0.000 0.667 2069 
LUA 0.707 0.750 0.215 0.000 1.000 2069 
HUA 0.180 0.125 0.208 0.000 1.000 2069 
CEO LUA 0.562 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 2069 
CEO HUA 0.150 0.000 0.357 0.000 1.000 2069 
Majority HUA 0.158 0.000 0.365 0.000 1.000 2069 
LIDVI 0.007 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.400 2069 
HIDVI 0.707 0.750 0.215 0.000 1.000 2069 
LMASFEMI 0.007 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.333 2069 
HMASFEMI 0.709 0.750 0.214 0.000 1.000 2069 
LPDI 0.707 0.750 0.215 0.000 1.000 2069 
HPDI 0.017 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.333 2069 
Eth. Div. no females -0.655 -0.625 0.199 -1.000 -0.222 2069 
Risk Measures:       
Asset Risk 0.063 0.044 0.070 0.000 0.345 2069 
Leverage Risk 0.690 0.741 0.177 0.024 0.967 2069 
Reinsurance 0.234 0.177 0.209 0.000 1.000 2069 
Performance Measures: 
ROA 2.889 2.540 3.831 -10.180 19.520 2069 
ROE 9.438 9.310 11.837 -32.970 48.880 2069 
Combined Ratio 100.063 99.110 24.142 21.510 232.980 2069 
Return on Revenue 11.839 7.050 31.283 -99.100 222.800 2069 
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Table 1-3 continued:       
Investment Yield 4.754 4.490 2.787 -3.581 15.3 2069 
Company Characteristics: 
Longtail 0.585 0.613 0.209 0.000 2.577 2069 
Ln(TA) 12.593 12.750 1.618 7.408 15.736 2069 
LobHHI 0.530 0.463 0.226 0.224 1.000 2069 
GeoHHI 0.532 0.433 0.291 0.164 1.000 2069 
PC1 0.892 1.000 0.311 0.000 1.000 2069 
Mutual 0.215 0.000 0.411 0.000 1.000 2069 
Group 0.652 1.000 0.477 0.000 1.000 2069 
NPW/Surplus 1.355 1.276 0.916 -0.084 12.578 2069 
Instrumental Variables: 
Peer Ethnic Diversity 0.640 0.639 0.023 0.603 0.692 2069 
Distance to Airport 0.031 0.018 0.057 0.002 0.764 2067 
 
1.3.3 Instrumental Variables for Ethnic Diversity  
For instrumenting the board diversity, we used the distance between the head office and a 
major airport (measured using Google maps) and the average ethnic diversity of peers. Where 
having more ethnically diverse candidates with insurance expertise on the boards of other 
companies can act as a pool of potential candidates to serve on the boards of other companies. The 
diversity on other boards, though, does not affect the risk strategies of the company of interest. 
This kind of instrument is similar to the one used by Liu et al. (2014) to calculate the percent of 
female directors in the firm's 2-digit SIC coded industry. Due to the nature of the insurance 
industry, there is a possibility that candidates to serve on boards would be scarce if limiting the 
choice to only the insurance industry. To account for this caveat, we simultaneously used distance 
to a major airport in addition to the diversity in the peer companies. The proximity to a major 
airport would encourage more directors living in other locations to serve on the boards of 
companies, which would broaden the potential directors’ pool. The relation could be positive or 
negative depending on the flights from where this airport gets the directors from. This instrument 
rationale is in line with Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012), who used a dummy variable for whether 
a firm is headquartered within 100 km from a large U.S. airport. It also aligns with Bernile et al. 
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(2018), who used the diversity of the supply of nonlocal potential directors residing one non-stop 
flight away from the firm headquarters as the instrumental variable. 
1.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
1.4.1 Does Board Ethnic Diversity Affect Risk? 
We measured board diversity in terms of ethnic diversity, which entered our regressions as 
the negative of the ethnic diversity Herfindahl Index. Our results show that greater ethnic diversity 
of directors is negatively associated with risk. As observed in Table 1-4, as ethnic diversity 
increases in the board, reinsurance that the company buys increases, asset risk decreases, and 
leverage risk decreases. The results are both statistically and economically significant. For 
example, a 1 standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity leads to a 5.6% increase in the 
reinsurance, which is the mechanism that allows an insurance company to manage the 
underwriting risk that may arise from its sold policies. 
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Table 1-4: OLS, Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables Regressions 
Panel A in this table presents the OLS and Fixed Effects regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity for the total sample. All variables are described 
in Table 1-A1. Panel B of this table presents the results of the instrumental variables regressions. The instrumented variable is ethnic diversity. The 
instruments are ethnic diversity in peer companies, distance to nearest major airport and all the control variables. P-values (in parentheses) are 
corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: OLS and Fixed Effects 
  OLS  Fixed Effects 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance 
Ethnic Diversity -0.031* -0.030* 0.064* -0.034* -0.033** 0.064* 
 (0.071) (0.055) (0.055) (0.072) (0.038) (0.071) 
Chair/CEO duality 0.004 -0.002 0.021 0.006 -0.001 0.031 
 (0.574) (0.896) (0.428) (0.440) (0.934) (0.237) 
Insider Ratio -0.013 0.014 -0.027 -0.007 0.015 -0.034 
 (0.343) (0.635) (0.489) (0.606) (0.628) (0.405) 
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.730) (0.794) (0.520) (0.884) (0.961) (0.772) 
Female Ratio -0.037** -0.004 -0.036 -0.045** -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.028) (0.886) (0.429) (0.011) (0.932) (0.921) 
Longtail -0.016 0.057 -0.056 -0.020 0.065 -0.080 
 (0.251) (0.283) (0.348) (0.212) (0.216) (0.207) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.226) (0.215) (0.410) (0.307) (0.261) (0.475) 
Ln(TA) 0.012*** 0.048*** -0.032*** 0.012*** 0.044*** -0.015 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.399) 
LobHHI 0.011 -0.010 -0.025 0.011 -0.003 -0.023 
 (0.492) (0.751) (0.667) (0.576) (0.927) (0.740) 
GeoHHI -0.001 0.007 -0.088* -0.011 -0.002 -0.069 
 (0.965) (0.775) (0.093) (0.587) (0.935) (0.277) 
PC1 0.082*** 0.039 0.097**    
 (0.000) (0.195) (0.013)    
Mutual -0.004 0.030 -0.061 -0.027** 0.053 -0.124 
 (0.711) (0.242) (0.258) (0.013) (0.112) (0.111) 
Group -0.039*** 0.048** -0.061*    
 (0.000) (0.036) (0.087)    
Reinsurance -0.045*** 0.225***  -0.047*** 0.224***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.056**  0.777*** -0.044*  0.830*** 
 (0.013)  (0.000) (0.076)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.067*** -0.099*** -0.004 0.064*** -0.093*** 
 (0.133) (0.000) (0.000) (0.137) (0.000) (0.001) 
Asset Risk  -0.190*** -0.257**  -0.187** -0.235** 
  (0.010) (0.026)  (0.013) (0.048) 
Constant -0.068* -0.187** 0.382*** -0.037 -0.132 0.230 
 (0.093) (0.039) (0.004) (0.522) (0.280) (0.301) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.326 0.634 0.291 0.098 0.428 0.179 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Firm Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Instrumental Variables Regressions 
 Second Stage Results First Stage Results 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance Ethnic 
Diversity 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
Ethnic 
Diversity 
Peer Ethnic Diversity    115.220*** 115.205*** 115.267*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance to Airport    0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
    (0.018) (0.016) (0.025) 
Ethnic Diversity -0.032* -0.031* 0.056*    
 (0.060) (0.056) (0.085)    
Chair/CEO duality 0.004 -0.002 0.020 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.572) (0.868) (0.437) (0.224) (0.228) (0.210) 
Insider Ratio -0.013 0.013 -0.027 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.342) (0.649) (0.490) (0.322) (0.329) (0.350) 
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.735) (0.754) (0.524) (0.680) (0.707) (0.748) 
Female Ratio -0.037** -0.004 -0.038 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.027) (0.872) (0.407) (0.720) (0.734) (0.829) 
Longtail -0.016 0.056 -0.055 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.250) (0.299) (0.357) (0.081) (0.107) (0.053) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.228) (0.217) (0.408) (0.180) (0.194) (0.234) 
Ln(TA) 0.012*** 0.048*** -0.033*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.961) (0.535) (0.546) 
LobHHI 0.011 -0.012 -0.025 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.492) (0.706) (0.668) (0.293) (0.272) (0.296) 
GeoHHI -0.001 0.009 -0.089* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.961) (0.702) (0.084) (0.864) (0.912) (0.596) 
PC1 0.082*** 0.041 0.097** 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.169) (0.012) (0.488) (0.424) (0.314) 
Mutual -0.004 0.025 -0.059 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.700) (0.302) (0.265) (0.738) (0.742) (0.829) 
Group -0.039*** 0.044** -0.060* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.048) (0.093) (0.554) (0.498) (0.651) 
Reinsurance -0.045*** 0.225***  0.008*** 0.009***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.001)  
Leverage Risk -0.056**  0.775*** 0.005  0.011** 
 (0.013)  (0.000) (0.230)  (0.013) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.068*** -0.099*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.135) (0.000) (0.000) (0.760) (0.418) (0.445) 
Asset Risk  -0.193*** -0.262**  -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.009) (0.023)  (0.731) (0.636) 
Constant -0.069* -0.184** 0.383*** -74.205*** -74.196*** -74.231*** 
 (0.090) (0.034) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 
R-squared 0.325 0.643 0.294 0.994 0.994 0.994 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Wald F >10 >10 >10    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Furthermore, a one standard deviation increase in the ethnic diversity of the board would 
decrease asset risk by 3.2%, as measured by the proportion of common stock and junk bonds out 
of the total company investments. Leverage decreases by 3.1% when the board’s ethnic diversity 
increases by 1 standard deviation. The ability to use these different measures of risk in the 
insurance companies gives us an excellent opportunity to dissect whether board member diversity 
has an impact on the broad aspects of risk in the company or is just limited to certain decisions. 
For example, Giannetti and Zhao (2019) found that return volatility and cash/assets are 
significantly associated with a board’s ethnic diversity, and they explain that opinionated 
disagreement and inability to reach a consensus leads to this greater volatility. On the other hand, 
measuring the risk management tools directly, we show that differences in ethnic backgrounds 
leads to a decrease in the riskiness of the company.  
Figure 1-1: Ethnic Group Representation on the Board of Directors  
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1.4.2 Why Does the Board Ethnic Diversity Affect Risk? 
 Giannetti and Zhao (2019) suggested that greater performance volatility is created by the 
inability of board members to reach agreements and thereby steer the company in a concise 
direction. We, on the other hand, found that the riskiness of the company decreases when the 
board’s ethnic diversity increases. This decrease in risk could be due to differences in the board 
members’ risk approaches due to their ethnic backgrounds. In his study of leadership 
characteristics in different cultures, Hofstede (1985) identified that cultural characteristics such as 
uncertainty avoidance are evident in the leadership style of company leaders. The countries with 
closer uncertainty avoidance scores (commonly used after Hofstede’s [1985] paper) happen to be 
in the same ethnic groups as we divided them into our study.12 This allowed us to differentiate our 
ethnic groups into two categories: those with countries that have high UAI and low UAI, where 
uncertainty avoidance, as described by Hofstede (1985), is how resistant to change the individuals 
are. As such, a leader from (or with background from) a country that has a high UAI would be 
more resistant to change and steer the company more conservatively, thus, taking fewer risks and 
being less risk enamored. The opposite is true for leaders with an ethnic background from counties 
with low UAI. 
 Thus, we posit that the decrease in the riskiness of the company due to increased diversity 
is driven by the differences the directors’ uncertainty avoidance cultural backgrounds. This implies 
that if a board of directors has a mix of members from different uncertainty avoiding cultures, they 
would contradict each others’ opinions and, hence, decrease the riskiness of the company’s 
strategies. To proxy for the cultural values, we replaced our diversity measure by a ratio of board 
members from countries with high UAI and the number of board members from counties with low 
                                                 
12 High uncertainty avoiding cultures and ethnic groups include Latin and Eastern Europe. Low uncertainty avoiding cultures and 
ethnic groups include Anglo and Nordic Europe. 
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UAI out of the total number of board members (LUA). We tested whether an increase in HUA 
increased risk and whether an increase in LUA decreased risk. If this were the case, then we could 
explain that the decrease in company riskiness is due to a mix of cultural values represented on the 
board which leads to lower riskiness of the company.  
 Our results shown in Table 1-5 confirmed our explanation. An increase in the ratio of board 
members with ethnic backgrounds from countries with high UAI decreases all risk measures, and 
an increase in the proportion of board members with ethnic backgrounds from countries with low 
UAI increases all risk measures. This is in agreement with Giannetti and Zhao (2019) in the sense 
that disagreements between board members are the factors that steer the strategies of the company. 
Opposite to Giannetti and Zhao (2019), we find that these disagreements result in decreasing the 
riskiness of the company.  
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Table 1-5: Instrumental Variables Regressions: HUA and LUA 
This table presents the second stage of instrumental variables regressions of risk on HUA and LUA for the total sample. All variables 
are as described in Table 1-A1. The instrumented variables are HUA and LUA. The instruments are ethnic diversity in peer companies, 
distance to nearest major airport and all the control variables. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level 
and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Asset Risk Leverage 
Risk 
Reinsurance Asset Risk Leverage 
Risk 
Reinsurance 
HUA -0.086* -0.082* 0.149*    
 (0.072) (0.058) (0.084)    
LUA    0.045* 0.043* -0.078* 
    (0.056) (0.057) (0.083) 
Chair/CEO duality 0.004 -0.003 0.021 0.003 -0.003 0.021 
 (0.613) (0.859) (0.419) (0.614) (0.843) (0.413) 
Insider Ratio -0.014 0.013 -0.026 -0.014 0.013 -0.026 
 (0.314) (0.671) (0.493) (0.316) (0.662) (0.514) 
Board Size 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.625) (0.867) (0.451) (0.851) (0.666) (0.588) 
Female Ratio -0.044** -0.011 -0.026 -0.043** -0.010 -0.028 
 (0.018) (0.684) (0.576) (0.015) (0.709) (0.543) 
Longtail -0.012 0.061 -0.061 -0.015 0.058 -0.057 
 (0.410) (0.267) (0.310) (0.310) (0.292) (0.343) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.204) (0.196) (0.449) (0.166) (0.181) (0.466) 
Ln(TA) 0.010*** 0.046*** -0.030*** 0.011*** 0.047*** -0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
LobHHI 0.009 -0.015 -0.020 0.008 -0.015 -0.019 
 (0.637) (0.665) (0.736) (0.641) (0.640) (0.741) 
GeoHHI 0.007 0.016 -0.103* 0.003 0.013 -0.096* 
 (0.703) (0.503) (0.054) (0.850) (0.582) (0.064) 
PC1 0.082*** 0.042 0.096** 0.079*** 0.039 0.102*** 
 (0.000) (0.165) (0.013) (0.000) (0.198) (0.009) 
Mutual -0.014 0.015 -0.040 -0.005 0.024 -0.056 
 (0.287) (0.572) (0.444) (0.609) (0.342) (0.284) 
Group -0.035*** 0.048** -0.065* -0.038*** 0.045** -0.061* 
 (0.001) (0.034) (0.071) (0.000) (0.045) (0.088) 
Reinsurance -0.048*** 0.224***  -0.047*** 0.225***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.050**  0.765*** -0.053**  0.770*** 
 (0.039)  (0.000) (0.022)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.069*** -0.100*** -0.004 0.069*** -0.099*** 
 (0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk  -0.168** -0.310***  -0.188** -0.271** 
  (0.021) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.018) 
Constant -0.022 -0.139 0.302** -0.066 -0.181** 0.379*** 
 (0.611) (0.145) (0.027) (0.104) (0.039) (0.004) 
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 
R-squared 0.271 0.640 0.292 0.310 0.641 0.292 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Wald F >10 >10 >10 >10 >10 >10 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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1.4.2.1 Would the CEO Ethnic Origin Moderate the Effect of Board Ethnic Diversity on Risk? 
While the board of directors sets the direction of the company strategies, CEOs are 
responsible for operational decisions. It is important to account for any possible effect that the 
CEO ethnic origin could have on the relation between board ethnic diversity and risk. To address 
this issue, we controlled for the CEO having an ethnic origin from a culture with high UAI by 
introducing a dummy variable that takes the value of one if CEO has a cultural origin from Latin 
Europe or Eastern Europe (high UAI) and zero otherwise. We also controlled for CEO having an 
ethnic origin from a culture with low UAI in the same manner. We added interaction terms of this 
dummy variable with ethnic diversity to test for any moderating effect.  
We did not find a significant moderating effect of CEO ethnic origin on the main measures 
of risk that board ethnic diversity is significantly associated with, as presented in Table 1-6. We 
also did not find a significant effect of the CEO ethnic origin as measured by CEO having high 
UAI or low UAI ethnic origins on the measures of risk. Furthermore, the effect of board ethnic 
diversity remains significantly associated with risk in the direction initially concluded in our main 
tests.  
1.4.3 Is the Board Diversity Effect on Risk Dependant on the Contextual Environment of 
the Firm? 
The upper echelon theory and the aforementioned empirical literature suggest that the 
effect of board diversity might depend on the structure of the organization as well as the type and 
complexity of operations. We start with the analysis of the effect of business diversity as a measure 
of business complexity. We follow the results on the organizational structure presented by the 
difference between stock and mutual firms. 
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Table 1-6: Ethnic Diversity of Board Members and CEO’s Ethnic Origin 
This table presents OLS regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity with dummy variables and interaction terms to test for the effect of 
CEO ethnic background (CEO HUA (LUA)) and its moderating effect on the board ethnic diversity and risk relation. CEO HUA(LUA) x 
Ethn Div. are interaction terms of board ethnic diversity and CEO HUA(LUA). All variables are as described in Table 1-A1. P-values (in 
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance Asset Risk Leverage Risk Leverage Risk 
Ethnic Diversity -0.034* -0.035** 0.077** -0.046** -0.019 0.101** 
 (0.057) (0.039) (0.034) (0.011) (0.511) (0.027) 
CEO HUA 0.009 0.007 -0.043    
 (0.645) (0.795) (0.472)    
CEO HUA x Ethn Div. -0.004 -0.031 -0.022    
 (0.909) (0.554) (0.832)    
CEO LUA    0.014 -0.017 -0.030 
    (0.284) (0.379) (0.472) 
CEO LUA x Ethn Div.    0.023 -0.020 -0.054 
    (0.264) (0.503) (0.356) 
Chair/CEO duality 0.004 -0.002 0.021 0.004 -0.001 0.019 
 (0.571) (0.867) (0.432) (0.519) (0.939) (0.475) 
Insider Ratio -0.014 0.011 -0.022 -0.013 0.014 -0.026 
 (0.293) (0.708) (0.576) (0.318) (0.631) (0.514) 
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.753) (0.730) (0.546) (0.724) (0.801) (0.514) 
Female Ratio -0.038** -0.005 -0.034 -0.037** -0.002 -0.037 
 (0.023) (0.840) (0.458) (0.026) (0.950) (0.430) 
Longtail -0.018 0.052 -0.052 -0.016 0.057 -0.056 
 (0.208) (0.332) (0.384) (0.258) (0.288) (0.347) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.235) (0.227) (0.406) (0.221) (0.216) (0.417) 
Ln(TA) 0.013*** 0.049*** -0.034*** 0.012*** 0.048*** -0.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
LobHHI 0.012 -0.009 -0.027 0.012 -0.011 -0.027 
 (0.465) (0.770) (0.654) (0.469) (0.745) (0.646) 
GeoHHI -0.003 0.001 -0.081 -0.001 0.005 -0.087* 
 (0.843) (0.964) (0.120) (0.973) (0.823) (0.095) 
PC1 0.080*** 0.038 0.100** 0.082*** 0.040 0.097** 
 (0.000) (0.211) (0.010) (0.000) (0.190) (0.012) 
Mutual -0.003 0.030 -0.063 -0.003 0.030 -0.062 
 (0.766) (0.231) (0.242) (0.733) (0.250) (0.247) 
Group -0.039*** 0.045** -0.060 -0.039*** 0.047** -0.062* 
 (0.000) (0.050) (0.100) (0.000) (0.039) (0.081) 
Reinsurance -0.043*** 0.227***  -0.045*** 0.225***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.059***  0.784*** -0.055**  0.776*** 
 (0.009)  (0.000) (0.013)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.067*** -0.098*** -0.004 0.067*** -0.099*** 
 (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.156) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk  -0.211*** -0.230**  -0.193*** -0.260** 
  (0.004) (0.045)  (0.009) (0.024) 
Constant -0.074* -0.197** 0.402*** -0.076* -0.185** 0.402*** 
 (0.070) (0.027) (0.002) (0.053) (0.038) (0.003) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.322 0.630 0.286 0.326 0.635 0.293 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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1.4.3.1 Diversity of Lines of Business  
Canella et al. (2008) explained that the involvement and, hence, the reflection of board 
member values might depend on the contextual environment of the firm. Those personal values 
can be shaped by the ethnicity of the board members and affect the riskiness of the company 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Furthermore, Bernile et al. (2018), Frijns et al. (2016), and Anderson 
et al. (2011) found that the complexity of the operating environment could moderate the way the 
board of directors’ diversity affects the performance of the company. Thus, we tested whether the 
complexity of an insurance company’s business would affect the association of board diversity 
and the risk of a company. The upper echelon theory suggests that a more uncertain environment 
would allow the board to be more involved. This suggests that a firm operating in a more complex 
business environment could have a significantly different association between board diversity and 
risk than a firm operating in a less complex environment. We tested this empirically by measuring 
the business complexity using the company’s diversity of business, as measured by the Herfindahl 
index of net premiums written in different lines of business and different geographic regions. We 
created a dummy variable that took the value of one if the company was in the most diverse tercile 
according to lines of business by type (Top Lob Div)13 or zero otherwise. We created interaction 
terms between this dummy variable and our measure of ethnic diversity to test whether a more 
complex firm would have a different association between ethnic diversity and risk. Moreover, we 
assessed the complexity in terms of the geographic diversity of lines of business following the 
same procedure as with the business diversity type.  
  
                                                 
13 Most diverse tercile by lines of business (geographic and type) is the tercile that has the lowest LobHHI and GeoHHI.  
33 
 
Table 1-7: Contextual Environment Testing Regressions 
This table presents OLS regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity for the total sample with dummy variables and interaction terms to 
test for the difference across different contextual environments. All variables are as described in Table 1-A1. Panel A presents the 
results for stock versus mutual. Ethn Div x Mutual is the interaction term of Mutual and Ethnic Diversity. Panel B presents the results for 
observations from top tercile of diversity by geography of lines of business (the tercile with lowest GeoHHI) versus other observations. 
Ethn Div x Top Geo Div. is the interaction term of Ethnic Diversity and Top Geo Div. Panel C presents the results for observations from 
top tercile of diversity by type of lines of business (the tercile with lowest LoBHHI) versus other observations. Ethn Div x Top Lob Div. 
is the interaction term of Ethnic Diversity and Top Lob Div. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Organizational Structure of Firms: Stock versus Mutual 
 OLS Asset Risk OLS Leverage Risk OLS Reinsurance 
Ethnic Diversity -0.039** -0.031* 0.066* 
 (0.039) (0.070) (0.073) 
Mutual 0.064** 0.009 -0.013 
 (0.028) (0.883) (0.883) 
Mutual x Ethnic Diversity 0.038* 0.035 -0.069 
 (0.083) (0.524) (0.353) 
Constant -0.075* -0.188** 0.383*** 
 (0.072) (0.038) (0.004) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.321 0.635 0.291 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Lines of Business Geographic Diversity  
Ethnic Diversity -0.027 -0.030* 0.085** 
 (0.155) (0.055) (0.038) 
Top Geo Div -0.003 -0.002 -0.070 
 (0.869) (0.906) (0.174) 
Ethn Div x Top Geo Div -0.011 -0.002 -0.066 
 (0.673) (0.953) (0.359) 
Constant -0.069* -0.183** 0.344*** 
 (0.091) (0.038) (0.006) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.329 0.632 0.282 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 
Control Variables Yes, except GeoHHI Yes, except GeoHHI Yes, except GeoHHI 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Lines of Business Type Diversity 
Ethnic Divesity -0.021 -0.038** 0.064 
 (0.299) (0.013) (0.122) 
Top Lob Div -0.021 0.010 -0.012 
 (0.152) (0.735) (0.814) 
Ethn Div x Top Lob Div. -0.030 0.024 -0.004 
 (0.176) (0.527) (0.960) 
Constant -0.047 -0.196** 0.369*** 
 (0.204) (0.025) (0.001) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.329 0.633 0.292 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 
Control Variables Yes, except LobHHI Yes, except LobHHI Yes, except LobHHI 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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The results in Table 1-7 (Panels B and C) show that ethnic diversity of directors does not 
significantly affect the risk for firms whose lines of business are highly diversified either by type 
or geography. These results might be due to the greater geographic and type of business 
diversification being considered as an underwriting risk management mechanism by itself, thereby 
removing the need for other risk strategies. These results agree with the upper echelon theory that 
proposes greater board involvement in uncertain environments. The results disagree with Bernile 
et al. (2018) on the grounds of uncertainty, where they suggest that board diversity is less effective 
under greater uncertainty. Our results do not support the hypothesis that business complexity has 
a moderating effect. The complexity of business is brought by it being more diverse. Our results 
show that there is no significant relation between board diversity and risk measures. This shows 
that in more complex firms, board diversity relation to risk strategies in not significant. Frijns et 
al. (2016) find similar results regarding the performance of firms.   
1.4.3.2 Organizational Structure 
We also tested the contextual environment’s effect in terms of the organizational structure. 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) found that stock insurers have more risk than mutual insurers; 
they also found that stock insurers write relatively more business than do mutual insurers in lines 
and states having a higher risk. Additionally, Ho et al. (2013) stated that mutual insurers, relative 
to stock insurers, with larger boards, have a higher underwriting risk, and those with CEO duality 
have a lower leverage risk. These findings suggest that for insurance companies, the organizational 
structure (stock vs. mutual) could act as a significant contextual environment that can affect how 
board diversity could affect risk. Thus, we assessed whether board diversity in stock insurance 
companies was significantly associated with risk as compared to mutual insurers. Our results in 
Table 1-7 (panel A) show that the effect was significantly different for asset risk only. Ethnic 
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diversity significantly increased the asset risk for mutual companies, thus, indicating that board 
diversity for mutual companies increases asset risk significantly while decreasing it for stock 
companies.  
We conclude from our results that board diversity effect on risk strategies is not significant 
when the company’s business is highly diversified. As such, the greater diversity of business 
substitutes the need of board members to make decisions to control operational risk. Hence, their 
ethnic values are not evident in their decisions in that case. As for the organizational structure, we 
do not find consistent results supporting the moderating effect of the organizational structure.  
1.4.4 Does Board Ethnic Diversity Also Affect Performance? 
Board ethnic diversity could have a significant effect on performance as it affects the risk 
strategies. Frijins et al. (2016) found that board ethnic diversity decreases performance, while 
Nguyen et al. (2018) found that uncertainty avoidance of CEOs increases profitability under 
competitive pressure. We tested the effect of board ethnic diversity on various performance 
measures commonly used in insurance to complement our results on risk strategies. 
We performed instrumental variables regression analysis using our primary ethnic diversity 
measure as an explanatory variable and regressed it on five measures of performance. First, we 
used Return on Revenue, which is the sum of underwriting income, investment income and income 
from subsidiaries as a percentage of gross written premiums, to measure the profitability of the 
insurance company comparing its net income to revenue. Second, we used Investment Yield, 
defined as Net Investment Income divided by the difference between the average beginning of 
year and end of year invested assets and net investment income, to test the effect on a specific 
aspect of insurance revenue generated from investments. Third, we used Return on Assets and 
Return on Equity, which are standard measures used in corporate finance. And finally, we used 
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the Combined Ratio, where the latter is an insurance-specific measure of profitability concerned 
with underwriting activity. Combined Ratio is the sum of the loss ratio and expense ratio, where 
the loss ratio is incurred losses divided by earned premiums and the expense ratio is incurred 
underwriting expenses divided by the earned premiums. The higher the combined ratio, the less 
profitable the company is, thus we expect a negative relation of combined ratio with ethnic 
diversity, indicating an increase in profitability of the insurance company.  
Results presented in Table 1-8 show that board ethnic diversity is positively associated 
with Return on Revenue and Investment Yield. These results conclude that board ethnic diversity 
improves insurance firms’ performance generated both from investment activities. Return on 
assets and return on equity do not appear in our results to be significantly associated with board 
ethnic diversity. This could be due to them being not precisely reflecting the specifics of the 
insurance industry business. These specifics of insurance business are more accurately measured 
by the other measures of performance used in our analysis and found to be significantly associated 
with board ethnic diversity. 
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Table 1-8: Ethnic Diversity and Performance 
This table presents instrumental variables regressions of performance measures on board ethnic diversity. All variables are as 
described in Table 1-A1. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Investment 
Yield 
Return on 
Revenue 
Return on 
Equity 
Return on 
Assets 
Combined 
Ratio 
Ethnic Diversity 0.549* 11.283* 1.910 0.703 -0.290 
 (0.087) (0.054) (0.308) (0.235) (0.939) 
Chair/CEO duality -0.184 -3.096 0.612 0.369 -1.909 
 (0.572) (0.515) (0.647) (0.419) (0.512) 
Insider Ratio -0.031 -2.365 -0.202 -0.403 3.830 
 (0.916) (0.722) (0.901) (0.514) (0.409) 
Board Size 0.044* 0.436 0.092 0.036 -0.213 
 (0.090) (0.311) (0.554) (0.480) (0.455) 
Female Ratio -1.237** -1.238 6.249** 1.500* -5.961 
 (0.010) (0.841) (0.017) (0.081) (0.213) 
Ln(TA) 0.381*** 1.115 0.009 0.009 -0.406 
 (0.000) (0.462) (0.986) (0.967) (0.766) 
GeoHHI 0.247 3.686 -1.631 -0.645 6.978** 
 (0.428) (0.478) (0.291) (0.276) (0.043) 
LobHHI -0.257 1.846 2.097 0.872 -4.411 
 (0.405) (0.784) (0.236) (0.197) (0.291) 
PC1 0.471** -6.015 3.703** 1.404** -3.072 
 (0.024) (0.377) (0.020) (0.022) (0.481) 
Mutual 0.127 -1.333 0.290 0.407 -3.904* 
 (0.475) (0.717) (0.803) (0.381) (0.074) 
Group -0.132 0.379 -0.819 -0.398 0.291 
 (0.408) (0.933) (0.443) (0.353) (0.919) 
Asset Risk 1.944 0.448 6.500 -0.825 -13.177 
 (0.188) (0.981) (0.391) (0.770) (0.376) 
Reinsurance 0.290 4.573 -1.853 -0.895 2.589 
 (0.300) (0.554) (0.371) (0.263) (0.641) 
Leverage Risk -1.465*** -42.363** 3.414 -1.740 4.672 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.360) (0.201) (0.587) 
NPW/Surplus -0.164** 0.874 -0.774 -0.178 0.294 
 (0.033) (0.577) (0.148) (0.261) (0.775) 
Constant 3.428*** 35.415* 7.636 4.984** 102.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.091) (0.220) (0.047) (0.000) 
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 2,067 
R-squared 0.362 0.0518 0.0917 0.0621 0.0399 
Number of firms 187 187 187 187 187 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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1.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
1.5.1 Alternative Measures of Diversity 
In our main results presented in Table 1-4, we used a measure of diversity calculated using 
the Herfindahl Index of ten ethnic groups, which could be criticized for exaggerating the ethnic 
diversity of the board members using too many ethnic groups. To minimize this possibility, we 
used the absolute value of the difference between the number of board members with origins from 
high uncertainty avoiding countries and the number of board members with origins from low 
uncertainty avoiding counties (Equation 3) as an alternative measure of board diversity. An 
increase in this absolute difference shows that there is less diversity. A higher absolute difference 
indicates that one of the groups could dominate the other; further, a decrease in the absolute 
difference shows that there is more diversity and that the two groups are more equally represented 
on the board, which allows for a decrease in risk.   
𝐴𝑏𝑠 (𝐻𝑈𝐴 − 𝐿𝑈𝐴) = |𝐻𝑈𝐴 − 𝐿𝑈𝐴|  (3) 
The results are presented in Table 1-9 and are in agreement with our main ethnic diversity 
results. An increase in the difference between the number of HUA and LUA directors (meaning a 
decrease in diversity) decreased the reinsurance and increased asset risk and leverage risk, which 
is consistent with our initial results in which greater board diversity decreased the riskiness of the 
company. 
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Table 1-9: Alternative Measures of Diversity 
This table presents the second stage results of instrumental variables regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity. Ethnic diversity is 
alternatively measured as the absolute value of the difference between the ratio of HUA directors and LUA directors on the board. A higher 
value of Abs(HUA-LUA) indicates lower diversity were there are more directors of one type and a lower value indicates more diversity. All 
other variables are as described in Table 1-A1. The instrumented variables are Abs(HUA-LUA). The instruments are ethnic diversity in peer 
companies and distance to nearest major airport and all the control variables. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the 
insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance 
Abs(HUA-LUA) 0.026* 0.026* -0.046* 
 (0.068) (0.056) (0.085) 
Chair/CEO duality 0.003 -0.003 0.021 
 (0.648) (0.827) (0.413) 
Insider Ratio -0.013 0.013 -0.027 
 (0.328) (0.658) (0.496) 
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.761) (0.744) (0.530) 
Female Ratio -0.037** -0.004 -0.038 
 (0.029) (0.870) (0.402) 
Longtail -0.014 0.058 -0.058 
 (0.331) (0.282) (0.329) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.241) (0.221) (0.397) 
Ln(TA) 0.012*** 0.048*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GeoHHI -0.000 0.009 -0.090* 
 (0.994) (0.689) (0.079) 
LobHHI 0.012 -0.012 -0.025 
 (0.491) (0.713) (0.668) 
PC1 0.082*** 0.041 0.096** 
 (0.000) (0.169) (0.012) 
Mutual -0.006 0.022 -0.054 
 (0.558) (0.356) (0.301) 
Group -0.039*** 0.045** -0.059* 
 (0.000) (0.047) (0.093) 
Reinsurance -0.044*** 0.226***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.056**  0.772*** 
 (0.014)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.068*** -0.099*** 
 (0.147) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk  -0.189*** -0.269** 
  (0.010) (0.020) 
Constant -0.063 -0.179** 0.374*** 
 (0.113) (0.041) (0.004) 
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,067 
R-squared 0.321 0.643 0.302 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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1.5.2 Ethnic Diversity Measure Accounting for Family Name Changes 
Changing the family name of an individual to their spouse’s family name is a common 
practice in some cultures (for example, Eastern European and Anglo). The family name change 
might affect the accuracy of identifying the ethnic origin of the individual if the family name of 
the spouse and the individual are rooted in different ethnic groups. We tried to minimize this 
problem by excluding females, who are the main group of individuals in our sample time frame 
who could have family name changes and recalculating the ethnic diversity measure for each 
company. We also adjusted the other board measures to reflect the exclusion of the females from 
the sample.  
Excluding females from the sample does not change the main conclusion of our results and 
maintain the same direction of the relation between board ethnic diversity and risk. Results 
presented in Table 1-11 show that board ethnic diversity maintains a significant positive 
association with reinsurance and significant negative association with asset risk.  
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Table 1-10: Instrumental Variables Regressions of Board Ethnic Diversity and Risk 
without Females 
This table presents the second stage results of instrumental variables regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity. Ethnic Diversity is measured 
removing all females from the sample to avoid a measurement error in identifying the ethnic origin if a female changes her family name upon 
marriage. All board characteristics variables are also adjusted to the exclusion of females on the board. All other variables are as described in 
Table 1-A1. The instrumented variable is ethnic diversity excluding females. The instruments are ethnic diversity excluding females in peer 
companies and distance to nearest major airport and all the control variables. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer 
level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance 
Ethnic Diversity -0.033** -0.023 0.073** 
 (0.018) (0.130) (0.025) 
Chair/CEO duality -0.002 0.004 0.004 
 (0.659) (0.573) (0.774) 
Insider Ratio -0.016 0.002 -0.010 
 (0.220) (0.936) (0.768) 
Board Size 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.192) (0.424) (0.684) 
Longtail -0.017 0.057 -0.058 
 (0.211) (0.293) (0.332) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.134) (0.198) (0.425) 
Ln(TA) 0.012*** 0.048*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GeoHHI -0.004 0.010 -0.091* 
 (0.824) (0.670) (0.080) 
LobHHI 0.013 -0.013 -0.025 
 (0.425) (0.697) (0.674) 
PC1 0.079*** 0.040 0.092** 
 (0.000) (0.178) (0.016) 
Mutual -0.002 0.024 -0.060 
 (0.838) (0.314) (0.259) 
Group -0.038*** 0.045** -0.062* 
 (0.000) (0.048) (0.086) 
Reinsurance -0.042*** 0.226***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.055**  0.775*** 
 (0.016)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.068*** -0.099*** 
 (0.151) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk  -0.190*** -0.241** 
  (0.009) (0.034) 
Constant -0.072* -0.169* 0.386*** 
 (0.072) (0.054) (0.004) 
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,067 
R-squared 0.347 0.644 0.294 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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1.5.3 Boards with High UAI Majority of Directors 
Our sample contains 69% of board members with Anglo origins. The Anglo group has low 
Uncertainty Avoiding Index. We may observe a decrease in risk due to increased ethnic diversity 
because the dominating group of Anglos is diluted with ethnic groups of relatively higher 
Uncertainty Avoiding Index, thus creating a decreasing effect on risk. We tested this possible 
outcome using a sample of firms with majority board members with ethnic origins with high 
Uncertainty Avoiding Index. We included a dummy variable (Majority HUA), which takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has more than 50 percent of board members from high uncertainty avoiding 
origins and zero otherwise. We created an interaction term Majority HUA x Ethnic Diversity to 
test for the possible difference in the effect of ethnic diversity on risk for such firms. If the dilution 
of majority of certain ethnic group’s cultural values (specifically Uncertainty Avoidance) is 
driving the results of ethnic diversity decreasing risk, then we would expect the opposite effect for 
firms with majority board members with ethnic origins with high uncertainty avoiding cultural 
values.  
The results presented in Table 1-11 show that having a majority of HUA board members 
does not significantly change the decreasing effect of board ethnic diversity on risk. To further test 
this result, we used Majority Germanic group14 instead of Majority HUA and find that having a 
majority of specific ethnic origin increases risk while not affecting the effect of ethnic diversity on 
risk.  
  
                                                 
14 Results are not presented but are available upon request. 
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Table 1-11: Regressions of Board Ethnic Diversity and Risk with Majority HUA Board 
Members 
This table presents OLS regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity for the total sample with dummy variables and 
interaction terms for the effect of board ethnic diversity when the majority (more than fifty percent) of board members 
are with ethnic origins from high uncertainty avoiding cultures. Maj. HUA x Ethn Div. is the interaction term of Majority 
HUA and Ethnic Diversity. All other variables are as described in Table 1-A1. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected 
for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance 
Ethnic Diversity -0.031* -0.028* 0.069** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.043) 
Majority HUA 0.012 0.000 -0.130* 
 (0.585) (0.999) (0.062) 
Maj. HUA x Ethn Div. -0.006 -0.062 -0.063 
 (0.910) (0.551) (0.665) 
Chair/CEO duality 0.004 -0.002 0.018 
 (0.556) (0.902) (0.504) 
Insider Ratio -0.012 0.016 -0.030 
 (0.368) (0.594) (0.458) 
Board Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.725) (0.832) (0.523) 
Female Ratio -0.034** 0.005 -0.060 
 (0.042) (0.852) (0.168) 
Longtail -0.016 0.057 -0.056 
 (0.249) (0.281) (0.344) 
ROA -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.284) (0.281) (0.274) 
Ln(TA) 0.013*** 0.049*** -0.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LobHHI 0.013 -0.006 -0.036 
 (0.403) (0.858) (0.540) 
GeoHHI -0.004 -0.001 -0.066 
 (0.807) (0.972) (0.183) 
PC1 0.082*** 0.040 0.091** 
 (0.000) (0.186) (0.019) 
Mutual -0.003 0.032 -0.066 
 (0.762) (0.190) (0.216) 
Group -0.040*** 0.045** -0.052 
 (0.000) (0.049) (0.144) 
Reinsurance -0.042*** 0.230***  
 (0.001) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.059***  0.783*** 
 (0.008)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.004 0.067*** -0.097*** 
 (0.131) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk  -0.198*** -0.232** 
  (0.006) (0.044) 
Constant -0.076* -0.206** 0.428*** 
 (0.054) (0.025) (0.002) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.329 0.630 0.296 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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1.5.4 Alternative Risk Time Frame 
Our main results are based on contemporaneous measures of risk, measuring how the 
diversity of the board in a certain year would affect the riskiness of the company in that same year. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the board of directors was appointed (or a change in diversity 
happened) later in the year and that their decisions would also be evident in the following year’s 
company riskiness. Noting that, even if the decisions of the board members came into effect in the 
contemporaneous year, these would most probably also continue into at least the next year as well. 
Hence, we re-ran the main tests using t+1 risk measures (as presented in Equation 4) to ensure that 
our results were also valid. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛼𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛.𝑑𝑖𝑣.𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑊𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡   
(4) 
The results in Table 1-12 show that ethnic diversity’s effect on both asset risk and leverage risk 
remained significant one year after the board’s diversity increased. However, the effect on asset 
risk is no longer significant, this could be due to that asset risk can be quickly changed overnight 
whenever the decision to do so occurs, while other measures might need some time to be 
implemented.  
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Table 1-12: One Year Forward Measures of Risk 
This table presents the second stage results of instrumental variables regressions of risk on board ethnic diversity with risk 
measures being one year forward. All variables are as described in Table 1-A1. The instrumented variable is ethnic diversity. 
The instruments are ethnic diversity in peer companies and distance to nearest major airport and all the control variables. P-
values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Asset Risk t+1 Leverage Risk t+1 Reinsurance t+1 
    
Ethnic Diversity -0.024 -0.032** 0.103*** 
 (0.122) (0.037) (0.007) 
Chair/CEO duality 0.008 0.006 0.005 
 (0.315) (0.601) (0.881) 
Insider Ratio -0.001 0.002 -0.018 
 (0.968) (0.937) (0.661) 
Board Size 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.624) (0.993) (0.210) 
Female Ratio -0.025 -0.016 -0.054 
 (0.140) (0.534) (0.359) 
Longtail -0.010 0.006 -0.021 
 (0.500) (0.865) (0.713) 
ROA 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.643) (0.160) (0.498) 
Ln(TA) 0.011*** 0.041*** -0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LobHHI 0.004 0.013 -0.156*** 
 (0.843) (0.604) (0.000) 
GeoHHI -0.001 -0.020 0.024 
 (0.930) (0.525) (0.637) 
PC1 0.085*** 0.063** 0.059 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.130) 
Mutual -0.005 0.025 -0.021 
 (0.593) (0.274) (0.664) 
Group -0.038*** 0.063*** 0.010 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.793) 
Reinsurance -0.038** 0.194***  
 (0.014) (0.000)  
Leverage Risk -0.062***  0.553*** 
 (0.009)  (0.000) 
NPW/Surplus -0.005 0.053*** -0.065*** 
 (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Risk  -0.186** -0.192 
  (0.026) (0.192) 
Constant -0.050 -0.063 0.664*** 
 (0.212) (0.451) (0.000) 
Observations 1,917 1,917 1,946 
R-squared 0.324 0.618 0.250 
Number of Firms 182 182 185 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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1.5.5 Hofstede Cultural Values: Individualism, Masculinity-Femininity and Power 
Distance 
We use in our primary analysis Hofstede Uncertainty Avoidance Index to proxy for the 
cultural values of board members since this cultural value is most closely related to individuals’ 
risk values. We want to make sure that we are using the right proxy for risk rather than it be driven 
by other cultural values developed by Hofstede of a certain group such as Individualism, 
Masculinity-Femininity, or Power Distance. We applied the same approach to the three cultural 
values as we did with Uncertainty Avoidance, where a group with a high value of a certain Index 
are the ethnic groups with the top 20 percent of the Index average and those with low value are the 
ones with the bottom 20 percent. We then calculated the ratios of board members with those values 
and regressed our main risk measures on them. The results in Table 1-13 show that none of the 
additional three Hofstede cultural values has a significant effect on the risk measures, which 
confirms the correctness of using the Uncertainty Avoidance Index as a proxy for cultural values 
in our main analysis. This also confirms that any other cultural value does not drive the effect.  
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Table 1-13: Individualism, Masculinity-Femininity and Power Distance Cultural Values 
This table presents OLS regressions of risk on three dimensions of Hofstede cultural values. All variables are as described in Table 1-A1. 
Panel A presents the results of the effect of board members’ ratios with low and high Hofstede Individualism Index on risk. Panel B presents 
the results of the effect of board members’ ratios with low and high Hofstede Masculinity-Femininity Index on risk.  Panel C presents the 
results of the effect of board members’ ratios with low and high Hofstede Power Distance Index on risk.  P-values (in parentheses) are 
corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 Panel A: Low and High Hofstede Individualism Index  
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance  Asset Risk Leverage 
Risk 
Reinsurance 
HIDVI 0.011 -0.004 -0.006     
 (0.505) (0.820) (0.887)     
LIDVI     0.025 0.116 0.029 
     (0.677) (0.105) (0.877) 
Constant -0.052 -0.164* 0.341***  -0.048 -0.170* 0.338** 
 (0.194) (0.073) (0.010)  (0.201) (0.065) (0.011) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069  2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.327 0.637 0.284  0.327 0.637 0.283 
Number of Firms 187 187 187  187 187 187 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Low and High Hofstede Masculinity Index (Low Masculinity is same as High Femininity) 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance 
HMASFEMI 0.013 -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.437) (0.990) (0.999)    
LMASFEMI    -0.016 0.053 -0.052 
    (0.833) (0.612) (0.815) 
Constant -0.054 -0.166* 0.339** -0.048 -0.166* 0.339** 
 (0.187) (0.070) (0.010) (0.208) (0.071) (0.010) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.326 0.637 0.283 0.327 0.637 0.284 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Low and High Hofstede Power Distance Index 
 Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance Asset Risk Leverage Risk Reinsurance 
LPDI 0.011 -0.004 -0.006    
 (0.505) (0.820) (0.887)    
HPDI    -0.047 -0.029 -0.047 
    (0.415) (0.667) (0.415) 
Constant -0.052 -0.164* 0.341*** -0.048 -0.166* -0.048 
 (0.194) (0.073) (0.010) (0.205) (0.071) (0.205) 
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 
R-squared 0.327 0.637 0.284 0.321 0.637 0.321 
Number of Firms 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prov. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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1.6 CONCLUSION 
 We provided evidence on the effect of board diversity, as represented by ethnic diversity, 
upon companies’ risk. We conjecture that ethnic diversity of the board decreases the riskiness of 
the company through the different ethnic values of the board members affecting the decisions. The 
differences in board members’ cultural values associated with their risk preferences lead to 
disagreements and overall adopting less risky strategies. Moreover, board ethnic diversity 
improves the companies’ performance, and causality is established using instrumental variables. 
We also tested whether this effect was dependant on the contextual environment and found that 
whenever the business is already well-diversified, the risk strategies are not significantly affected 
by board diversity. Whereas the organizational structure of the company does not consistently 
moderate the effect of board diversity on risk. The results of this study are robust to endogeneity 
issues, the time frame of decisions, possible name changes of female directors, CEO ethnic 
background, and use of UAI as a proxy of cultural values. 
 This study could be extended to other aspects of corporate decisions and outcomes which 
are made by board members. Given the very recent attention of stakeholders, legislators, and media 
to increasing ethnic and racial diversity, it is important to address such questions and explore the 
importance of such diversity. Currently, this aspect is understudied both in accounting and finance 
literature, where we need to know more how ethnic and racial backgrounds of senior management 
and board members would play a role in company financial outcomes and governance. 
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1.7 APPENDIX 
Table 1-A1: Description of Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Board Characteristics: 
Ethnic Diversityit 
Negative of Diversity Herfindahl Index of board members’ ethnic backgrounds 
defined as 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = − ∑ (
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠
)2101  
Chair/CEO Dualityit 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Chair of the board of insurer i is also the CEO of that 
insurer i  in year  t  and 0 otherwise. 
Insider Ratioit 
Proportion of insiders of the total board size, where an insider is any current or 
previous company officer serving on the board of directors. 
Board Sizeit Total number of directors on the board. 
Female Ratioit The ratio of females to total board size. 
LUAit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with lowest 
20%  Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
HUAit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with highest 
20% Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
CEO LUAit 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO of firm i in year t belongs to a group of cultural 
original with lowest 20% Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index and 0 otherwise. 
CEO HUAit 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the CEO of firm i in year t belongs to a group of cultural 
original with highest 20% Hofstede uncertainty avoidance index and 0 otherwise. 
Majority HUAit 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the more than 50 percent of board members of firm i in 
year t belong to a group of cultural original with highest 20% Hofstede uncertainty 
avoidance index and 0 otherwise. 
HIDVIit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with highest 
20% Hofstede individualism index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
LIDVIit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with lowest 
20% Hofstede individualism index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
HMASFEMIit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with highest 
20% Hofstede masculinity-femininity index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
LMASFEMIit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with lowest 
20% Hofstede masculinity-femininity index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
HPDIit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with highest 
20% Hofstede power distance index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
LPDIit 
Proportion of board members who belong to a group of cultural original with lowest 
20% Hofstede power distance index of GLOBE groups’ averages. 
Risk Measures:  
Asset Riskit 
The sum of common stock and junk bonds invested divided by total assets, defined 
as : 
𝐶𝑆+𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝐴
 
Leverage Riskit 1 minus surplus over total assets, defined as:1 −
𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠
𝑇𝐴
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Reinsuranceit 
The sum of premiums written ceded divided by the sum of direct and assumed 
premiums written, defined as:  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛 
 
Performance Measures: 
RoRit 
Return on Revenue is the sum of underwriting income, investment income 
(excluding gains) and income from subsidiaries as a percentage of gross written 
premiums. 
InvYieldit 
Investment Yield is defined as Net Investment Income divided by the difference 
between Average Beginning of Year and End of Year Invested Assets and Net 
Investment Income. 
ROAit Return on Assets is measured as net income before taxes divided by total assets. 
ROEit Return on Equity is measured as net income before taxes divided by total equity. 
Combined Ratioit 
Combined Ratio is the sum of the loss ratio and expense ratio. Where the loss ratio is 
incurred losses (including the loss adjustment expense) divided by earned premiums 
and the expense ratio is incurred underwriting expenses divided by the earned 
premiums. 
Company Characteristics:  
Longtaili,t  
Longtail is measured as unpaid claims and adjustment expenses divided by total 
liabilities. 
Ln(TA)it The natural logarithm of total assets. 
LoBHHIit Herfindahl index for insurer i’s net premiums written in year t by line of business. 
GeoHHIit Herfindahl index for insurer i’s net premiums written in year t by province. 
PC1it 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is a domestic company and zero if it is a 
foreign branch. 
Mutualit 
Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is a mutual insurance company and zero if it 
is stock. 
Groupit Binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is part of a group and zero otherwise. 
NPW/Surplusit Net premiums divided by surplus. 
 
Instrumental Variables 
Peer Ethnic Diversityit 
Average ethnic diversity of board members’ Herfindahl Index of peer firms of 
insurer i in year t. 
Distance to Airportit Distance to nearest major international airport from firm’s headquarters. 
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2 PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND ACCOUNTING ESTIMATES: 
CULTURAL ORIGIN, GENDER AND REPORTED LOSS RESERVES  
 
  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 “Cultivating a culture that fosters diversity and inclusion is a business imperative all firms and employers 
need to consider … as critical means for organizational growth and success.” 
-  Barry C. Melancon, CPA, CGMA 
President & CEO, American Institute of CPAs, 
CEO, Association of International Certified Professional Accountants 
Firms are investing millions of dollars to increase their diversity and inclusion as a means 
to grow their business and be successful. For example, Google spent $114 million on diversity 
programs in 2014 and $150 million in 2015 (Newkirk, 2019). Governments passed bills stipulating 
the importance of ethnic and gender diversity among management.15 Theoretical evidence 
suggested that personal values of top management affect their decisions (upper echelon theory 
proposed by Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and cultural values influence accounting values and 
systems (Gray, 1988). Despite theoretical evidence and legislators’ and corporations’ increased 
efforts for diversity and inclusion, accounting and finance empirical literature lacks an answer to 
whether and how ethnic (cultural) origin and gender of managers affect corporate decisions and 
financial reporting. 
We address these questions by testing whether gender and cultural origin of actuaries and 
CEOs affect the accuracy of loss reserves, the drivers of this effect, and whether background 
homogeneity could act as a moderator. We show that the cultural origin of actuaries is significantly 
associated with the accuracy of loss reserves, consistent with the upper echelon theory. We provide 
evidence that this association stems from the effect of the actuaries’ cultural values on accounting 
                                                 
15 In the U.S., the U.S. House Financial Services Committee at 116th Congress passed, on July 11, 2019, bills H.R. 281, H.R. 1018 
and H.R. 3279 which require companies to annually disclose gender, race, and ethnicity of their directors, nominees, and senior 
executive officers and the Federal Reserve Bank to interview at least one individual reflective of ethnic diversity when appointing 
a regional bank president. In Canada, the passage of Bill C-25 on May 1, 2018 requires corporations to place before the shareholders 
information regarding the ethnic diversity of directors and the members of senior management. And, in the U.K., the Parker Review 
Committee on October 24, 2017 recommended that the boardrooms of the UK’s leading public companies increase the ethnic 
diversity of UK boards. 
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values (Conservatism) as proposed by Gray’s theory (1988).  Furthermore, we show evidence that 
the greater conservative female effect is only significant in certain situations (underreserving). 
Additionally, we show that cultural background homogeneity of actuaries and CEOs could only 
play a moderating role when the cultural values of the actuary alone do not have enough influence 
on the accuracy of loss reserves. 
We provide empirical evidence that actuaries with Anglo (Latin European) cultural origin 
decrease (increase) the accuracy of loss reserves by 0.5%. We show that this effect is driven by 
the cultural values of the Appointed Actuary. Actuaries with higher (lower) Uncertainty 
Avoidance, higher (lower) Power Distance, and lower (higher) Individualism cultural values are 
significantly associated with greater (lower) accuracy of loss reserves. As for Masculinity-
Femininity cultural value, we show that having a cultural origin with higher Masculinity (but not 
femininity) is associated with lower accuracy of loss reserves. A one point increase (decrease) in 
Uncertainty Avoidance (individualism) is associated with a 1.5% increase (decrease) in the 
accuracy of loss reserves. Given that the average loss reserves are $1,118,637, a 1.5% discrepancy 
would result in $16,780 under/over reserving, which would be reflected on the earnings of the 
company. Additionally, a one point increase in power distance would increase the accuracy of loss 
reserves by 1.6%. Our results are consistent with upper echelon theory that management values do 
affect their decisions. They are also consistent with the propositions of Gray’s theory (1988) on 
how Hofstede’s (1980) cultural values influence Conservatism. These results are robust to 
endogeneity and family name changes. We establish causality by using instrumental variables and 
quasi-experimental analysis for the cultural value (Uncertainty Avoidance) considered relevant for 
Conservatism by the majority of previous literature (see Salter, Kang, Gotti & Doupnik, 2013). 
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Additionally, our results shed light on why there might be no general conclusiveness 
regarding the gender effect on financial reporting. We show that female actuaries significantly 
increase the accuracy of loss reserves only when they are underestimated. This effect is consistent 
with the general economics and psychology literature, which posits that females are more risk-
averse on average. As for the results of the effect of CEOs’ genders, they do not hold consistent 
after controlling for endogeneity and analyzing them across time. This hints to the presence of 
selection bias, which pushed companies to hire more female CEOs after the recent financial crisis. 
Also, the significant effect of Masculinity but not Femininity cultural value could serve as an 
additional indication of the weakness of female effect on loss reserve accuracy in general terms 
versus specific situations.  
Our study uses Appointed Actuaries and CEOs from 1,900 U.S. property and casualty 
insurance companies over the period from 2005 to 2013. The use of such a dataset allows us to 
directly study the effect of the personal background of the main decision-makers on an accounting 
estimate (loss reserves) without being masked by other decisions that the managers have to account 
for. The role of the Appointed Actuary is almost solely to estimate the loss reserves, which is 
further approved (point estimate is chosen) by management. We use first names to identify the 
gender and last names to identify the cultural origin of an individual. The use of an epidemiological 
approach (last names to identify cultural origin) separates the effect of the culture from the 
institutional and economic environment. Separating the impact of the culture allows us to directly 
test Gray’s theory (1988) that cultural values influence accounting values, which previous studies 
could not do using cross-country analysis (Fernández, 2010; Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2004). Using 
the magnitude of the loss reserve error allows us to test Gray’s theory (1988) regarding 
Conservatism accounting value. Using insurance companies gives access to both private and public 
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companies and financial institutions, which are frequently excluded from literature due to the 
scarcity of data and are highly regulated. But if we find significant results in a highly regulated 
industry, it would serve as evidence that non-regulated industries could have an even stronger 
effect. We use ordinary least square regressions to conduct our main tests and control for 
endogeneity using instrumental variables and state fixed effects. We also run a series of robustness 
checks and confirm our results still hold significant. 
Finally, we make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the financial 
reporting literature by testing the effect of cultural origin and gender on accounting decisions and 
reporting. We fill the gap in accounting literature, which so far lacks tests on the impact of the 
national culture (Plöckinger, Aschauer, Hiebl, & Rohatschek, 2016). The only study outside of the 
international cross-country analysis is Clikeman, Geiger, and O’Connell (2001), who study the 
effect of students’ national culture on perceptions on earnings management. Their study is limited 
to students and based on laboratory experiments. We provide evidence using archival data on real 
decisions made. Additionally, by studying the effect of the two main decision-makers having 
different statuses in the company regarding a specific accounting estimate, we provide direct and 
clear evidence to the inconclusive literature of gender effect on corporate decisions. 
Second, we contribute to the international accounting literature that studies the effect of 
cultural values on accounting values and systems. This literature extensively focused on cross- 
country analysis (Leuz & Wysocki, 2016) either at the firm level or individual level to test cultural 
values’ effect on accounting values of Gray’s theory (1988). By using the epidemiological 
approach, we are able to separate the effect of cultural values from any other institutional, 
economic, or country fixed effect that could not be controlled for by using cross-country 
(Fernández, 2010) analysis, as was used in previous literature (Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2004).  
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Third, Plöckinger et al. (2016), in a literature review of the upper echelon theory and 
financial reporting, shows that research is needed on the intra top management team decision 
making. Zhang (2019) also notes that accounting literature lacks studies accounting for the impact 
of joint top management characteristics on financial reporting, despite the practical knowledge that 
one single executive rarely makes such decisions. We contribute to fill this gap in the literature 
and provide evidence on the effect of cultural origin homogeneity of CEO and actuary on the 
accuracy of loss reserves and its moderating effect.  
Broadly, our study contributes to the literature that studies the effect of personal 
characteristics of management on corporate decision making by studying the cultural origin and 
gender on a decision that is directly and almost solely related to a specific decision-maker. We 
also contribute to the limited literature (Karolyi, 2016) that studies the effect of culture on 
corporate decisions by showing that cultural origin is persistent and significant. Additionally, we 
contribute to recent insurance literature that attributes a behavioral aspect of a decision on loss 
reserves (Berry-Stölzle, Eastman, & Xu, 2018) by showing that cultural values of actuaries are 
associated with loss reserve accuracy. Finally, this study is important for legislators and 
stakeholders to make evidence-based decisions on increasing diversity and inclusion. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds in the usual fashion. We provide background and 
literature review on culture and gender concerning financial reporting and introduce loss reserves 
and the role of the actuary in section II. Then we present our research design in section III and 
provide our results in section IV. A series of robustness checks follow this in section V, and we 
briefly conclude in section VII. 
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2.2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 Cultural Origin and Accounting Estimates 
Corporations are facing increasing pressure to increase the ethnic representation among the 
top management team.16 Ethnicity stems from the cultural origin, which shapes the cultural values 
of top management and affects the decisions they make (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Gray (1988) 
proposed that cultural (societal) values affect accounting values which in turn influence the 
accounting systems. He uses Hofstede's (1980) cultural value dimensions of Power Distance, 
Masculinity-Femininity, Individualism, and Uncertainty Avoidance to develop hypotheses on how 
these influence accounting values of Conservatism, Secrecy, Professionalism, and Uniformity.  
2.2.1.1 Hofstede Cultural Values 
Hofstede (1980), in his foundational work based on a survey of 116,000 IBM employees, 
identified four cultural value dimensions: Power Distance, Masculinity-Femininity, Individualism, 
and Uncertainty Avoidance. These dimensions are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100 by 
comparing the countries. We present below a brief description of each of Hofstede's (1980) 
dimensions, along with accounting literature that associates those values to accounting decisions 
and measures. 
Power Distance (PD) is the extent to which the members of a society accept power 
inequality. Power Distance dimension is not frequently included in the accounting studies. Gray’s 
theory (1988) associates PD with Professionalism, Secrecy, and Uniformity but does not make any 
                                                 
16 The U.S. House Financial Services Committee at 116th Congress passed, on July 11, 2019, bills H.R. 281, H.R. 1018 and H.R. 
3279 which require companies to annually disclose gender, race, and ethnicity of their directors, nominees, and senior executive 
officers and the Federal Reserve Bank to interview at least one individual reflective of ethnic diversity when appointing a regional 
bank president (116th Congress, 2019). In Canada, the passage of Bill C-2516 on May 1, 2018 at the first session of Forty-second 
Parliament, requires corporations to place before the shareholders information regarding the ethnic diversity of directors and the 
members of senior management. In the U.K., the Parker Review Committee released its final report on the ethnic diversity of UK 
boards, on October 24, 2017, which recommends that the boardrooms of the UK’s leading public companies increase the ethnic 
diversity of UK boards (Parker, 2017). 
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predictions regarding the effect of PD on Conservatism. The findings of Sudaram and Fogarty 
(1996) and Zeghal and Lahmar (2018) show conflicting evidence where the former shows that PD 
increases Conservatism, while the latter shows that it decreases Conservatism. Gaganis, Hasan, 
Papadimitri, and Tasiou (2019) find that insurance companies in countries with higher PD have 
lower risk. Of similar conclusion regarding risk are Shane (1993) and Mihet (2013) who find 
negative association between PD and firm risk taking. Hope (2003), Guan, Purjalali, Sengupta, 
and Teruya (2005) and Kanagaretnam, Lim, and Lobo (2011) all find a positive association of PD 
with disclosure, discretionary accruals, and smoother earnings, respectively.  
Masculinity-Femininity (MAS) is the extent to which force is endorsed. In more masculine 
societies, men and women are very distant emotionally. This Hofstede dimension does not show 
consistent conclusions across accounting literature. Gray (1988) proposes that MAS is negatively 
associated with Conservatism and Secrecy, while Salter and Niswander (1995), Sudaram, and 
Fogarty (1996) do not find empirical evidence of Gray’s theory (1988) on Secrecy but have 
conflicting results regarding Conservatism. Conversely, other literature finds evidence that MAS 
is significantly associated with disclosures (Hope, 2003), earnings management (Kanagaretnam et 
al., 2011) and conservatism (Zeghal & Lahmar, 2018; Salter et al., 2013). The literature, though, 
shows that it is Femininity (Low MAS) and not Masculinity (High MAS) that affects conservatism 
(Zeghal & Lahmar, 2018; Salter et al., 2013). 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) is the extent to which the members of a society feel 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity.  This dimension is among the most widely studied 
cultural values affecting conservatism and risk. Accounting literature supports Gray’s theory 
(1988) that UA is positively associated with Conservatism (Kanagaretnam, Lim & Lobo, 2014; 
Salter et al. 2013; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996; Salter & Niswander, 1995). Also, finance and 
59 
 
accounting literature agree that UA is negatively associated with risk (Gaganis et al., 2019; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2018; Pan, Siegel, & Wang, 2017). 
Other than Conservatism and risk, accounting literature found that UA is significantly associated 
with higher materiality estimates (Arnold, Bernardi, & Neidermeyer, 2001), lower accruals (Guan 
et al., 2005; Gray, Kang, Lin, & Tang, 2015), smoother earnings (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011) and 
less disclosure (Hope, 2003). Literature also found support for Gray’s theory (1988) of positive 
association of UA with Uniformity (Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996) but conflicting results regarding 
the association of UA with Secrecy and Professionalism (Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996; Salter & 
Niswander, 1995). 
Individualism (IDV) is the extent to which people feel independent and not connected to 
their groups. IDV, along with UA, is another dimension that is commonly associated with risk and 
conservatism. Previous studies agree that IDV is positively associated with risk (Gaganis et al. 
2019; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Rieger, Wang, & Hens, 2015) and negatively associated with 
conservatism (Gray, 1988; Salter et al., 2013; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996). Accounting literature 
also finds that individualism is significantly associated with earnings management (Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2015; Guan et al., 2005), earnings discretion (Han et al., 2010; Hope, 
2003) and the tone of communicating with investors (Brochet, Miller, Naranjo, & Yu, 2019). 
2.2.1.2 Gray Theory (1988)  
Gray (1988) posits that accountants derive their values from societal values, which in turn 
influence accounting values, which consequently influence accounting systems. Gray (1988) 
defines Professionalism as the extent to which an accountant prefers to exercise self-professional 
judgment versus following statutory regulations; Secrecy as the extent to which disclosure of 
information and transparency is not preferred; Conservatism as the extent to which certainty is 
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preferred over ambiguity of future events and less risk taking and Uniformity as the extent to which 
uniform practices and rules are preferred to be used over time versus greater flexibility.  
We focus our study on the Conservatism accounting value, as described by Gray (1988). 
Conservatism is considered the most important accounting value from the perspective of financial 
reporting (Doupnik & Tsakumis, 2004; Gray, 1988) and greatly understudied by literature, which 
tests the relationship between cultural values on accounting values at the individual level (as 
opposed to firm-level). To proxy for Conservatism, we use the accuracy of loss reserves, which 
could reflect how much the actuary and CEO overestimate or underestimate loss reserves over five 
years. Consistent with Gray’s definition of Conservatism, the inaccuracy of loss reserves is 
associated with greater riskiness of the company, and the extent of earnings manipulation. 
Inadequate reserving could deteriorate financial strength and lead to insurer solvency issues 
(Weiss, 1985).  
2.2.1.3 Effect of Culture on Accounting Decisions and Measures – Firm-Level, Experimental 
and Epidemiological Approach  
International accounting literature extensively focused on the cross country analysis (Leuz 
& Wysocki, 2016) either at the firm level or individual level to test Gray’s theory (1988) regarding 
the influence of cultural values on accounting values.  This literature concluded the influence of 
cultural values on accounting values by testing the effect of cultural values on accounting systems 
assuming that it also proves the effect of cultural values on accounting values (Doupnik & 
Tsakumis, 2004).  
Cross-country Firm-Level Approach 
Cross-country tests at the firm level show evidence of cultural values affecting accounting 
disclosures (Hope, 2003; Jaggi & Low, 2000), conservatism (Zeghal & Lahmar, 2018; Salter et 
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al., 2013, Salter & Lewis, 2011), and earnings management (Gray et al., 2015; Guan et al., 2005, 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2011, Han et al., 2010). This literature attempts in some way to control for 
the legal and institutional environment to test the effect of cultural values on the accounting values. 
Hope (2003) and Jaggi and Low (2000) reach conflicting results upon controlling for the legal 
origin of the country, where Jaggi and Low (2000) conclude that controlling for the legal origin 
eliminates the significance of cultural values on disclosures. On the other hand, Hope (2003) 
concludes that the legal origin is an important conditioning variable and finds that UA and MAS 
are negatively associated with disclosures while IDV and PD are positively associated with 
disclosures. 
Other studies control for the institutional and reporting environment by testing whether the 
effect of cultural values remains significant after the adoption of international standards. Zeghal 
and Lahmar (2018) concluded that conditional conservatism remains significantly associated with 
PD, UA, MAS, IDV, Long-termism, and Indulgence after transitioning of European countries to 
international standards. Gray et al. (2015) show that the considered cultural values of IDV and UA 
continue to affect accounting differences in earnings management after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS.  
Cross-country Experimental Approach 
Studies conducted in the form of experiments or surveys at the individual level rather than 
firm-level but also across countries also conclude that cultural values remain significantly 
associated with different accounting measures and practices despite uniform accounting standards.  
Schultz and Lopez (2001), using accountants from France, Germany, and the U.S., show 
that despite the common accounting standards across these countries, accountants’ judgments are 
significantly different. Doupnik and Richter (2004) question the applicability of uniform 
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accounting standards across countries after showing that U.S. and German professional 
accountants’ interpretation of verbal probability expression is significantly different. Kummer and 
Schmidt (2018) and Hughes, Sander, Higgs, and Cullinan (2009) use students and entry-level 
accountants to control for the organizational and professional culture influence on the values of 
the experiment participants, and conclude that cultural values have a significant effect on judgment 
and decision making and risk assessment.  
 Epidemiological Approach 
Despite showing evidence of the effect of cultural values on accounting measures and 
practices, the cross-country tests still cannot establish a direct test of whether cultural values affect 
the accounting values. Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004) criticize the firm-level approach to only test 
the relation between cultural values and accounting systems by assuming that all members of the 
country share homogenous cultural values, propose using experiments. The experimental (or 
quasi-experimental) approaches conducted as described above at the individual level were able to 
control for the organizational and professional culture but could not still control for a common 
country fixed effect. As noted by Fernández (2011), a cross-country approach has problems of 
omitted variables and endogeneity, which is compounded by mismeasurement across countries. 
Thus, cross-country analysis cannot directly test whether the effect is due to institutional and 
economic factors or cultural values.  
The epidemiological approach has been used by economics literature to show that culture 
matters controlling for country fixed effects and shared institutional, economic, and environmental 
environment, for such issues as labor markets, growth, financial developments, among others 
(Fernández, 2011). Only recently, the finance and accounting literature started to use this approach 
to study the effect of individual decision-makers in an organization on finance and accounting 
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relevant decisions. In accounting, among the only ones we know of, Brochet et al. (2019) study 
how the managers’ ethnic-cultural background affects their communication with the investors and 
find that managers with an ethnic origin that has higher individualism have more optimistic tone. 
They also show that this ethnic-cultural origin is persistent and lasts for executives who get 
exposed to different cultures through their work experience. Nguyen et al. (2018) show that the 
ancestral origin of the CEOs (tracking the CEO ancestry up to the third generation) significantly 
affects the performance of banks under competitive pressure. Pan et al. (2017) show that the 
cultural origin of the founders and top management teams significantly affects the risk of the firm. 
 To control for the legal, regulatory, and economic environments and establish a direct test 
of whether the cultural values affect accounting values, we use the epidemiological approach to 
test whether the cultural origin of the actuary and CEO affect the accuracy of loss reserves. We 
also test whether the cultural values have a significant effect, thus directly testing Gray’s theory 
(1988) of the influence of Hofstede's (1980) cultural values on Conservatism. This allows us also 
to test the upper echelon theory of Hambrick and Mason (1984) in an accounting decision setting. 
The upper echelon theory proposes that the personal backgrounds of top management affect their 
decisions.  
2.2.1.4 Moderating Effect of Cultural Origin Homogeneity   
Our approach in studying the effect of cultural background and values of actuary and CEO 
on the accuracy of loss reserves has many implications. On the one hand, we can directly test 
whether cultural values influence accounting values, as proposed by Gray (1988). On the other 
side, we can fill the gap in accounting literature by testing the upper echelon theory (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) on accounting measures, which so far mostly lacked tests on the effect of the national 
culture (Plöckinger et al., 2016).  
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Plöckinger et al. (2016), in a literature review of the upper echelon theory and financial 
reporting, shows that research is needed on the intra top management team decision making. Zhang 
(2019) also notes that accounting literature lacks studies accounting for the collective impact of 
top management characteristics on financial reporting despite the practical knowledge that one 
single executive rarely makes such decisions. Zhang (2019) shows that the background 
homogeneity of the top management team, as proxied by their experience and firm tenure, has a 
significant effect on the likelihood of restatements and discretionary accruals.  
We further contribute to the accounting literature to fill this gap and test whether the shared 
cultural background of the actuary and the CEO, being the primary decision-makers regarding the 
loss reserves, significantly affects the accuracy of loss reserves.  
2.2.1.5 Effect of Gender on Accounting Estimates 
After the 2008 financial crisis, financial industry leaders stated that women could decrease 
the risks of financial institutions. Notably, in 2011, Michel Barnier, Europe’s internal markets 
commissioner, proposed one-third of the boards of banks to be women to alleviate unison of 
thought and thus be more efficient in problem-solving.  More recently, Christine Lagarde (2018) 
stated that: “Higher share of women on the boards …is associated with greater stability…. if it had 
been Lehman Sisters rather than Lehman Brothers, the world might well look a lot different today”.   
In contrast to the anecdotal evidence to increase female representation among the top 
management, accounting, and finance literature do not find conclusive results to ascertain that 
female managers could lead to better earnings quality, greater conservatism, or lower risk. Some 
literature shows that female managers and directors could be associated with increased risk 
(Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014), classification shifting (Zalata, Ntim, Aboud, & Gyapong, 2019), 
greater conservatism (Barua, Davidson, Rama, & Thiruvadi, 2010; Peni & Vähämaa, 2010; 
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Francis, Hasan, Park, & Wu, 2015; Liu, Wei, & Xi, 2016; Ho, Li, Tam, & Zhang, 2015), lower 
likelihood of financial misreporting (Gupta, Mortal, Chakrabarty, Guo, & Turban, 2019), less tax 
aggressiveness (Francis, Hasan, Wu, & Yan, 2014) and better earnings quality (García-Sánchez, 
Martínez-Ferrero, & García-Meca, 2017; Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). While other studies do not 
find significant evidence of gender effect on risk (Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016; Giannetti 
& Zhao, 2019; Adams & Ragunathan, 2015), tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2010), 
earnings management (Ge, Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2011; Sun, Liu & Lan, 2011) or earnings quality 
(Ye, Zhang, & Rezaee, 2010). The inconclusive findings of accounting and corporate finance 
literature on female leaders and financial decisions do not agree with the economic and psychology 
literature which suggests that an average woman is more risk-averse than an average man (e.g., 
Croson, Gneezy, & Rey-Biel, 2012; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008). 
Therefore, although accounting and finance research has produced numerous studies in recent 
years on the effect of gender on corporate decisions, gender differences in terms of accounting 
decision making is still an open question. 
We approach the question of the gender effect on accounting estimates by studying whether 
female actuaries and CEOs have a significant effect on the accuracy of loss reserves. Given the 
inconclusive literature, we cannot predict a direction on how female actuaries and CEOs could 
influence the accuracy of loss reserves. Assuming a female actuary is similar to an average female 
in society, we could expect a female actuary to produce more accurate loss reserves consistent with 
the economics and psychology literature. On the other hand, if a female actuary has more of the 
top management team (TMT) characteristics, given the conflicting conclusions regarding female 
TMT representation and financial decisions, it is difficult to predict whether there would be a 
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significant association with the accuracy of loss reserves or whether a female actuary would 
produce more or less accurate loss reserves.  
Our study contributes to the accounting and finance literature studying the gender effect 
by testing the effect of a decision-maker (actuary) who not necessarily is in the top management 
team but is the direct decision-maker regarding a specific accounting estimate while 
simultaneously controlling and testing the effect of CEO gender could be the second direct 
decision-maker on loss reserves. In addition, our sample covers both private and public companies, 
which are usually excluded from corporate finance and accounting studies due to the scarcity of 
data. 
2.2.2 Insurer Loss Reserves  
Property-casualty insurer loss reserves are typically the largest liability on their balance 
sheet, with the loss reserve consisting of three components: claims reported and adjusted, but not 
yet paid; claims reported, but not yet adjusted, and incurred but not reported (IBNR) losses. Since 
claim frequency and severity is not known ahead of time by insurers, managers and actuaries must 
estimate these reported amounts. Over time, as insurers obtain more information on claims and 
make actual payments, the reserve estimates become more certain. Insurers are required to report 
this “development” of losses over time in statutory accounting statements filed with state insurance 
regulators.17 Comparing the initial loss estimates with ultimate losses actually paid yields the loss 
reserve error, which represents how much the estimates (at any point during the process) deviate 
from the “true” losses.  
                                                 
17 As we describe later, P/C insurers report reserve development in Schedule P. Life insurer reserving is substantially different and 
they do not report any form of development on life or annuity contracts. Life insurers, however, do report development of any 
accident and health contracts they sell. Similarly, firms filing as health insurers report development for their health insurance 
contracts.  
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In the absence of any discretion on behalf of management, insurers would likely still report 
some “error” in their loss forecasts. These nondiscretionary estimation errors are due to the 
inherent difficulty in estimating claims (e.g., Swiss Re 2008; Grace & Leverty, 2012). However, 
a large academic literature has examined the loss reserve using arguments that while some of the 
estimation error is noise, some components can be attributable to managerial discretion. These 
studies suggest that the loss reserve error is a powerful measure of managerial discretion compared 
to traditional residual-based models of accounting discretion (e.g., Jones 1991) since researchers 
can observe eventual realizations of initial estimates.  
Insurance reserving literature suggests that managers can intentionally underestimate or 
overestimate losses in response to various incentives, thereby influencing their balance sheet 
(through liabilities) and income statement (through incurred claims). These studies find evidence 
that P/C insurers manipulate reserves in response to solvency regulation (Petroni, 1992; Gaver & 
Paterson, 2004), rate regulation (Nelson, 2000; Grace & Leverty, 2010), and earnings smoothing 
(Beaver, McNichols & Nelson, 2003). Very few studies, however, show whether personal 
managerial traits could affect the loss reserves, thus showing evidence of a behavioral factor in the 
estimation of loss reserves. The only study we know of shows that CEO overconfidence is 
significantly associated with relatively low loss reserves Berry-Stölzle et al. (2018).  
Given the nature of the process for estimating the loss reserves and their weight on the 
financial statements of insurance companies, it is important to study whether the personal 
background of main decision-makers (Appointed Actuaries and CEOs) are significantly associated 
with the loss reserves. We fill this gap by testing whether cultural origin and gender of Appointed 
Actuary and CEO affect the accuracy of loss reserves.  
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2.2.3 The Role of the Actuary 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Law 745 (NAIC, 
2003) requires that property and casualty insurers annually to submit a Statement of Actuarial 
Opinion written by the company’s Appointed Actuary which contains key statements about the 
insurer’s loss reserve including that the reserve meets the requirements of the insurance laws in 
the state of domicile. 
The reserve is calculated with accepted actuarial standards and practice, and the reserve 
makes reasonable provisions for the unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses of the company. 
The actuary may also provide an opinion on other reserve items such as the impact of reinsurance 
arrangements on loss reserves, changes in company operations (such as claims adjusting and 
underwriting), anticipated salvage and subrogation and the presence of difficult to estimate claims 
(such as terrorism, environmental and asbestos claims).  
However, it is management (and not the Appointed Actuary) that provides the loss reserve 
point estimate. Whereas the actuary may only be concerned with how nondiscretionary factors 
impact reserve accuracy, management may have different incentives. As noted above, 
management may exercise discretion over the loss reserve to avoid solvency regulation (Petroni, 
1992; Gaver & Paterson, 2004), influence rate regulators (Nelson, 2000; Grace & Leverty, 2010), 
or smooth earnings (Beaver et al., 2003).  
Because management, and not the Appointed Actuary, chooses the reported loss reserve in 
the U.S., this could create tension between Appointed Actuary and management. The NAIC’s 
Casualty Actuarial and Statistical (C) Taskforce (CASTF), in its 2015 guideline to insurers 
commented on this reality (NAIC, 2015, 1)  
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The CASFT encourages management to seek feedback from a “qualified actuary” prior to 
management’s decision on establishing carried reserves. […] It also helps avoid a difficult 
situation in which management is committed to a decision that results in pressure on the 
actuary to “stretch” the range of reasonable reserve estimates.  
As both Appointed Actuary and management are involved in setting the loss reserves, it is 
important to account for the personal background of management as well. Thus, we test whether 
the CEO's cultural origin and gender significantly affect the accuracy of loss reserves and whether 
the homogeneity of CEO and actuary background could have a significant moderating effect.  
2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.3.1 Data 
Our data is from annual property-casualty (P/C) statutory statements filed with state 
insurance regulators that are compiled by the NAIC. These filings contain detailed information on 
U.S. P/C insurer financial information, including loss reserve development and the identity of the 
Appointed Actuary and CEO.  
We classify each CEO and actuary as male or female based on their first name using a 
commercial website Gender-API.com. First names that could not be identified using Gender-
API.com, have an accuracy less than 90% or are based on a sample of less than 100 observations 
are identified manually using the Oxford Dictionary of First Names and Google search for the 
specific person corresponding to the first name. 
 To separate the institutional and economic effect of the country and focus on the effect of 
the cultural origin, we use the epidemiological approach. As per Fernández (2011), the 
epidemiological approach allows us to study the variation in decisions across different immigrant 
groups residing in the same country (U.S.). This approach has been used in economics, including 
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female labor force participation, fertility, labor market regulation, redistribution, growth, and 
financial development (Fernández, 2011) and recently in finance and accounting. Following 
previous literature which uses this approach (Pan et al., 2017; Giannetti & Zhao, 2019; Liu, 2016; 
Nguyen et al., 2019, Brochet et al., 2019), we use the last name of the CEO and actuary to identify 
their cultural origin. We use four sources to identify the origin of the family name – Forebears.com, 
Dictionary of American Family Names, Onomap, and Ancestry.com. First, we use three sources 
to determine the origin for the family name separately. Forebears.com provides the current 
prevalent country, Dictionary of American Family Names identifies the origin of the family name 
origination and its variation and Onomap (a project in the Geography Department in the University 
College London) identifies the cultural group of the family name.  
If Forebears.com, Dictionary of American Family Names, and Onomap do not provide 
consistent information, we use Ancestry.com to identify the country from which a family name 
arrived in the U.S. or Canada. If this country matched one of the previous databases, we would use 
this as the cultural origin. Otherwise, we assign the family name to a cultural group based on the 
current prevalent country as per Forebears.com. After identifying the country(ies) of origin, we 
map the origin of the family name to a cultural group as divided by GLOBE (2014) project by 
House, Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges, & Sully de Luque (2014). If the GLOBE project does not cover 
a specific country, we follow a close analog procedure as in the GLOBE project and assign those 
countries into corresponding groups based on similar characteristics such as language, geographic 
location, religion, and history. 
Table 2-A1 describes our sample selection process. We start with all insurers in the NAIC 
P/C annual statutory filings between 2005 and 2017, which includes 40,994 firm-year 
observations. We exclude all insurers which are waived or exempt from providing an actuarial 
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opinion, do not report the name of the actuary, or only report the actuarial company name. We also 
drop observations that report negative surplus or losses, as well as observations with missing 
necessary control and dependent variables for our study. We then winsorize all financial variables 
at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Our final sample consists of 12,348 insurer-year observations 
representing 1,900 unique insurers from 2005 to 2013.  
2.3.2 Identifying Cultural Origin and Measuring Cultural Value Scores 
We assign the cultural origin of actuaries and CEOs into cultural groups as described by 
the GLOBE project. The project, consisting of over 200 researchers in 62 countries, has been 
studying the influence of culture on managerial behavior since 1994.  Specifically, we assign each 
CEO and actuary to a cultural group based on the GLOBE project (House et al., 2014): Anglo, 
South Pacific, Germanic Europe, Latin Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East, 
Confucian Asia, Southern Asia, Latin America, and Nordic Europe. Each of these cultural clusters 
shares characteristics such as geographic proximity, climate zone, mass migration, ethnic-social 
capital, religious roots, and linguistic roots (Chhokar, Brodbeck & House, 2007).  
Figure 2-1: Distribution of Actuaries by Cultural Groups 
This Figure shows the percentage and number of actuaries by their cultural origin. The x-axis is the cultural group 
which the actuary belongs to and the y-axis represents the number of actuaries in our sample. Percentages above every 
column indicate the percent of actuaries in our sample of 12,348. 
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Clustering the origin of actuaries and CEOs into cultural groups decreases the possibility 
of mistakenly assigning the background to a wrong country due to historical geographic border 
changes. The GLOBE project does not cover all of the countries of origin in our sample; in those 
cases, we placed the country into the closest group by characteristics. The distribution of actuaries 
by a cultural group is given in Figure 2-1. 
To study the effect of cultural values, we use Hofstede’s Value Survey Module (VSM) 
scores provided on his website and updated in 2015. Hofstede's (1980) cultural values are widely 
used in economics, accounting, and finance literature to study the effect of cultural differences on 
various outcomes.18 These scores are assigned to the countries in comparison to each other for 
each cultural dimension, and they range from 0 to 112 (we use the scaled to 100 scores). We use 
Hofstede's (1980) original cultural dimensions: Masculinity-Femininity (MAS), Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UA), Power Distance (PD), and Individualism (IDV) as proxies for the cultural values 
of actuaries and CEOs. Each of these cultural values could play a role in how actuaries and CEOs 
affect reserve error estimation. Masculinity-Femininity, described as the extent to which force is 
endorsed in society, could be associated with actuaries and CEOs with greater MAS values being 
more aggressive in managing the loss reserves. Gray (1988) proposes that Masculinity decreases 
Conservatism, and Meier-Pesti and Penz (2008) show that greater masculinity is associated with 
higher financial risk-taking regardless of gender. Uncertainty Avoidance, defined as how much a 
society tolerates uncertainty and ambiguity, could be associated with less risky decisions (more 
conservative), leading to greater accuracy of loss reserves. Gray (1988) proposes that UA is 
positively associated with Conservatism. This proposition is widely supported in the accounting 
literature (Kanagaretnam, Lim & Lobo, 2014; Salter et al. 2013; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 1996; Salter 
                                                 
18 See Karolyi (2016) and Salter et al. (2013). 
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& Niswander, 1995). Also, finance and accounting literature agree that UA is negatively associated 
with risk (Gaganis et al., 2019; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshraghi, 2018; 
Pan, Siegel, & Wang, 2017). Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) use Hofstede (1980) Individualism as 
a proxy for overconfidence and self-attribution bias and show that individualism is positively 
associated with trading volume and volatility. Individualism, which was shown in other studies to 
be associated with overconfidence also affecting risk attitudes (Gaganis et al. 2019; Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2014; Rieger, Wang, & Hens, 2015; Gray, 1988; Salter et al., 2013; Sudarwan & Fogarty, 
1996), could be associated with lower accuracy of loss reserves. Finally, Shane (1993), Mihet 
(2013), and Gaganis et al. (2019) find evidence of PD being negatively associated with risk. Power 
Distance is defined as being associated with the equal distribution of power in a society. Thus we 
expect that this cultural value to be associated with lower accuracy of loss reserves. 
To match Hofstede's (1980) cultural values to our GLOBE (2014) groups, we map the 
countries covered by Hofstede VSM scores to the GLOBE project cultural groups. Then, we 
calculate the averages of each of the four Hofstede cultural values to obtain an average Cultural 
Value Index (CVI) for each of the cultural groups to which actuaries and CEOs represented in our 
sample belong. The average CVIs (UA, MAS, PD, and IDV) for each GLOBE project cultural 
groups are presented in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1: Average CVIs for GLOBE Cultural Groups 
This table presents the averages of four Hofstede Cultural Value Index Averages for each Globe Project Cultural 
Group. The CVIs are Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), Masculinity-Femininity (MAS), Power Distance (PD), and 
Individualism (IDV). 
Globe Cultural Group Hofstede Cultural Value Index Averages 
 UA MAS PD IDV 
Africa 53.00 43.50 70.50 23.50 
Anglo 44.00 61.17 33.67 83.17 
Confucian Asia 50.00 60.60 66.00 25.60 
Eastern Europe 80.71 46.71 67.43 47.07 
Germanic Europe 68.33 55.50 37.17 67.50 
Latin America 82.00 50.50 65.30 22.00 
Latin Europe 89.40 46.60 58.80 56.80 
Middle East 72.20 48.20 57.40 43.20 
Nordic Europe 40.25 13.75 28.25 69.25 
Southern Asia 56.67 53.67 70.67 27.33 
We also identify cultural groups with the highest and lowest 20 percent of the average CVI 
for each cultural value to test the difference at the extreme ends of those cultural values. Based on 
this classification, Anglo and Nordic Europe cultural groups have the lowest UA, lowest PD, and 
highest IDV scores. Groups with the highest MAS scores are Anglo, and Confucian Asia and 
groups with lowest MAS scores are Latin Europe and Nordic Europe. Confucian and Southern 
Asia have the lowest IDV scores, and Eastern Europe and Southern Asia have the lowest PD 
scores. Finally, Eastern and Latin Europe have the highest UA scores. 
2.3.3 Measuring Loss Reserve Errors 
To construct each insurer’s loss reserve error, we require data from Schedule P of each 
insurer’s annual statutory filing. Schedule P Part 2 provides data on incurred losses and loss 
development. We use Schedule P Part 2 - Summary, which is the sum of all lines of business 
because we are interested in the aggregate reserving behavior at the company level. 
Table 2-2 provides an example of Schedule P Part 2 - Summary from ACE American 
Insurance Company. The numbers in the Table 2-2 are losses incurred (the sum of losses paid and 
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the loss reserve) and amounts for the incurred loss adjustment expenses.19 Losses incurred are 
estimated and reported in the year incurred (i.e., the accident year) and subsequently revised. For 
example, in column 6 of Table 2-2, ACE estimated losses for 2006 in 2006 to be $3,062,746 
(reported in thousands of U.S. dollars). By 2011 ACE had updated this estimate to be $2,601,211 
(column 11). For the 2006 accident year, therefore, ACE initially overestimated losses by $461,535 
($3,062,746-$2,601,211). While this error is referred to as the accident year error, managing 
previous accident years will also alter a firm’s financial statements. Managers can overestimate or 
underestimate loss reserves until all claims have been paid.20  
In Table 2-2 we can calculate the calendar year reserve error by taking the sum of initial 
estimates in column 6 (i.e., the bolded Figures) and subtracting the ultimately paid losses in column 
11 (also bolded).21 The sum of the bolded figures in column 6 is $19,070,502, representing loss 
estimates during the calendar year 2006 for the accident year 2006 and all prior accident years. 
The ultimately paid losses as of 2011 are $17,726,359. The 2006 loss reserve error is, therefore, 
$1,344,143 ($19,070,502-$17,726,359), which represents an overestimation of initial claims.  
  
                                                 
19 All dollar amounts are in $000s of U.S. dollars. 
20 Barth et al. (2019) find that while using calendar year and accident year loss reserve errors yields statistically different 
coefficient estimates, these differences do not appear to be economically meaningful.  
21 While we refer to the values in column 11 as the “ultimate” paid losses, it is not necessarily the case that all losses have been 
paid after 10 years of development. However, we are limited by the reporting standards of Schedule P and, therefore, assume that 
all claims have been fully paid as of the 10th accident year.  
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Table 2-2: Schedule P – Part 2 Summary 
The following table contains data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s annual statutory filing. We 
construct reserve errors as Incurred Lossest – Incurred Lossest+n. Since we use five-year errors, n is 5. From the below table, we 
take the sum of the bold values in column 6 (19,070,502) and subtract from that total the sum of the bold values in column 11 
(17,726,359) This difference is the reserve error, which equals 1,344,143 in this example. This total will be positive if an insurer 
over-reserved and negative if an insurer under-reserved. 
Excerpt from the 2011 Annual Statement of ACE American Ins Co. 
NAIC Property-Liability Annual Statement: Schedule P—Part 2—Summary 
Incurred Net Losses and Defense and Cost Containment Expenses Reported at Year End ($000 omitted) 
1 
Accident 
Year 
2 
2002 
3 
2003 
4 
2004 
5 
2005 
6 
2006 
7 
2007 
8 
2008 
9 
2009 
10 
2010 
11 
2011 
Prior 5,078,038 5,071,351 5,797,589 6,254,020 6,226,103 6,196,693 6,272,376 6,319,513 6,380,162 6,556,014 
2002 1,500,643 1,577,357 1,781,499 1,694,376 1,764,741 1,730,440 1,693,571 1,701,902 1,710,655 1,698,728 
2003  2,287,425 2,070,036 2,193,082 2,128,955 2,009,994 2,005,987 1,950,893 1,965,579 1,922,897 
2004   2,888,365 2,592,836 2,603,694 2,278,069 2,235,793 2,246,927 2,187,825 2,172,853 
2005    3,435,994 3,284,263 2,962,984 2,845,413 2,812,629 2,784,845 2,774,656 
2006     3,062,746 2,886,813 2,880,132 2,813,843 2,753,745 2,601,211 
2007      3,285,381 3,003,720 2,927,313 2,893,535 2,896,689 
2008       3,516,789 3,555,336 3,548,912 3,519,332 
2009        2,782,336 2,690,015 2,637,746 
2010         2,942,142 2,952,660 
2011          3,452,200 
 
Based on the above, we calculate our reserve error variable, Errorit as follows: 
 , , 5
,
,
 i t i ti t
i t
Incurred Losses Incurred Losses
Error
Assets
 (1) 
We scale by total assets to account for differences in insurer size. Prior studies have 
generally found their results to be robust to using different scaling factors (Petroni, 1992; Beaver 
et al., 2003; Grace & Leverty, 2010). We also note that we use developed losses five years in the 
future as our proxy for ultimate losses (i.e., five-year errors). We choose five-years, which is 
consistent with the majority of existing studies, as it represents a tradeoff between allowing for a 
sufficiently long development period without sacrificing too many lead years of data. Since reserve 
error calculation requires data after the financial statement period, using five years necessitates 
losing the five most recent years of data. In the most extreme case, calculating a 10-year error for 
2013 would require loss development data from 2022, which does not yet exist. Barth, Eastman, 
and Eckles (2019) report that approximately 92 percent of claims are paid after five years, 
suggesting relatively limited discretion over reserve estimation after five years.  
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2.3.4 Empirical Methodology 
Our main objective is to examine the relationship between loss reserve accuracy and the 
actuary’s gender and cultural origin while controlling for other actuary characteristics and firm 
characteristics. Focusing on the magnitude of the loss reserves allows us to test Gray’s theory 
(1988) regarding the Conservatism accounting value. 
We start our examination by estimating the following model: 
𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (2) 
Where 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝛼𝑦 represents the year fixed effects and  𝛼𝑠 represents state fixed 
effects. We add year and state fixed effects to alleviate the omitted variable bias. Also state fixed 
effect controls for difference in regulatory regimes between states which may influence the setting 
of loss reserves. In addition, it may be the case, due to geographic constraints, that firms are 
constrained in their choice of an Appointed Actuary (e.g., the only qualified actuaries locally are 
of Anglo or Latin European origin). To address this, our models controlled for state fixed effects. 
Additionally, we controlled for 𝒁𝑖,𝑡 , non-discretionary variables, and 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 , discretionary variables,  
that have been found to affect reserve errors in the insurance literature. These variables are 
described in Table 2-A2. 
 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one if an actuary (CEO) 
belongs to one of the three largest cultural groups in our sample: Anglo, Latin Europe, or Germanic 
Europe group and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 (𝐶𝐸𝑂)𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
actuary (CEO) is female and zero otherwise.  
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Further, we are interested whether the cultural origin effect on the accuracy of loss reserves 
stems from the cultural values that the individual inherits from a certain cultural group, to do that 
we estimate two models: 
The first model tests the effect of the average cultural value developed by Hofstede (1980): 
𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜑𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
Where 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝛼𝑦 represents the year fixed effects and 𝛼𝑠 represents the state 
fixed effects. Our main independent variable of interest is 𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 , which corresponds to 
the average per GLOBE (2014) cultural group of the Hofstede (1980) four cultural values: 
Masculinity-Femininity (MAS), Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), Power Distance (PD) and 
Individualism (IDV). 
The second model tests the effect of the highest and lowest 20 percent of cultural value 
groups. We run model (4) testing each of the Hofstede’s four cultural values using eight separate 
regressions:  
𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ)𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜑𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (4) 
Where 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝛼𝑦 represents the year fixed effects and 𝛼𝑠 represents the state 
fixed effects. The main independent variables are 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡. 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the actuary’s cultural origin is in the lowest 20 percent by average 
CVI score and zero otherwise and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one if the actuary’s 
cultural origin is in the highest 20 percent by average CVI score and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the actuary is a female and zero otherwise and  𝒁𝑖,𝑡 are non-
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discretionary variables and 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 are discretionary variables that impact loss reserve accuracy, these 
variables are described in Table 2-A2. 
Since the process of determining the loss reserve starts with a proposed range of reserves 
by the actuary and the CEO determining a point estimate based on that range, it is also important 
to identify whether the CEO's personal background has a significant effect on the accuracy of the 
loss reserve. We test both the direct effect of CEO personal background and whether the similarity 
of CEO and actuary could significantly moderate the effect. We use equation (3) amended for the 
CEO's personal background to test the effect of CEO cultural origin and gender in the same manner 
that it tests the effect of the actuary cultural origin and gender. We additionally estimate model (5) 
to test the moderating effect of the CEO and actuary having the same cultural origin.  
 𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛽𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝐶𝑉𝐼(𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡 × 𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴) 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑡  (5) 
The additional variables of interest are 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡 and 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡 × 𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴. 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡 is a binary variable equal to one if the Appointed Actuary and CEO belong to the 
same GLOBE (2014) cultural group and zero otherwise. 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡 × 𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴 is an 
interaction term of 𝐴𝑣. 𝐶𝑉𝐼 𝐴𝐴  and  𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡.  
It is also important to study whether personal background affects the accuracy of loss 
reserves in both directions of over and under reserving.  To test that, we focus on the effect of 
uncertainty avoidance cultural value. Previous literature (Rieger et al., 2015; Pan et al., 2017 and 
Nguyen et al., 2019) posit that uncertainty avoidance among other Hofstede (1980) cultural values 
is the relevant to study the risk attitude effect and most widely used to study the effect of culture 
on Conservatism (see Salter et al., 2013). We use model (6) and tested the effect of Uncertainty 
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Avoidance splitting the main sample into subsamples when the reserve error is negative and 
positive:  
𝐴𝑏𝑠(𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠 + +𝛽𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑣. 𝑈𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ)𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝑈𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝒁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡  (6) 
Table 2-3: Variation of Cultural Values and Gender of Actuaries by Year 
The following table shows the variation by year of actuary female percentages and the average Hofstede 
(1980) cultural value indexes: MAS for Masculinity-Femininity Index, UA for Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index, PD Power Distance Index, and IDV Individualism Index. 
Year Av. MAS Av. UA Av. PD Av. IDV Percent of 
Females 
2005 0.551 0.573 0.400 0.728 0.0955 
2006 0.550 0.583 0.407 0.721 0.0891 
2007 0.553 0.586 0.410 0.720 0.102 
2008 0.562 0.587 0.423 0.708 0.127 
2009 0.557 0.586 0.423 0.705 0.128 
2010 0.556 0.590 0.423 0.703 0.116 
2011 0.558 0.589 0.423 0.702 0.129 
2012 0.556 0.593 0.431 0.698 0.118 
2013 0.553 0.599 0.437 0.690 0.121 
N 12348 12348 12348 12348 12348 
 
Our main analysis uses ordinary least squares (OLS), controlling for year fixed effects, 
heteroskedasticity, and clustering the standard errors at the insurer-level. Table 2-3, which shows 
the variation of the cultural origin of actuaries year over year suggests that our variables of interest 
do not vary enough throughout the years in our sample to run the models, including firm fixed 
effects. In addition, we conduct a Hausman test to decide whether to use random or fixed effects 
to test the effect of cultural origin, cultural values, and gender on loss reserve accuracy. The 
Hausman test suggested that random effects are more appropriate in our sample. Furthermore, 
some of our essential control variables would be eliminated by using the firm fixed effects. To 
alleviate any omitted variable bias, we control for the state of domicile fixed effects since statewide 
regulations could affect insurance company operations. 
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2.4 RESULTS 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The main objective of this study is to examine whether the personal background of 
actuaries and CEOs affect the accuracy of loss reserves. We proxy for personal background by the 
cultural origin and gender of the Appointed Actuary and CEO. As noted earlier, we categorize the 
cultural origins into cultural groups as described in the GLOBE project (2014).  
Figure 2-1 shows the distribution of the cultural origins of the actuaries in our sample. 
Almost half of the actuaries in our sample belong to the Anglo group, followed by 20 percent from 
Germanic Europe and 15 percent from Latin Europe. Although the representation of the other 
cultural groups is lower than 10 percent, it still creates a diversity of cultural origins in our sample. 
A similar representation of cultural origin groups is observed for the CEOs. Around 60 percent are 
of Anglo origin, 14 percent of Germanic Europe origin and 13 percent of Latin European, as shown 
in Table 2-4. The representation of cultural origins of actuaries and CEOs in our sample is 
comparable to other studies that use a similar approach in studying the effect of cultural 
background on corporate decisions. For example, 52 percent of directors in Giannetti and Zhao’s 
(2019) sample are originally from United Kingdom, United States, and Ireland (Anglo origin as 
defined in our study), and 13 percent are from Germany and Netherlands (Germanic Europe as 
defined in our study).  
To test whether cultural values of the actuaries and CEOs affect the accuracy of loss 
reserves, we use Hofstede's (1980) four cultural values: Masculinity-Femininity, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Power Distance, and Individualism. The descriptive statistics in Table 2-4 show that 
the average Masculinity-Femininity (MAS) score is 0.555, which is close to the maximum in the 
sample. This could be because around half of the actuaries in our sample are from cultural groups 
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with the highest MAS score and only 16 percent from cultural groups with the lowest MAS score. 
Similarly, Individualism (IDV) score is also closer to the maximum of 0.832 with actuaries from 
cultural groups with highest scores of IDV constitute half of the sample, and those from cultural 
groups with lowest scores of IDV are below 5 percent of the sample. Less skewness is observed 
in the Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) score and Power Distance (PD) where the average UA score 
is 0.587, and that of PD is 0.42. The representation of actuaries from cultural groups with the 
lowest 20 percent UA score is around half of the sample. In comparison, actuaries from cultural 
groups with the highest 20 percent of UA constitute 23 percent. The representation of actuaries 
from the highest PD and lowest PD cultural groups is 54 percent and around 10 percent, 
respectively.   
In the subsample of insurance companies for which data for CEOs is available, 34 percent 
of CEOs and actuaries have the same cultural origins, which could have a significant impact on 
how the interaction of CEOs and actuaries could affect the decisions made regarding the loss 
reserves. However, the female representation of actuaries is higher than that of CEOs, where our 
sample, on average, has 11 percent, female actuaries, as compared to only 6 percent of female 
CEOs. The percentage of female CEOs in property and casualty insurance companies is lower than 
those of public firms as compared, for example, to an average of 9 percent in Faccio et al. (2016).  
Descriptive statistics in Table 2-4 summarizes the characteristics of the insurance 
companies in our sample, which are used as control variables. The statistics in Table 2-4 show 
that, on average, 18 percent use Big 4 audit/actuary consulting companies, which could also be 
related to having only 18 percent of the companies in our sample being public.  Roughly 20 percent 
of our sample are mutual insurers, and 70 percent belong to groups. The mean reserve error of 2.5 
percent is twice as large as the mean error reported in Grace and Leverty (2012) and Berry-Stölzle 
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et al. (2018). Both of these studies are undertaken at the group level, while we use firm-level data 
as different members of a group can use different actuaries. Other variables such as loss, profit, 
longtail, and business diversity are similar to Grace and Leverty (2012) and Berry-Stölzle et al. 
(2018).  
Our non-discretionary and discretionary variables’ results are consistent in sign and 
significance with majority of recent studies of loss reserves. Consistent with Kamiya and Milidonis 
(2018) we find that being an employee (relative to being an officer in Kamiya and Milidonis, 2018) 
is negatively associated with loss reserve error accuracy. Also, Kamiya and Milidonis (2018) find 
that taxes and being part of a group is negatively associated with reserve errors while longtail is 
positively associated with reserve errors which is consistent with our findings. Our result of the 
positive association of reinsurance and reserve error is consistent with that of Berry-Stölzle et al. 
(2018). Finally, having an Appointed Actuary from a Big Four Auditing Firm is associated with 
more conservative loss reserve errors was one of the main findings of Petroni and Beasley (1996).  
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Table 2-4: Summary Statistics 
The following table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. All the variables are described in Table 2-A2. All 
financial variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
 N Mean Sd Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Abs(RE) 12348 0.0521 0.0589 0.000173 0.318 
RE 12348 0.0248 0.0721 -0.267 0.255 
Actuary Characteristics 
Female AA 12348 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Anglo AA 12348 0.516 0.500 0 1 
Latin Eur AA 12348 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Ger Eur AA 12348 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Av. MAS AA 12348 0.555 0.085 0.138 0.612 
Av. UA AA 12348 0.587 0.178 0.403 0.894 
Av. PD AA 12348 0.420 0.128 0.282 0.707 
Av. IDV AA 12348 0.708 0.151 0.256 0.832 
Highest MAS 12348 0.532 0.499 0 1 
Lowest MAS 12348 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Highest UA 12348 0.225 0.417 0 1 
Lowest UA 12348 0.537 0.499 0 1 
Highest PD 12348 0.0984 0.298 0 1 
Lowest PD 12348 0.537 0.499 0 1 
Highest IDV 12348 0.537 0.499 0 1 
Lowest IDV 12348 0.0352 0.184 0 1 
CEOActCult 3548 0.335 0.472 0 1 
CEO Characteristics 
Female CEO 3548 0.0603 0.238 0 1 
Anglo CEO 3548 0.597 0.491 0 1 
Ger CEO 3548 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Latin Eur CEO 3548 0.133 0.339 0 1 
Non-Discretionary Variables: 
Employee 12348 0.303 0.460 0 1 
Bigfour 12348 0.183 0.387 0 1 
Geog_HHI 12348 0.538 0.387 0.0325 1.000 
Product_herf 12348 0.621 0.313 0.118 1.000 
Size 12348 18.69 1.890 14.48 23.56 
Longtail_npw 12348 0.657 0.300 0 1 
Reinsurance 12348 0.389 0.300 -0.00143 1.012 
Mutual 12348 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Group 12348 0.695 0.461 0 1 
Public 12348 0.182 0.386 0 1 
Discretionary Variables: 
High_Tax 12348 0.698 0.459 0 1 
Prob_Insolvent 12348 0.0239 0.021 0.00147 1.000 
Profit 12348 0.729 0.444 0 1 
Small_Loss 12348 0.00964 0.0977 0 1 
Small_Profit 12348 0.0346 0.183 0 1 
Loss 12348 0.174 0.379 0 1 
Instrumental Variables 
Other LUAt-1 10645 0.579 0.0161 0.551 0.606 
Other HUAt-1 10645 0.185 0.0138 0.157 0.205 
HUA Students 12038 0.295 0.306 0.135 1.371 
SumFemCEO 12348 0.897 1.273 0 9 
SumFemAct 12348 1.816 3.851 0 20 
N 12348     
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2.4.2 Determinants of Loss Reserve Errors 
2.4.2.1 Does Personal Background Affect the Accuracy of Loss Reserves? 
We start by analyzing whether the personal background of the actuaries and CEOs affect 
the accuracy of loss reserves by testing the effect of actuary cultural origin and gender on the 
absolute value of the scaled loss reserve error. We present these results in Table 2-5. 
The results in Table 2-5 show that actuaries but not the CEOs’ cultural origin significantly 
affect the accuracy of the reserve error. Specifically, actuaries with Anglo origins are positively 
and significantly associated with a greater absolute value of the loss reserve error (i.e., less accurate 
loss reserve), where having an actuary with Anglo origins could be associated with a 0.5% 
discrepancy in the loss reserves. Actuaries whose cultural origins lie in the Latin European 
countries are associated with statistically smaller errors, suggesting that these individuals could be 
providing more accurate loss reserves than their Anglo colleagues associated with 0.5% more 
accurate loss reserves. Additionally, actuaries with origins from Germanic European countries, 
despite being second largest represented group as shown in Figure 2-1, do not have a significant 
effect on the accuracy of the loss reserves without controlling for the CEO background.22 
Our main results, presented in Table 2-5, do not provide statistical evidence that the gender 
of the actuary is significantly associated with the accuracy of the loss reserves without controlling 
for CEO background. However, when controlling for the CEO background, our results show that 
female actuaries are associated with greater loss reserve accuracy. On the other hand, our main 
results show that female CEOs decrease the accuracy of loss reserves. 
  
                                                 
22 In the interest of space and presentation clarity, we do not report the results of the less represented cultural groups. These results 
show that actuaries with cultural origin from Southern Asia are positively associated with loss reserve accuracy and those with 
cultural origin from Nordic Europe are negatively associated with loss reserve accuracy. All other cultural groups are not found to 
be significantly associated with the loss reserve accuracy. 
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Table 2-5: Effect of Largest Cultural Groups and Gender on the Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
The following table reports the results of ordinary least square regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the 
reserve error scaled by total assets. Anglo is a binary variable equal to 1 if the actuary (CEO)’s origin is of the Anglo cultural 
group and zero otherwise. Latin Eur is a binary variable equal to 1 if the actuary (CEO)’s origin is of the Latin Europe cultural 
group and zero otherwise. Ger Eur is a binary variable equal to 1 if the actuary (CEO)’s origin is of the Germanic Europe cultural 
group and zero otherwise. The division of countries of origin into corresponding cultural groups are based on the GLOBE project 
(2004). All other variables are described in Table 2-A2. All financial variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. P-values (in 
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
Anglo AA 0.005***      0.009***   
 (0.008)      (0.003)   
Latin Eur AA  -0.005*      -0.007*  
  (0.059)      (0.078)  
Ger Eur AA   -0.003      -0.007** 
   (0.111)      (0.050) 
Anglo CEO    0.003   0.003   
    (0.326)   (0.307)   
Latin Eur CEO     -0.001   -0.001  
     (0.769)   (0.808)  
Ger Eur CEO      -0.002   -0.002 
      (0.615)   (0.588) 
Female -0.002 -0.002 -0.002    -0.009* -0.010** -0.009* 
 (0.564) (0.447) (0.572)    (0.062) (0.040) (0.082) 
Female CEO    0.017** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 
    (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.032) 
Employee -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.070) (0.098) (0.075) (0.670) (0.644) (0.650) (0.799) (0.820) (0.878) 
BigFour -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.016) (0.481) (0.475) (0.453) (0.622) (0.496) (0.665) 
Geog_HHI 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.785) (0.808) (0.818) (0.978) (0.999) (0.997) (0.978) (0.982) (0.994) 
Product_herf 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.755) (0.701) (0.776) (0.790) (0.777) (0.782) (0.899) (0.831) (0.810) 
Longtail_npw 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.093) (0.086) (0.129) (0.134) (0.104) 
Reinsurance -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.093) (0.091) (0.093) (0.109) (0.100) (0.102) 
Mutual -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.152) (0.148) (0.155) (0.200) (0.195) (0.208) (0.214) (0.179) (0.271) 
Group -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011* -0.011 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.096) (0.094) (0.092) (0.085) (0.087) (0.100) 
Public -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.172) (0.135) (0.130) (0.766) (0.725) (0.717) (0.935) (0.790) (0.736) 
High_Tax -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.085) (0.083) (0.093) (0.348) (0.342) (0.348) (0.419) (0.412) (0.442) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.022 -0.025 -0.022 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.058 0.051 0.056 
 (0.622) (0.569) (0.622) (0.423) (0.426) (0.427) (0.365) (0.431) (0.382) 
Profit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.212) (0.222) (0.220) (0.206) (0.215) (0.210) (0.210) (0.237) (0.228) 
Small_Loss 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (0.648) (0.643) (0.654) (0.395) (0.398) (0.398) (0.412) (0.408) (0.443) 
Small_Profit -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.882) (0.849) (0.856) (0.602) (0.610) (0.601) (0.497) (0.512) (0.523) 
Loss 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.157) (0.162) (0.157) (0.756) (0.770) (0.760) (0.759) (0.807) (0.767) 
Constant 0.053** 0.060*** 0.057** 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.875) (0.799) (0.803) (0.770) (0.654) (0.778) 
Observations 12,348 12,348 12,348 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548 
R-squared 0.141 0.139 0.139 0.153 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.157 0.156 
Number of firms 1,900 1,900 1,900 884 884 884 884 884 884 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Given the mixed results in the literature related to the effect of gender on firm performance 
and risk-taking, our gender-related results are not surprising and should be analyzed with greater 
caution. In that regard, we perform an identification test which is described later in the robustness 
section and show that the effect of CEO gender does not hold. This hints to a possible selection 
bias, which is brought up by the greater stakeholders’ pressure post-2008 financial crisis of 
increasing female representation at top management positions23 to achieve less risky decisions and 
better firm performance. As for the actuary gender, our results are consistent with the general 
economics and psychology literature (e.g., Croson, Gneezy, & Rey-Biel, 2012; Croson & Gneezy, 
2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008) which shows that females are more risk-averse than males. But 
in contrast to that literature, our results are situation constrained and cannot be generalized. We 
show that a female actuary significantly increases the accuracy of loss reserves only in some cases, 
such as upon underreserving.  
2.4.2.2 Why does Cultural Origin Affect the Accuracy of Loss Reserves? 
To further analyze the reasons for the effect of specific actuary cultural origins on the 
accuracy of loss reserves, we use the average CVI of Hofstede (1980) four cultural values (UA, 
MAS, PD, and IDV) of the counties in the cultural groups in our sample and the effect of highest 
and lowest 20 percent by CVI of cultural groups on the accuracy of loss reserves.  
Table 2-6 presents our results, where Panel A shows that three out of four Hofstede (1980) 
cultural values are significantly associated with the accuracy of loss reserves. A 1 standard 
deviation increase in UA is associated with a 1.5% increase in the accuracy of reserve errors (a 
decrease in the absolute value of loss reserve). PD is also positively associated with the accuracy 
                                                 
23 In unreported results, available upon request, we perform a subsample analysis on the effect of female CEOs comparing more 
recent years to earlier ones (we use pre and post 2010 as a year of splitting the sample due to data constraints) and find that CEO 
gender effect is only significant post 2010 as compared to earlier years of our sample. 
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of reserve errors, where a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 1.6% increase in the 
accuracy. IDV, on the other hand, is negatively associated with the accuracy of reserve errors, and 
a one standard deviation increase in IDV is associated with a 1.5% decrease in the accuracy of 
reserve errors. These results show that the cultural values inherited by actuaries from a specific 
cultural group could be behind how they approach estimating the reserve errors. These results are 
consistent with literature which shows that the cultural values are persistent and are reflected in 
risk attitudes and Conservatism (e.g., Brochet et al., 2019; Pan et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018; 
Salter et al., 2013, Kanagaretnam et al., 2014, & Rieger et al., 2015). It is also consistent with 
Gray’s theory (1988) and the upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
It is not surprising that UA, PD, and IDV are all associated with a similar degree of 
accuracy of the loss reserves since those values are shown to be highly correlated (presented in 
Table 2-A3) and closely related to how they affect the risk attitudes. Where if actuaries’ cultural 
values lead them to prioritize being more accurate, avoid negative future outcomes, or be less 
overconfident, they will estimate loss reserves more accurately. On the other hand, if their cultural 
values prioritize overconfidence and accepting more uncertain situations, these actuaries might not 
put a priority in estimating the loss reserves with greater accuracy.   
To further analyze the effect of cultural values on the loss reserve accuracy and alleviate 
the possibility of the results being driven by a specific cultural group (Anglo as it represents more 
than half of actuaries in our sample), we study the effect of cultural groups with highest and lowest 
20 percent of CVI. These tests show how cultural values at both ends of cultural values could 
affect the accuracy of loss reserves and avoids the effect of a specific dominating cultural group. 
The results presented in Panel B of Table 2-6 show that although Masculinity being 
associated with greater overconfidence is not significantly associated with loss reserve accuracy 
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in general, our results show that High Masculinity is associated with lower accuracy of loss 
reserves. This is consistent with Gray’s theory (1988) and other literature, which supports that 
Masculinity is associated with greater risk. Our results show that it is Masculinity but not 
Femininity, which has a significant effect on the accuracy of loss reserves. Results of UA and IDV 
hold consistent with the results of the average cultural values where greater UA (highest UA) is 
positively associated with loss reserve accuracy, and lower UA (lowest UA) is negatively 
associated with loss reserve accuracy. Similarly, for IDV, where greater individualism (highest 
IDV) is negatively associated with loss reserve accuracy, and the opposite is true for lower 
individualism. These results also alleviate the concern of them being driven by the Anglo group, 
where the most represented cultural group for the highest UA is Latin Europe, and the lowest IDV 
cultural groups are Confucian and Southern Asia. As for the PD, the results in Panel B of Table 2-
6 show that only the lowest PD is negatively associated with loss reserve accuracy.  
As shown in Table 2-6, our results support the explanation that cultural values inherited by 
actuaries belonging to certain cultural groups seem to impact the accuracy of loss reserves’ 
estimation. Actuaries with cultural values which promote greater risky behavior and 
overconfidence value accuracy less, which leads to less accurate estimation of loss reserves and 
the opposite is true for those actuaries whose cultural values promote less risky behavior and less 
uncertainty in decisions.  
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Table 2-6: Effect of Cultural Values of Actuaries on the Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
The following table reports the results of ordinary least square regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the 
reserve error scaled by total assets. Panel A reports the results of the average of Hofstede (1980) cultural value indexes per 
GLOBE(2014) cultural group. Where Av. CVI AA is the corresponding to each column average cultural value index: MAS for 
Masculinity-Femininity Index, UAI Uncertainty Avoidance Index, PD Power Distance Index, and IDV Individualism Index. 
Panel B reports the results of highest (lowest) 20% by Hofstede (1980) cultural value of the GLOBE(2014) groups. Where the 
highest(lowest) 20% take a value of 1 if the cultural group has highest(lowest) 20% average cultural value index and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are described in Table 2-A2. All financial variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. P-values 
(in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effect of Average Cultural Value Indexes 
 MAS UA PD IDV 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
Av. CVI AA 0.002 -0.015*** -0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.816) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
Female AA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.577) (0.529) (0.612) (0.612) 
Employee -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.090) (0.082) (0.096) (0.082) 
BigFour -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) 
Geog_HHI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.825) (0.776) (0.776) (0.765) 
Product_herf 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.750) (0.731) (0.719) (0.730) 
Longtail_npw 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reinsurance -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mutual -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.144) (0.152) (0.133) (0.135) 
Group -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) 
Public -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.134) (0.152) (0.147) (0.162) 
High_Tax -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.087) (0.086) (0.081) (0.080) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.025 -0.022 -0.025 -0.023 
 (0.572) (0.613) (0.575) (0.597) 
Profit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.222) (0.217) (0.213) (0.207) 
Small_Loss 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.648) (0.628) (0.634) (0.646) 
Small_Profit -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.842) (0.902) (0.870) (0.867) 
Loss 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.159) (0.161) (0.162) (0.160) 
Constant 0.056** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.045** 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.044) 
Observations 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 
R-squared 0.137 0.142 0.139 0.139 
Number of firms 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2-5-continued 
Panel B: Effect of Highest (Lowest) Cultural Value Index Backgrounds 
 MAS UA PD IDV 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
Highest 0.005**  -0.004*  -0.003  0.006***  
 (0.013)  (0.086)  (0.266)  (0.001)  
Lowest  -0.002  0.006***  0.006***  -0.007** 
  (0.363)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.045) 
Female AA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.567) (0.523) (0.574) (0.562) (0.655) (0.562) (0.562) (0.591) 
Employee -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* -0.006* -0.005* -0.006* -0.006* -0.005* 
 (0.071) (0.092) (0.100) (0.069) (0.092) (0.069) (0.069) (0.089) 
BigFour -0.008** -0.007** -0.007** -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.008** -0.007** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.029) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) 
Geog_HHI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.798) (0.824) (0.808) (0.760) (0.817) (0.760) (0.760) (0.799) 
Product_herf 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.769) (0.735) (0.726) (0.747) (0.755) (0.747) (0.747) (0.731) 
Longtail_npw 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reinsurance -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mutual -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.155) (0.146) (0.143) (0.150) (0.138) (0.150) (0.150) (0.132) 
Group -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) 
Public -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.172) (0.139) (0.143) (0.155) (0.138) (0.155) (0.155) (0.133) 
High_Tax -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.089) (0.085) (0.084) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.083) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.022 -0.025 -0.026 -0.020 -0.025 -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 
 (0.620) (0.567) (0.562) (0.645) (0.570) (0.645) (0.645) (0.580) 
Profit 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.212) (0.223) (0.224) (0.209) (0.219) (0.209) (0.209) (0.212) 
Small_Loss 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.642) (0.649) (0.630) (0.641) (0.639) (0.641) (0.641) (0.662) 
Small_Profit -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.892) (0.841) (0.870) (0.896) (0.857) (0.896) (0.896) (0.821) 
Loss 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.155) (0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) 
Constant 0.054** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.053** 0.057*** 0.053** 0.053** 0.056** 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) 
Observations 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 12,348 
R-squared 0.141 0.138 0.139 0.142 0.137 0.142 0.142 0.137 
Number of firms 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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2.4.2.3 Do CEO Personal Characteristics Moderate Actuary Background Effect on the 
Accuracy of Loss Reserves? 
The Appointed Actuary’s job is to propose a range for loss reserves to management, from 
which management will determine a point estimate to report on the financial statements. Thus, the 
CEO’s background could also have a significant effect on the accuracy of loss reserve estimates. 
The results in Table 2-5 showed that CEO cultural group is not significantly associated with the 
accuracy of reserve errors, which could be due to that the CEO's background is not directly 
associated with the accuracy of the reserves. It is possible, though, that CEO personal background 
could have an indirect moderating effect on the accuracy of reserves. We hypothesize that if the 
CEO and actuary share the same cultural values, the effect of those values on the accuracy of the 
reserves will have a significantly stronger effect.  
As shown in Table 2-7, we do not find statistical evidence supporting the presence of an 
effect of the similarity in the cultural values of CEOs and actuaries except in the case of 
Masculinity. The moderating effect of the CEO-actuary similar cultural values significantly 
decreases the accuracy of loss reserves. This is consistent with our previous results of Highest 
Masculinity (but not lowest Masculinity) being negatively associated with the accuracy of reserves. 
This cultural value is strengthened by having high scores and representation of Masculinity but not 
Femininity (the lower end of the Masculinity-Femininity score).   
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Table 2-7: Effect of Cultural Values of Actuaries on the Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
Conditional on CEO Cultural Background Similarity 
The following table reports the results of ordinary least square regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute 
value of the reserve error scaled by total assets. CEOActCult is a binary variable that takes the value of one if CEO 
and actuary have the same GLOBE(2014) cultural group background and zero otherwise. CEOActCult x Av. CVI 
AA is an interaction term of the average Hofstede(1980) cultural value index Av. CVI AA  of the GLOBE(2014) 
group with CEOActCult. All other variables are described in Table 2-A2. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 
percent. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and 
***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Mas UA PDI IDV 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
Av. CVI AA -0.016 -0.027*** -0.036*** 0.034*** 
 (0.117) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEOActCult -0.090** 0.007 0.001 -0.007 
 (0.019) (0.461) (0.962) (0.803) 
CEOActCult x Av. CVI AA 0.153** -0.020 -0.009 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.303) (0.822) (0.901) 
Female AA -0.010** -0.011** -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.041) (0.023) (0.048) (0.048) 
Employee 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.573) (0.654) (0.635) (0.610) 
BigFour 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.419) (0.431) (0.368) (0.415) 
Geog_HHI -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.911) (0.942) (0.943) (0.931) 
Product_herf 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.821) (0.863) (0.789) (0.821) 
Longtail_npw 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 
 (0.116) (0.164) (0.118) (0.106) 
Reinsurance -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.104) (0.101) 
Mutual -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.205) (0.228) (0.127) (0.136) 
Group -0.012* -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* 
 (0.072) (0.056) (0.051) (0.055) 
Public -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.611) (0.704) (0.693) (0.746) 
High_Tax -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.367) (0.386) (0.357) (0.343) 
Prob_Insolvent 0.050 0.054 0.050 0.054 
 (0.436) (0.395) (0.435) (0.403) 
Profit 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.217) (0.218) (0.205) (0.194) 
Small_Loss 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.440) (0.409) (0.387) (0.394) 
Small_Profit -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.494) (0.466) (0.504) (0.493) 
Loss 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.783) (0.803) (0.797) (0.785) 
Constant 0.022 0.040 0.036 -0.004 
 (0.471) (0.220) (0.244) (0.900) 
Observations 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548 
R-squared 0.154 0.158 0.155 0.154 
Number of firms 884 884 884 884 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Our overall findings show that the cultural background of actuaries but not CEOs are 
associated with the accuracy of loss reserves. This effect is driven by the cultural values of the 
actuaries where those cultural values which promote less risky attitudes and caution are associated 
with greater accuracy of loss reserves, while those which promote more risky attitudes and 
uncertainty are associated with less accurate loss reserves. Our results show that the gender of 
actuaries is significantly associated with the accuracy of loss reserves only upon under reserving 
and when controlling for the CEO gender. We also find that the CEO's cultural origin is not directly 
associated with the accuracy of loss reserves and only strengthens the Masculinity effect of the 
actuary in decreasing the accuracy of loss reserves.  
2.4.2.4 How Do Personal Values Affect Loss Reserve Accuracy both upon Under-reserving and 
Over-reserving? 
We also believe that the personal background of the actuary influences the incentive to 
over reserve or under reserve. Specifically, we are interested in whether the effect of the cultural 
values and gender on the loss reserve accuracy is only in one direction.  
In particular, we conjecture that an actuary from cultures promoting less (greater) accuracy 
and having a more (less) risky attitude is more likely to over reserve or under reserve. Thus we 
would see greater (lower) positive reserve errors (over reserving) and smaller (greater) negative 
reserve errors (under reserving errors). We use the UA value score as it is most closely related to 
risk attitudes and accuracy of estimation. We hypothesize that actuaries with cultural backgrounds 
from low UA cultures, provide wider intervals for possible reserve estimates and exercise greater 
discretion in the range of estimates and those from high UA cultures provide narrower intervals 
for the reserve estimates. To test this, we divide our analysis into two subsamples, one with 
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underestimated reserves and the other with overestimated reserves and test the effect of the 
Appointed Actuary UA cultural values on the accuracy of loss reserves.  
Table 2-8: Effect of Actuary Uncertainty Avoidance on the Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
Upon Under-reserving and Over-reserving 
The following table reports the results of ordinary least square regressions. The dependent variable is the value of the absolute 
value of reserve error scaled by total assets. Column headed with RE>0 presents results when the reserve error is positive, and 
column headed with RE<0 presents results when the reserve error is negative. Av. UA AA is the average of the Hofstede (1980) 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index per GLOBE(2014) cultural group. Lowest (Highest) UA is a binary variable which takes the value 
of 1 if the cultural group is of lowest(highest) 20% of average UA and zero otherwise. All other variables are described in Table 
2-A2. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level 
and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
 RE>0 RE<0 RE>0 RE<0 RE>0 RE<0 
Av. UA AA -0.011* -0.031***     
 (0.061) (0.000)     
Lowest UA   0.004** 0.010***   
   (0.022) (0.001)   
Highest UA     -0.003 -0.011*** 
     (0.290) (0.003) 
Female AA -0.000 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011** -0.000 -0.011** 
 (0.887) (0.027) (0.905) (0.030) (0.949) (0.035) 
Employee -0.006* -0.007 -0.006* -0.007 -0.006* -0.006 
 (0.079) (0.123) (0.076) (0.108) (0.084) (0.186) 
BigFour -0.006* -0.007 -0.007* -0.008 -0.006* -0.006 
 (0.077) (0.142) (0.065) (0.109) (0.086) (0.188) 
Geog_HHI 0.007** -0.012** 0.007** -0.012** 0.007** -0.013** 
 (0.028) (0.043) (0.028) (0.045) (0.030) (0.035) 
Product_herf 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Size -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.277) (0.807) (0.280) (0.829) (0.287) (0.747) 
Longtail_npw 0.013*** 0.010* 0.013*** 0.010* 0.013*** 0.010* 
 (0.001) (0.084) (0.001) (0.072) (0.001) (0.080) 
Reinsurance -0.022*** -0.009 -0.022*** -0.009 -0.022*** -0.009 
 (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.111) 
Mutual -0.007** -0.011** -0.007** -0.011** -0.007** -0.011** 
 (0.050) (0.022) (0.049) (0.022) (0.047) (0.019) 
Group -0.005 -0.012** -0.005 -0.012** -0.005 -0.013** 
 (0.125) (0.037) (0.128) (0.042) (0.121) (0.032) 
Public -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.170) (0.541) (0.177) (0.522) (0.158) (0.534) 
High_Tax -0.000 -0.007*** -0.000 -0.007** -0.000 -0.007*** 
 (0.728) (0.010) (0.725) (0.012) (0.723) (0.008) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.188*** 0.052 -0.185*** 0.055 -0.191*** 0.043 
 (0.004) (0.389) (0.005) (0.360) (0.004) (0.469) 
Profit 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.390) (0.432) (0.387) (0.428) (0.394) (0.457) 
Small_Loss 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 
 (0.452) (0.433) (0.464) (0.451) (0.446) (0.440) 
Small_Profit -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.489) (0.530) (0.482) (0.537) (0.487) (0.572) 
Loss 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.119) (0.413) (0.122) (0.387) (0.119) (0.436) 
Constant 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.059** 0.073*** 0.073** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.045) (0.001) (0.012) 
Observations 8,987 3,328 8,987 3,328 8,987 3,328 
R-squared 0.160 0.201 0.161 0.200 0.158 0.197 
Number of firms 1,705 1,053 1,705 1,053 1,705 1,053 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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We present the results in Table 2-8. Our results suggest that the accuracy of loss reserve 
estimates performed by actuaries from low UA cultures is affected in both directions of the loss 
reserves. Where the estimates of the reserve error are higher for the positive reserve errors and 
lower for the negative reserve errors, thus, causing the reserve error to be more dispersed in both 
directions.  
A negative relationship between actuaries with a cultural background from High UA 
cultures suggests that they are associated with smaller under-reserving errors.  This is consistent 
with our expectation that these actuaries post smaller under-reserving errors.  
We also find that female actuary is associated with smaller under-reserving errors 
suggesting that they provide reserve estimates with more caution specifically when under 
reserving. Finding that female actuary estimate reserves with more accuracy at the under-reserving 
side is consistent with the findings of economics and psychology literature that females are more 
risk-averse than men. 
2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We perform several robustness tests because insurers choose their Appointed Actuary, and 
as such, there are endogeneity concerns. First, to alleviate the omitted variable bias, we controlled 
for year and state fixed effects as explained in the model section. 
Second, we perform identification tests to alleviate the concern of reverse causality. 
Reverse causality could arise due to the insurance companies choosing Appointed Actuaries with 
values that match the insurers’ preference in directing their loss reserves. As such, leading to 
reverse causality where the loss reserves of the insurance company cause the appointment of a 
certain actuary. We perform instrumental variables regressions to establish causality of the effect 
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of actuary cultural values and gender of both CEOs and actuaries that were found to be 
significantly associated with loss reserve accuracy in our main ordinary least square regressions.   
 We also perform a quasi-experimental shock analysis to alleviate the concern of an 
endogeneity arising from reverse causality. It may be possible that external events impact the 
choice of an actuary. Specifically, if insurers were intentionally choosing actuaries from a certain 
cultural group or gender to manage their loss reserve estimates, then after the 2008 financial crisis, 
we anticipate that insurers would be motivated to hire actuaries with values that promote less risky 
attitude and uncertainty. Thus, the cultural background of the actuary should be more important 
after the financial crisis than before.    
An additional robustness check is related to a concern of mistakenly assigning a cultural 
group using the family name. This issue mainly arises for females where whether or not a woman 
adopts her husband’s last name upon marriage depends on societal norms. Without undertaking 
any formal research, we believe that this might be the practice in the United States (in contrast, 
adopting one’s husband’s surname is forbidden in Quebec, Canada, and many EU countries and it 
is not common in China, Malaysia, Korea, and many Spanish speaking countries both in Europe 
and South America). Thus, to avoid confounding effects, we also examine the relationship between 
cultural background and the accuracy of loss reserves for male actuaries only.24  
2.5.1 Causal Relation between Actuary Cultural Values and Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
We use instrumental variables analysis to alleviate an endogeneity concern arising from 
reverse causality where an insurer with specific loss reserves chooses an Appointed Actuary with 
certain cultural values to manipulate the reserve accuracy.  
                                                 
24 We acknowledge that marriage for same-sex couples has been legal in some jurisdictions in the U.S. since 2004, but only since 
2015 has it been legal in all states. Therefore, we make the assumption that the possibility a male/females actuary taking the last 
name of his/her husband is small and such occurrence would not impact our results.  
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We choose as our instrumental variables the total number of Appointed Actuaries in 
insurance companies other than the intended insurer in the previous year, who belong to a cultural 
group with the highest (lowest) UA score. Those actuaries constitute the pool of Appointed 
Actuaries with specific cultural values that an insurance company can attract to appoint in the 
coming year. Given the specific skills and training that the Appointed Actuary should have make 
them limited to the insurer, there is an inverse relationship between the pool of actuaries in peer 
companies of specific cultural value with the instrumented variable (Av. UA, highest (lowest) 
UA). Thus, a specific insurer has fewer chances of having an Appointed Actuary with low UA 
values if other insurance companies have a greater number of Appointed Actuaries with low UA 
and vice versa for high UA. Our first stage results in Table 2-9 confirm this observation with a 
negative (positive) association of the total number of actuaries with the highest (lowest) UA 
cultural values and the average UA score. The second instrumental variable that we use is the 
estimated number of students with high UA cultural values in the closest Center of Actuarial 
Excellence (CAE) to the insurer. This variable, in contrast to the already existing in the labor force 
actuaries, constitutes the market for freshly graduating actuaries who do not yet have ties to any 
insurance company. We estimate this number of students by using the percentage of international 
students from countries with the highest UA cultures and multiply it by the total number of students 
enrolled in the CAE. The number of students with the highest UA values in closest CAE would be 
positively associated with the Appointed Actuary being also from a culture with the highest UA 
and vice versa for lowest UA actuaries.  
Our first stage regression results presented in Table 2-9 confirm this prediction, where 
HUA students are significantly positively (negatively) associated with the Highest (Lowest) UA. 
Our tests of over-identification, weak instruments, and under-identification as measured by 
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Hansen-Sargan J statistic, Kleinberg-Paap Wald F statistic and Kleinberg-Paap Wald LM statistic, 
show that our instrumental variables chosen (as used in Table 2-9) are valid, not weak, and 
correlated with the endogenous variable tested.  
The second stage regression results are consistent with our OLS findings. The cultural 
values of actuaries (as proxied by the average UA) significantly increases the accuracy of loss 
reserves, where actuaries with cultural origins with lowest UA scores decrease the accuracy of loss 
reserves and those with cultural origins with the highest UA scores increase the accuracy of loss 
reserves.  
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Table 2-9: Identification Test - Effect of Actuary Uncertainty Avoidance on the Accuracy 
of Loss Reserves 
The following table reports the results of two stage least square regressions. The instrumented variables are the Highest UA, 
Lowest UA and Av. UA AA. The instrument variables used are: Other HUAt-1(Other LUAt-1) which is the number of actuaries 
with Highest (Lowest) UA in peer companies (insurance if employed and actuarial if non-employed actuary) in the previous 
year and HUAstudents which is an estimate of number of students in the closest Center of Actuarial Excellence who have a High 
UA background. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the reserve error scaled by total assets. All other variables are 
described in Table 2-A2. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering 
at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 Av. UA Abs(RE) Highest UA Abs(RE) Lowest UA Abs(RE) 
Av. UA AA  -0.024**     
  (0.039)     
Highest UA    -0.008*   
    (0.092)   
Lowest UA      0.011** 
      (0.014) 
Female AA -0.015 -0.003 0.021 -0.002 0.054* -0.002 
 (0.138) (0.434) (0.387) (0.537) (0.052) (0.484) 
Employee 0.018** -0.006* 0.024 -0.004 -0.069*** -0.005 
 (0.026) (0.091) (0.170) (0.245) (0.002) (0.174) 
BigFour -0.013 -0.005 -0.022 -0.003 0.035 -0.004 
 (0.259) (0.137) (0.410) (0.430) (0.235) (0.222) 
Geog_HHI 0.015 -0.001 0.029 -0.001 -0.032 -0.001 
 (0.132) (0.737) (0.198) (0.782) (0.253) (0.846) 
Product_herf -0.003 0.021*** -0.019 0.020*** -0.029 0.021*** 
 (0.804) (0.000) (0.478) (0.000) (0.340) (0.000) 
Size -0.005** -0.000 -0.010* -0.001 0.017*** -0.001 
 (0.035) (0.734) (0.053) (0.627) (0.008) (0.635) 
Longtail_npw -0.029*** 0.016*** -0.055** 0.016*** 0.073*** 0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
Reinsurance 0.024** -0.013*** 0.048** -0.013*** -0.041 -0.013*** 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.040) (0.001) (0.159) (0.001) 
Mutual -0.001 -0.006* -0.008 -0.006* -0.019 -0.005* 
 (0.943) (0.058) (0.668) (0.073) (0.421) (0.087) 
Group -0.021*** -0.007* -0.053*** -0.008** 0.033 -0.008** 
 (0.010) (0.058) (0.005) (0.046) (0.144) (0.047) 
Public 0.026*** -0.002 0.054*** -0.002 -0.055*** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.301) (0.002) (0.297) (0.007) (0.400) 
High_Tax -0.001 -0.002* 0.006 -0.002* 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.804) (0.084) (0.649) (0.084) (0.883) (0.104) 
Prob_Insolvent 0.042 -0.013 -0.574* -0.013 -0.457 -0.003 
 (0.759) (0.776) (0.076) (0.767) (0.232) (0.952) 
Profit -0.000 0.002 -0.013 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.961) (0.353) (0.349) (0.297) (0.975) (0.270) 
Small_Profit 0.009 -0.000 0.025 -0.001 -0.023 -0.001 
 (0.319) (0.870) (0.256) (0.803) (0.383) (0.837) 
Small_Loss -0.005 0.001 -0.031 0.002 0.024 0.001 
 (0.763) (0.748) (0.403) (0.677) (0.578) (0.730) 
Loss 0.002 0.002 -0.010 0.002 -0.019 0.002 
 (0.836) (0.416) (0.533) (0.475) (0.360) (0.456) 
Other LUAt-1 36.178***    -153.211***  
 (0.000)    (0.000)  
Other HUAt-1 -24.975***  -148.164***    
 (0.000)  (0.000)    
HUA Students   0.079***  -0.069***  
   (0.000)  (0.006)  
Constant -16.615*** 0.081*** 25.837*** 0.074*** 91.632*** 0.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) 
Observations 10,645 10,645 10,415 10,415 10,415 10,415 
R-squared 0.373 0.154 0.428 0.151 0.401 0.154 
Wald F  251.768  266.517  241.900 
Hansen-Sargan Pval  0.447  0.347  0.279 
Kleibergen-Paap LM Pval  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of firms 1,849 1,849 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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2.5.2 Exogenous Shocks and the Choice of Actuary 
We also perform a quasi-experimental shock analysis to test for the presence of a reverse 
causality and establish causality between the actuary cultural values and the accuracy of the loss 
reserves.  
Specifically, for the exogenous shock, we examine the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. 
If insurance companies were intentionally choosing actuaries from a certain cultural group to 
manage their loss reserve estimates, then after the 2008 financial crisis, we would expect firms to 
employ actuaries from high UA cultures. This practice would make the cultural background of the 
actuary more important after the financial crisis than before. To test that, we include an indicator 
variable Post2008 into our original model (equation (3)), which takes the value of one for the 
period after 2008 and zero for the period before 2008. We interact this indicator variable with our 
proxies of actuary cultural values,𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐴, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑈𝐴, and Av. UA AA to test whether their 
effect is significantly different after the financial crisis, thus confirming a selection bias. 
The results in Table 2-10 suggest that there is no evidence of selection bias. The interaction 
term coefficient does not exhibit a significant effect on the accuracy of the loss reserve. The 
coefficient estimate on Lowest UA remains negatively and significantly associated with the loss 
reserve accuracy, and that of Av. UA AA remain positively and significantly associated with the 
loss reserve accuracy.  
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Table 2-10: Quasi Experimental Shock Analysis - Effect of Actuary Uncertainty Avoidance 
on the Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
The following table reports the results of ordinary least square regressions. The dependent variable is the absolute value 
of the reserve error scaled by total assets. Lowest (Highest) UA is a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
cultural group is of lowest(highest) 20% of average UA and zero otherwise. Av. UA is the average of the Hofstede 
(1980) Uncertainty Avoidance per GLOBE(2014) cultural group. Post2008 is a binary variable equal to 1 if year is 
post 2008 and zero if year is before 2008. Low(High)UApost is an interaction term of Lowest (Highest) UA and 
Post2008. Av.UApost is an interaction term of Av. UA and Post2008.  All other variables are described in Table 2-A2. 
All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer 
level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
Lowest UA 0.007***   
 (0.002)   
LowUApost -0.003   
 (0.247)   
Highest UA  -0.002  
  (0.552)  
HighUApost  -0.003  
  (0.387)  
Av. UA   -0.017** 
   (0.013) 
Av.UApost   0.004 
   (0.578) 
Post2008 -0.003 -0.004** -0.007 
 (0.230) (0.042) (0.133) 
Female AA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.515) (0.500) (0.465) 
Employee -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.064) (0.084) (0.076) 
BigFour -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.031) 
Geog_HHI 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.966) (0.990) (0.980) 
Product_herf 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.749) (0.771) (0.739) 
Longtail_npw 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reinsurance -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mutual -0.005* -0.005* -0.005 
 (0.097) (0.094) (0.101) 
Group -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Public -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.128) (0.111) (0.129) 
High_Tax -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.204) (0.214) (0.209) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.846) (0.768) (0.828) 
Profit 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 
 (0.093) (0.106) (0.098) 
Small_Loss 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.656) (0.637) (0.636) 
Small_Profit -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.950) (0.900) (0.934) 
Loss 0.005** 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.050) (0.053) (0.051) 
Constant 0.050** 0.056** 0.065*** 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.004) 
Observations 10,950 10,950 10,950 
R-squared 0.145 0.142 0.145 
Number of firms 1,893 1,893 1,893 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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2.5.3 Causal Relation between Actuary and CEO gender and Accuracy of Loss Reserves 
Our ordinary least square analysis shows that female CEOs are significantly and negatively 
associated with the accuracy of loss reserves. We are concerned that the choice of the CEO gender 
by the insurance company is affected by the increased pressure in recent years (especially after the 
2008 financial crisis) to hire female CEOs because they are expected to undertake less risky 
decisions. If our concern is valid, the findings in the OLS regressions suffer from an endogeneity 
issue arising from reverse causality. As a preliminary test, we ran a subsample analysis to test 
whether the effect of female CEOs in a more recent period (post-2008 financial crisis)25 is different 
from that in earlier periods of our sample (pre-2008). We divide our data into two sub-samples 
pre-2008 and post-2010; we find that gender of CEO is not significantly associated with the 
accuracy of loss reserves, while it is significantly and negatively associated with the accuracy of 
loss reserves in the more recent period. These results serve as a preliminary test for our concern of 
reverse causality.  
To more formally address the endogeneity concern regarding the gender effect results that 
we find significant. We address the significant effect of female actuaries of loss reserves at the 
under-reserving side (Table 2-8), the significant effect of female actuary when controlling for 
female CEO (Table 2-5), and the significant effect of female CEO (Table 2-5) on the accuracy of 
loss reserves. We run instrumental variables analysis using the total number of female CEOs in 
the insurance companies in the corresponding state as an instrument for Female CEO and the total 
number of female actuaries in all actuarial companies in the specific year as an instrument for 
Female AA.  
                                                 
25 We use 2010 as the reference year due to data constraints, results are not presented but available upon request.  
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Table 2-11: Identification Test - Effect of CEO and Actuary Gender on the Accuracy and 
Direction of Loss Reserves 
The following table reports the results of two stage least square regressions. The instrumented variables are the Female CEO 
and Female AA. The instruments are the total number of female CEOs (SumFemCEOs) in the insurance companies in our sample 
in the corresponding state in the same year and total number of female actuaries (SumFemAct) in the other actuarial companies 
in the corresponding year. The dependent variables are the absolute value of the reserve error scaled by total assets (Abs(RE)) 
and RE<0 the negative reserve error . All other variables are described in Table 2-A2. All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 
percent. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 Female AA RE<0 Female AA Abs(RE) Female CEO Abs(RE) 
Female AA  0.019*  -0.006 -0.002 -0.010** 
  (0.058)  (0.579) (0.896) (0.029) 
Av. UA AA -0.031 0.030*** -0.128** -0.027*** 0.020 -0.024*** 
 (0.636) (0.000) (0.050) (0.001) (0.586) (0.002) 
Female CEO   0.021 0.016**  0.014 
   (0.539) (0.028)  (0.634) 
Employee -0.033 0.007* 0.001 0.002 0.015 -0.000 
 (0.308) (0.064) (0.957) (0.697) (0.249) (0.903) 
Bigfour -0.190*** 0.008* -0.191*** 0.003 0.025 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.471) (0.462) (0.572) 
Geog_HHI 0.010 0.012** 0.006 0.000 -0.025 -0.001 
 (0.707) (0.025) (0.812) (0.948) (0.170) (0.801) 
Product_herf 0.046* -0.020*** 0.054* 0.029*** 0.075*** 0.031*** 
 (0.091) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Size -0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.007 0.001 
 (0.833) (0.705) (0.654) (0.728) (0.161) (0.694) 
Longtail_npw -0.029 -0.010* -0.061* 0.008 0.030 0.006 
 (0.295) (0.066) (0.056) (0.137) (0.143) (0.315) 
Reinsurance 0.106*** 0.007 0.035 -0.010* 0.006 -0.009* 
 (0.000) (0.197) (0.123) (0.069) (0.750) (0.098) 
Mutual 0.001 0.010** -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.956) (0.037) (0.958) (0.174) (0.840) (0.137) 
Group -0.015 0.011** -0.013 -0.013** -0.028* -0.015** 
 (0.526) (0.043) (0.569) (0.043) (0.074) (0.013) 
Public -0.025** 0.002 -0.009 -0.001 -0.028** -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.701) (0.594) (0.772) (0.033) (0.768) 
High_Tax 0.010 0.006** 0.021*** -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.212) (0.017) (0.010) (0.384) (0.942) (0.449) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.079 -0.042 0.010 0.061 -0.034 0.063 
 (0.495) (0.435) (0.904) (0.355) (0.602) (0.340) 
Profit 0.007 -0.003 -0.029** 0.004 0.008 0.004 
 (0.600) (0.378) (0.012) (0.226) (0.510) (0.259) 
Small_Loss 0.019 -0.007 -0.061** 0.008 0.025 0.008 
 (0.618) (0.324) (0.046) (0.384) (0.282) (0.385) 
Small_Profit 0.021 -0.003 -0.060*** -0.003 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.237) (0.459) (0.003) (0.534) (0.370) (0.442) 
Loss 0.021 -0.003 -0.025* 0.001 0.009 0.001 
 (0.152) (0.378) (0.072) (0.774) (0.499) (0.706) 
SumFemAct 0.035***  0.040***    
 (0.000)  (0.000)    
SumFemCEO     0.028***  
     (0.000)  
Constant 0.009 -0.294*** 0.179 0.067** -0.159 0.044 
 (0.933) (0.000) (0.170) (0.022) (0.114) (0.125) 
Observations 3328 3328 3548 3548 3548 3548 
R-squared 0.299 0.195 0.299 0.162 0.058 0.103 
Wald F  117.083  218.293  24.608 
Kleibergen-Paap LM Pval  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
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Our results presented in Table 2-11 show that the significant effect of Female CEO and 
actuary does not hold in the instrumental variables regressions, except when controlling for CEO 
gender, which aligns with our concern of the presence of a reverse causality and selection problem. 
Thus, we caution on concluding that the gender of the CEO or the actuary could have a significant 
effect on the accuracy of loss reserves.  
As for the positive association of the female actuary and the accuracy of loss reserves at 
the under-reserving side, our results still hold after implementing the instrumental variables 
regressions. These results are consistent with the findings of psychology and economic literature 
confirming that females are more risk-averse (Croson, Gneezy, & Rey-Biel, 2012; Croson & 
Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2008) and some finance and accounting literature (Faccio et 
al., 2016; Francis et al., 2015). 
2.5.4 Robustness Test—Family Name Changes 
We believe that it is conventional in the U.S. that women adopt their husband’s surname 
upon marriage. While acknowledging that this practice strengthens our result (as it introduces more 
noise in the regressions because female actuaries could be assigned to the wrong cultural group), 
we rerun our main regression excluding females from our sample. The results in Table 2-12 
confirm the robustness of our results, where the effect of the cultural values used as proxies still 
holds upon excluding the females from our sample.  
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Table 2-12: Effect of Actuary Background on the Accuracy of Loss Reserves Excluding 
Females 
The following table reports the results of ordinary least square regressions excluding all female actuaries. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of the reserve error scaled by total assets. All other variables are described in Table 2-A2. 
All variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. P-values (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the insurer 
level and heteroskedasticity. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 MAS UA PDI IDV 
 Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) Abs(RE) 
Av. CVI AA -0.001 -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.016*** 
 (0.897) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
Employee -0.007** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.007** 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.012) 
BigFour -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.008*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) 
Geog_HHI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.809) (0.838) (0.848) (0.851) 
Product_herf 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.694) (0.654) (0.649) (0.659) 
Longtail_npw 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reinsurance -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Mutual -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.328) (0.341) (0.299) (0.303) 
group -0.010** -0.009** -0.010** -0.009** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) 
Public -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.181) (0.226) (0.208) (0.223) 
High_Tax -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.043) 
Prob_Insolvent -0.037 -0.033 -0.036 -0.034 
 (0.417) (0.458) (0.423) (0.445) 
Profit 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.170) (0.171) (0.167) (0.158) 
Small_Loss 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.619) (0.610) (0.615) (0.619) 
Small_Profit -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.966) (0.981) (0.999) (0.994) 
Loss 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.178) (0.186) (0.186) (0.182) 
Constant 0.064** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.054** 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.035) 
Observations 10,939 10,939 10,939 10,939 
R-squared 0.131 0.136 0.133 0.133 
Number of firms 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Companies are spending millions of dollars on increasing diversity (Newkirk, 2019). 
Legislators, in turn, are ensuring greater ethnic and gender representation by passing bills requiring 
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companies to report the race, ethnicity, and gender of their top management. Although theoretical 
evidence suggests that personal background of management significantly affects their decisions 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and cultural values influence accounting values (Gray, 1988), 
empirical evidence is either inconclusive (as the case with gender) or limited (as the case with 
cultural origin).   
We fill the gap in accounting literature by showing that the cultural background of 
Appointed Actuaries is significantly associated with the accuracy of loss reserves and that this 
association is driven by the cultural values of the actuaries. Actuaries with higher (lower) 
Uncertainty Avoidance, higher (lower) Power Distance, lower (higher) Individualism are 
significantly associated with greater (lower) accuracy of loss reserves. These results are consistent 
with the upper echelon theory and support Gray’s theory (1988) by directly testing the influence 
of cultural values on accounting values (Conservatism). We establish causality by using 
instrumental variables and quasi-experimental tests, and our results are robust to endogeneity and 
other robustness checks. 
We also show that the gender effect cannot be generalized, which could be the reason of 
inconclusiveness in the previous literature. Our results show that female actuaries increase the 
accuracy of loss reserves only upon under reserving. Additionally, Masculinity (and not 
femininity) is associated with lower accuracy of loss reserves. As for the CEO gender effect, the 
significant association with loss reserve accuracy does not hold after controlling for endogeneity. 
Our results hint to the possibility of companies being pushed to hire female CEOs after the recent 
financial crisis. 
Additionally, we show that cultural background homogeneity of actuaries and CEOs could 
only play a moderating role when the cultural values of the actuary alone do not have enough 
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influence on the accuracy of loss reserves (as the case of Masculinity). These results contribute to 
filling the gap in corporate decision literature on how the homogeneity of management 
characteristics affects corporate decisions as noted to be scarce by Zhang (2019) and Plöckinger 
et al. (2016). 
Our study provides legislators and stakeholders with scientific evidence of how ethnic and 
gender diversity could affect financial reporting. Such evidence is necessary to show the 
importance of diversity and its possible sources in light of the increasing pressure and spending on 
improving it. Our study shows that cultural values are persistent and significantly affect accounting 
decisions. We find evidence that companies could achieve diversity by sourcing managers not only 
from different cultural origins. For example, those who identify as Caucasian (Anglo, Latin 
European, Germanic, Eastern, or Western European) have different values within the Caucasian 
group and would result in different decisions and contribute to diversity.  
Finally, our study promotes further research on the effect of cultural background on finance 
and accounting decisions and reporting beyond cross-country analysis. It identifies that the cultural 
values of decision-makers should be accounted for when studying the effect of personal 
characteristics on accounting decisions. It promotes the use of an epidemiological approach to 
separate the impact of culture from institutional and economic factors. It also sheds light on the 
importance of considering the specific situations when studying the gender effect rather than trying 
to generalize across the female positions in the company and different decisions to be made.  
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2.7 APPENDIX 
2.7.1 Summary of Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
Hofstede (1980), in his foundational work based on a survey of 116,000 IBM employees, 
identified four cultural value dimensions: Power Distance, Masculinity-Femininity, Individualism, 
and Uncertainty Avoidance. These dimensions are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100 by 
comparing the countries. We present below a brief description of each of Hofstede's (1980) 
dimensions: 
Power Distance: is the extent to which the members of a society accept power inequality. In 
societies with greater power distance, hierarchy and unequal power distribution is more accepted 
in organizations and institutions. In low power distance societies the norm value is that inequality 
should be minimized. 
Masculinity-Femininity: is the extent to which force is endorsed. In more masculine societies, men 
and women are very distant emotionally and such societies are characterized by competition and 
achieving material success. While societies with lower masculinity are characterized by mentoring 
and higher quality of life. 
Uncertainty Avoidance: is the extent to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Societies with lower uncertainty avoidance encourage change and 
experimentation. While societies with higher uncertainty avoidance dislike change and could be 
characterized by “well-oiled machine” processes. 
Individualism: is the extent to which people feel independent and not connected to their groups. 
People in higher individualism societies focus of the “I” and are more self-oriented. People in low 
individualism societies (collectivism) are more group or family centric.  
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2.7.2 Summary of Gray (1988) Accounting Values and Framework 
Gray (1988) posits that accountants derive their values from societal values, which in turn 
influence accounting values, which consequently influence accounting systems. The framework 
of Gray theory (1988) is summarized in Figure 2-A1. 
 
We summarize Gray (1988) accounting values definitions below: 
Professionalism: is the extent to which an accountant prefers to exercise self-professional 
judgment versus following statutory regulations.  
Secrecy: is the extent to which disclosure of information and transparency is not preferred. 
Conservatism: is the extent to which certainty is preferred over ambiguity of future events and less 
risk taking. 
Uniformity: is the extent to which uniform practices and rules are preferred to be used over time 
versus greater flexibility.  
  
 
 
External Influences 
Ecological Influences Societal Values Institutional Consequences 
Accounting SystemsAccounting Values
Figure 2-A1: Gray (1988) Framework 
Source: Gray 1988 
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Table 2-A1: Sample selection 
Individually reporting Property and Casualty Insurance 
company-years in NAIC Statutory files from 2005-2017 
  40,994 
Less: Companies exempt from statutory opinion or do not 
report a specific individual name of actuary 
 -10,936 30,058   
Less: Companies with negative or null surplus  -109 29,949 
Less: Companies with negative or null losses  -6,127 23,822 
Less: Companies with negative or null Incurred Lossest   - 1,277 22,545 
Less: Companies missing financial variables including 
the dependent variable 
 -10,196 12,349 
Less: Companies missing company characteristics 
variables 
 -1 12,348 
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Table 2-A2: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description 
Dependent Variables  
REi,t 
Reserve Error which is the difference between insurer i’s original medical malpractice loss 
reserve estimate in year t and the developed loss reserve in period t+5 scaled by total assets.  
Abs(RE)i,t 
Absolute Value of Reserve Error which is the difference between insurer i’s original medical 
malpractice loss reserve estimate in year t and the developed loss reserve in period t+5 scaled 
by total assets. 
Actuary Characteristics  
Female AAit Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i is a female in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Anglo AAi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i has a background of Anglo 
GLOBE(2014) group in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Latin Eur AAi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i has a background of Latin Europe 
GLOBE(2014) group in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Ger Eur AAi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i has a background of Germanic 
Europe GLOBE(2014) group in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Av. CVI AAi,t 
Average of Hofstede(2001) Cultural Value Index of the GLOBE(2014) cultural group to which 
the Appointed Actuary of insurer i in year t belongs. The Cultural Value Indexes considered in 
our study are: Masculinity-Femininity (MAS);  Uncertainty Avoidance (UA);  Power Distance 
(PD);  Individualism-Collectivism (IDV). 
Highesti,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i in year t belongs to a group of 
GLOBE(2014) cultural original with highest 20% Hofstede(2001) Cultural Value Index 
Average and 0 otherwise. 
Lowesti,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i in year t belongs to a group of 
GLOBE(2014) cultural original with lowest 20% Hofstede(2001) Cultural Value Index Average 
and 0 otherwise. 
CEOActCult i,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i in year t and the CEO of the same 
insurer in that year belong to the same GLOBE(2014) cultural original group and 0 otherwise. 
CEO Characteristics  
Female CEOi,t Binary variable equal to 1 if CEO of insurer i is a female in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Anglo CEOi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if CEO of insurer i has a background of Anglo GLOBE (2014) group 
in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Latin Eur CEOi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if CEO of insurer i has a background of Latin Europe GLOBE (2014) 
group in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Ger Eur CEOi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if CEO of insurer i has a background of Germanic Europe GLOBE 
(2014) group in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Non-discretionary Variables 
Employeei,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if Appointed Actuary of insurer i in year t is an employee insurer i 
and 0 otherwise. 
Big Fouri,t 
Binary variable equal 1 if insurer i used one of the big 4 actuarial/audit firms in year t and 0 
otherwise. The big 4 are Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KMPG and Pricewaterhouse Coopers. 
Sizei,t  Natural log of insurer i’s total assets in year t. 
Groupi,t Binary variable equal to 1 if insurer i is a member of a group in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Mutuali,t Binary variable equal to 1 if insurer i is organized as a mutual in year t and 0 otherwise. 
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Publici,t Binary variable equal to 1 if insurer i is publicly traded in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Reinsurancei,t 
Insurer i’s reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of reinsurance assumed and direct premiums 
written in year t.  
Geog HHIi,t Herfindahl index for insurer i’s net premiums written in year t by state. 
Product HHIi,t Herfindahl index for insurer i’s net premiums written in year t by line of business. 
Longtaili,t Percentage of insurer i’s net premiums written in long-tailed business in year t. 
Discretionary Variables 
High_Taxi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if insurer i in year t does not have a net operating loss carryforward 
and 0 otherwise. 
Prob_Insolventi,t 
The predicted probability of insolvency of insurer i in year t based on a fitted probability of 
insolvency using IRIS ratios. 
Profiti,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if earnings of insurer i in year t are in the top 90% of the positive 
earnings distribution and 0 otherwise. 
Small_Lossi,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if earnings of insurer i in year t are in the top 5% of the negative 
earnings distribution and 0 otherwise. 
Lossi,t 
A binary variable equal to 1 if earnings are in the top 90% of the negative earnings distribution 
and 0 otherwise. 
Small_Profiti,t 
Binary variable equal to 1 if earnings of insurer i in year t are in the bottom five 5% of the 
positive earnings distribution and 0 otherwise. 
Instrumental Variables  
Other LUAi,t-1 
Total number of Appointed Actuaries in insurance companies other than insurer i in year t-1 
who belong to a group of GLOBE (2014) cultural original with lowest 20% Hofstede (1980) 
Cultural Value Index Average of Uncertainty Avoidance and 0 otherwise. 
Other HUAi,t-1 
Total number of Appointed Actuaries in insurance companies other than insurer i in year t-1 
who belong to a group of GLOBE (2014) cultural original with highest 20% Hofstede (1980) 
Cultural Value Index Average of Uncertainty Avoidance and 0 otherwise. 
HUA Studentsi,t Estimated number of students (in thousands) in the nearest Actuarial Center of Excellence to 
insurer  i in year t who  belong to a group of GLOBE (2014) cultural original with highest 20% 
Hofstede (1980) Cultural Value Index Average of Uncertainty Avoidance. 
SumFemCEOi,t Total number of female CEOs in insurance companies other than insurer i in year t in the state 
of domicile of the insurer i.  
SumFemActi,t Total number of female Appointed Actuaries in actuarial companies (or insurance companies if 
the Appointed Actuary is an employee) other than that to which the Appointed Actuary of insurer 
i belongs in year t.  
114 
 
Table 2-A3: Correlation of actuary and CEO background variables 
This table presents pairwise correlation of actuary and CEO background variables. *, **, and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Female 
AA 
Anglo 
AA 
Latin 
Eur AA 
Ger 
Eur AA 
Av. 
MAS 
AA 
Av. UA 
AA 
Av. PD 
AA 
Av. 
IDV AA 
CEO 
Act 
Cult 
Anglo 
CEO 
Ger 
Eur 
CEO 
Latin 
Eur 
CEO 
Female 
CEO 
Female AA 1.00             
Anglo AA 0.04* 1.00            
Latin Eur AA -0.03* -0.43*** 1.00           
Ger Eur AA -0.09*** -0.46*** -0.20*** 1.00          
Av. MAS AA -0.02 0.65*** -0.39*** 0.03 1.00         
Av. UA AA 0.02 -0.82*** 0.75*** 0.25*** -0.45*** 1.00        
Av. PD AA 0.04** -0.67*** 0.51*** -0.20*** -0.36*** 0.72*** 1.00       
Av. IDV AA 0.02 0.82*** -0.32*** -0.05** 0.45*** -0.63*** -0.92*** 1.00      
CEOActCult -0.01 0.52*** -0.18*** -0.21*** 0.36*** -0.39*** -0.37*** 0.45*** 1.00     
Anglo CEO -0.04** -0.03 -0.06*** -0.00 -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.00 -0.07*** 0.38*** 1.00    
GerEurCEO -0.01 -0.03 0.07*** -0.03 -0.01 0.12*** 0.07*** -0.01 -0.16*** -0.50*** 1.00   
LatinEurCEO 0.06*** -0.04* 0.01 0.11*** 0.04* 0.06*** -0.02 0.02 -0.14*** -0.48*** -0.16*** 1.00  
Female CEO 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.05** -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.13*** -0.02 1.00 
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3 PRICING DYNAMICS IN THE MARKET FOR CATASTROPHE 
BONDS  
  
116 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 It has been more than 30 years since the modern Catastrophe Bond (Cat bond) market arose 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. Since then, the idea of giving investors the opportunity to 
take part in insurance risks has gained in popularity. According to Artemis,26 issuance of Cat bonds 
reached USD 13.86 billion in 2018, while there were USD 37.55 billion of Cat bonds outstanding 
at the end of the same year. Given the rising popularity of this asset class among investors, it is 
important that we understand the evolution of factors affecting Cat bond pricing. Our paper 
addresses this issue and examines the behaviour of Cat bond pricing over time as well as the time 
variability of the factors affecting such prices. We believe our study improves our understanding 
of the Cat bond pricing mechanics and, as a result, makes a significant contribution to the related 
literature.  
From a pricing perspective, the main driver of the Cat bond risk prices is the bond expected 
loss (EL).27 The main objective of this paper is to study the time series evolution of the price of 
expected loss risk and identify its most significant time patterns.28 More importantly, we formally 
test for possible economic theories that can explain the observed patterns. 
The following is a summary of our main findings. First, we document two periods during 
which (ceteris paribus) the price of expected loss risk increased significantly. The first one, 
triggered by bonds issued at the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, lasted for 
approximately 16 months. The second, triggered by bonds issued after the Tohoku earthquake and 
the U.S. windstorms season during March 2011, lasted for 23 months. Both of these periods of 
                                                 
26 Artemis Catastrophe Bond & Insurance-Linked Securities Deal Directory, “Catastrophe bonds & ILS issued and outstanding by 
year” retrieved from: https://www.artemis.bm/dashboard/catastrophe-bonds-ils-issued-and-outstanding-by-year/ 
27 For example, the pricing models of Lane (2000), Lane and Mahul (2008), Dieckmann (2010), Galeotti, Gürtler and Winkelvos 
(2013) 
28 We refer the price of expected loss risk to the coefficient (multiple) of the linear regression of Cat bond spreads and bond expected 
loss. This price does not measure uncertainty on the estimation of expected loss.  
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increasing prices were followed by periods of decreasing prices that lasted for 23 to 29 months.  
The increases, approximately 34% over and above the pre-event expected loss spread, are 
statistically and economically significant. 
We explore two possible economic explanations proposed in the literature for such time 
series behavior. Gürtler, Hibbeln and Winkelvos (2016) attribute the increase in prices after 
Hurricane Katrina to an investors’ decrease in their reliance on estimated expected losses. In other 
words, due to the event, investors update their preferences by reducing their trust on the estimated 
event probabilities and expected losses predicted by catastrophe modeling companies. This 
triggers an increase in the expected loss coefficients (prices). Alternatively, the increases observed 
after major catastrophic events may be a consequence of an increase in investors’ effective risk 
aversion leading to hard reinsurance market environments. According to the Dieckmann (2010) 
theoretical model, large catastrophic events may trigger changes in Cat bond investors’ effective 
risk aversion if the event brings them closer to their habit consumption levels. If individual 
investors measure happiness with respect to a subsistence level of consumption, events like Katrina 
bring them close to this subsistence level, and as a result, investors command a higher risk premium 
in order to provide the needed financing.29  Also, Cummins and Trainar (2009) discuss how 
changes in effective risk aversion may explain the swings in reinsurance prices and supply of 
coverage documented in the literature. When they sustain a capital shock due to a large catastrophe 
or unusual investment loss, reinsurers’ effective risk aversion rises, leading to higher prices and a 
hard reinsurance market environment. Such observed behaviour in the reinsurance markets are 
likely to be emulated by the Cat bond markets. 
                                                 
29 It is important to note that we test the theoretical motivations of Gürtler, Hibbeln and Winkelvos (2016) and Dieckmann (2010) 
and not their empirical results. Different from our study, the empirical tests in Gürtler, Hibbeln and Winkelvos (2016) are based on 
secondary market data and are oriented to test the long-term change of expected loss multiples after catastrophic events. 
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We formally test for the relevance of these two alternative hypotheses in our sample. Our 
tests show that the price of expected loss risk is only affected by large catastrophes triggering Cat 
bond losses. Other large catastrophes which did not trigger Cat bond losses (e.g., Hurricane 
Sandy), did not have a significant effect on expected loss risk prices. If the changes in expected 
loss prices are motivated by investors’ behavioural updates in their preferences after a large 
catastrophe, these effects should be observed after any large catastrophe. Moreover, we find no 
evidence that investors update these preferences after improvements or updates in the modeling 
technology, assumptions, and data used by third-party catastrophe modelling agencies. These tests 
and others, among a series of robustness checks, provide evidence that the increase in the price of 
expected loss risk is unlikely to be the result of behavioral changes in investors’ perceptions with 
respect to catastrophic risk. Instead, consistent with the Dieckmann (2010) hypothesis, the increase 
in the price of expected loss risk is likely related with changes in effective risk aversion, initiated 
by investors reaching habit consumption levels when a catastrophic event triggers Cat bond losses.  
Second, we find an overall decreasing trend in the price of expected loss risk in our sample 
period that covers Cat bonds issued between 1999 and 2016. Our multivariate model shows that 
the price of expected loss risk decreases in average 0.62 bps for every month in our sample.30 
These results are not surprizing and in line with previous findings in the literature (Cummins and 
Weiss, 2009; Gürtler, Hibbeln, and Winkelvos, 2016; and Braun, 2016). This decreasing trend in 
the price of expected loss risk may be the result of an initial novelty effect and a subsequent 
maturation effect reflecting the increasing investor experience and learning in the Cat bond 
markets.31  
                                                 
30 The price of expected loss risk decreased by 42% from the 1999-2005 period to the 2014-2016 period.  
31 See Froot (2001), Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000), Froot and O’Connell (2008) and Cummins and Mahul (2008) for discussions 
on the decrease of Cat bond expected loss ratios over time. See Braun et al. (2013) and Braun and Weber (2017) for the effects of 
learning on Cat bonds and ILS markets.  
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Our empirical tests are based on the pricing model proposed by Braun (2016) who used 
primary market data to identify the main price determinants of Cat bond spreads. We use this 
model as a benchmark, and apply it to an extended sample ending in 2016. Thus, our sample 
includes bonds issued both before and after the subprime financial crisis, as well as bonds issued 
both before and after catastrophes that triggered significant Cat bond losses, such as Hurricanes 
Katrina and Wilma (August and October 2005) and the Tohoku Earthquake and U.S. windstorms 
(March and April 2011).  Furthermore, unlike previous studies, our sample also includes data from 
2011 to 2016 a period without any major financial crises. 
We also study the behaviour of other factors that influence the evolution of Cat bond risk 
prices. One of them is the Rate on Line (ROL) which is a proxy for the contagion effect of 
reinsurance markets. Our results show a significant increase in the ROL coefficient after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma, lasting for approximately 12 months. We speculate that this pattern 
is the result of the lack of reinsurance capital immediately after the event and the abundance of 
capital after several months of no-occurrence of any event, as proposed by Froot (2001). This 
contagion effect seems to be present only at the aftermath of large catastrophes.  We also confirm 
previous results on the contagion effects of financial markets observed during significant financial 
events such as the subprime financial crisis.32 In our sample, the price for contagion effects 
increases and becomes significant after the subprime financial crisis, an effect that lasts for 
approximately 26 months, from March 2009 until May 2011.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section two, we describe the data and our pricing 
model.  In section three, we analyze the time variability of the price of expected loss risk and study 
the possible economic channels that explain these changes. In section four, we study the evolution 
                                                 
32 For example, see Carayannopoulos and Perez (2015) and Gürtler, Hibbeln and Winkelvos (2016). 
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of the contagion effects of reinsurance and financial markets on the Cat bond market. We conclude 
in section five. 
3.2 CAT BONDS PRICING  
3.2.1 Data  
Primary market Cat bond data were obtained from Trade Notes by Lane Financial LLC. 
Type of trigger, type of risk/peril, and territory where the catastrophe might occur where collected 
from the Artemis Deal Directory.33 Initially, after excluding 43 bonds related to medical benefits, 
longevity and extreme mortality perils, our data consisted of 522 Cat bond tranches issued between 
March 1999 and March 2016. We remove observations with missing EL and spread, and remove 
outliers for a final sample of 449 observations.34  
Braun (2016) estimated his model using a sample of 312 tranches issued between June 
1997 and December 2009.35 Our extended sample, ending in 2016, is especially important for the 
time series nature of our study. Having a longer post-crisis period allows us to better observe Cat 
bond market trends, as well as examine how Cat bond structural changes, instituted after the 
subprime financial crisis, affected investors’ risk attitudes and Cat bond prices.   
3.2.2 The pricing model 
Our pricing model uses an econometric approach building on previous work of Lane 
(2000), Lane and Mahul (2008), Braun (2016), and Gürtler et al. (2016).36 Specifically, our 
                                                 
33 Artemis Catastrophe Bond & Insurance-Linked Securities Deal Directory https://www.artemis.bm 
34 See Braun (2016) appendix for details on outlier removal. Our results are robust to the use of the complete sample (including 
outliers). These results are available upon request.  
35 To validate the forecast power of the model, Braun (2016) leaves 114 tranches (from January 2010 to December 2012) out of 
the estimation period reserved for out-of-sample tests. 
36 Alternative pricing models include non-arbitrage valuation models for Cat derivatives (Cumins & Geman, 1994,1995; Bakshi & 
Madan, 2002; Chang et al., 1996, 2008, 2010; Braun , 2011; Gatzert, Pokutta, & Vogl, 2019; Beer & Braun, 2019; Beer, Braun & 
Marugg, 2019) and also for the valuation of Cat Bonds (Lee and Yu, 2002; Vaugirard, 2003a,b; Jarrow, 2010; Ma & Ma, 2013). 
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benchmark model is a linear pricing model for the primary market of Cat bonds proposed by Braun 
(2016).  As many theoretical and empirical studies suggest,37 the main driver of Cat bond spreads 
in the model is the expected loss (EL).  EL is specific to every bond and is the product of the 
probability of first loss (PFL), which is the probability that the event occurs, and the conditional 
expected loss (CEL), which is the expected loss the investor will incur per dollar invested (i.e., a 
measure of the severity of loss ).38  Bonds issued for events with larger EL will require larger 
spreads. 
  In addition, the model controls for: bond-specific characteristics, types of the underlying 
catastrophe risk, and contagion effects from reinsurance and financial markets.  We replicate the 
pricing regressions and after an econometric test of these potential explanatory factors, the 
following model is used for the pricing of Cat bonds issued in the primary market:39 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 +
                     𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖                   (1)  
 
 In the model above, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 denotes the spread of Cat bond i measured in bps.  EL is the 
expected loss of the Cat bond tranche issued measured in percentage points. Thus, 𝛽1 measures 
the sensitivity of investors to the specific natural disaster risk inherent to corresponding Cat bond. 
We refer to 𝛽1 as the price of EL risk. The model includes five dummy variables that identify 
bonds that:  are linked to a U.S. or multi-territory catastrophe events (PEAK),  are issued having 
                                                 
More recently, models analyzing the risk-return correlation profile of Cat bonds returns have been proposed in the literature, 
including Carayannopoulos and Perez (2015), Braun, Ben Ammar and Eling (2019), Drobetz, Schroder and Tegtmeier (2020), and 
Trottier, Lai and Godin (2019). 
37 For example, Lane (2000), Lane and Mahul (2008), Dieckmann (2010), Galeotti, Gürtler  and Winkelvos (2013). 
38 Lei, Wang and Tzeng (2008) model PFL and CEL along with probability of exhaustion (POE) and find that investors care about 
their probability of losing (PFL) and losing everything (POE) more than how much they would lose (CEL). 
39 Our model differs from the final model in Braun (2016) since some variables not included in his model, due to lack of 
significance, are significant in our extended sample. Our results are robust to the use of Braun (2016) model and are available from 
the authors.  
122 
 
Swiss Re as a sponsor (SR),  have an investment grade rating (IG), are covering wind catastrophes 
(WIND) and are covering earthquakes (EQ).  
ROL is the Lane Financial LLC Synthetic Rate on Line index that measures reinsurance 
pricing in the secondary market, so we use it to control for possible contagion effects from the 
reinsurance market as a whole. We acknowledge the fact that the ROL index may be an imperfect 
proxy for reinsurance market effect, since it can measure the co-movement between primary and 
secondary market ILS prices. However, a better proxy for the general level of reinsurance 
premiums is difficult to obtain since pricing information for traditional reinsurance contracts is 
rather opaque and difficult to get.  In order to measure possible contagion effects with financial 
markets, the model includes BBSPR, the spread of BB rated corporate bonds in percentage points. 
Finally, the model controls for bond characteristics such as the volume issued (SIZE), and the 
number of months to maturity (MATURITY).   
While we estimate the pricing model in our full sample, in order to make results comparable 
with Braun’s (2016), whose sample ends in 2009, we also report results for two subsamples:  1999-
2009 and 2010-2016. Results are reported in Table 3-1.  Despite some sample differences, we are 
able to replicate the original pricing model estimation results of Braun (2016).  Our results for the 
extended sample ending in March 2016 (Table 3-1, column 1) contain almost double the number 
of Cat bond tranches, 449 compared to 225 for the shorter period. The inclusion of additional data 
results in several changes in the coefficients and their significance. The reduction in the 
coefficients for EL and PEAK are especially large, as it is also the increase in the ROL coefficient.  
We consider this as first evidence of significant time variability in the risk prices associated with 
most explanatory variables in the pricing model. This variability is more evident if we analyze 
estimation results based on a sample of recently issued tranches during the 2010-2016 period 
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(Table 3-1 column 3). The price of EL risk decreases from 204.27 in the 1999-2009 sample to 
167.42 in the more recent sample, a reduction of 18%.   Next, we explore the nature of these time 
variations in detail.  
 
Table 3-1: The Pricing Model 
We estimate an OLS model for pricing Cat bonds in the primary markets: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 is the spread of the tranche i of the Cat bond issued (in bps);  EL is the expected loss of the Cat bond tranche issued 
(in percentage points), PEAK is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the Cat bond tranche is linked to a U.S. or multi-territory 
catastrophe event. SR is a dummy which takes the value of 1 for Cat bonds issued having Swiss Re as a sponsor. ROL is the Lane 
Financial LLC Synthetic Rate on Line Index published on a quarterly basis (in points). IG is a dummy variable which takes a value 
of 1 for Cat bonds which have an investment grade rating. BBSPR is the spread of BB rated corporate bonds (in percentage points).  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the volume of cat bonds issued in millions of USD. 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌 is the number of months to maturity.  𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷 is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the Cat bond tranche is linked to a wind catastrophe event. 𝐸𝑄 is a dummy which takes the 
value of 1 if the Cat bond tranche is linked to an earthquake catastrophe event. P-values are in parenthesis and *, **,*** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
VARIABLES Full Sample 
1999-2016 
1999-2009 2010-2016 
    
EL 181.87*** 204.27*** 167.42*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK 81.54*** 157.27*** 31.48 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.51) 
SR -47.83** -130.95*** -3.33 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.93) 
IG -184.99*** -177.23***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
ROL 352.81*** 266.98*** 388.45*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR 23.54*** 22.14*** 37.46** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
SIZE -0.26** -0.59*** -0.12 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.22) 
MATURITY -2.87*** -0.90 -4.20*** 
 (0.00) (0.27) (0.00) 
WIND -123.13*** 3.54 -219.32*** 
 (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) 
EQ -143.58*** -65.70 -148.65*** 
 (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) 
PEAK x WIND 126.05*** 119.16** 171.13*** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
    
N 449 225 224 
adjusted R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 
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3.3 THE DYNAMICS OF CAT BONDS EXPECTED LOSS PRICES  
The Cat bond market has experienced important structural changes in the last 17 years.  
There has been an increasing trend in the dollar value of bonds issued, altered only by the financial 
crisis.  In addition, the sponsors as well as the distribution of perils and covered territories have 
varied over time.40 Therefore, changes in the pricing model parameters are also expected. In this 
section we analyze these changes using a multivariate analysis setting where all the relations 
between variables are accounted for and the possibility of omitted variable bias is minimized. We 
focus on identifying time patterns in the price of EL risk and then study possible economic 
explanations for these patterns. 
3.3.1 Time patterns in the price of EL risk 
We apply two different methodologies in order to evaluate the time variation of the Cat 
bond price of EL risk. Our first approach uses a multivariate linear regression of our pricing model 
of Equation 1, using the six sub-samples 1999-2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-
2013, and 2014-2016.  Our EL coefficient estimates should reflect the average price of EL risk for 
all bonds in a given subsample. 
Estimation results for the multivariate regression by sub-period are depicted in Table 3-2. 
We observe that the price of EL risk, 𝛽1, exhibits a significant decreasing pattern, with a low value 
of 135.13 observed in the 2014-2016 period, a decrease of 42% from the 1999-2005 period. These 
results imply that at the beginning of our sample an average investor required an EL spread of 2.31 
times EL, where EL is measured in percentage points. Ceteris paribus, the same investor only 
requires a spread of 1.35 times EL for the same event at the end of our sample.  Notice that this is 
                                                 
40 A complete descriptive analysis of changes in the Cat bond market characteristics from 1999 to 2016 is reported in Appendix A.   
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a multivariate effect, thus it is free of other possible determinants such as financial market 
contagion (BBSPR), changes in overall conditions in the reinsurance markets (ROL), or changes 
on other bond characteristics such as peak territory (PEAK), sponsor quality (SR) and bond rating 
(IG). We also observe that the price of EL risk is not monotonically decreasing, since EL 
coefficient increases were observed for the 2010-2011 and 2012-2013 periods. We test if these 
changes in the coefficients over time are statistically significant41 and find that, in comparison with 
the 1999-2005 EL coefficient, there is an economically and statistically significant decrease in the 
2008-2009, 2010-2011, and 2014-2016 periods. The results show that there is not a constant 
decreasing pattern, and that for the periods 2006-2007 and 2012-2013 there is not a significant 
decrease with respect to the 1999-2005 EL coefficient.  Thus, the time variation in the price of EL 
risk has a decreasing trend in our sample period, but has some temporary significant non-
decreasing periods.42  
 A potential drawback of this multivariate regression approach is that it implicitly assumes 
that the price of EL risk remains constant during each sub-sample. Since the sub-samples are 
selected arbitrarily in some sense, then possible time series patterns may not be clearly identified. 
For example, if a specific event affecting spreads occurs in the middle of a given sub-sample, the 
estimated price of EL risk will capture an average of the spreads before and after the event. Thus, 
we would not be able to clearly identify the effect of the event. Our second approach, a rolling 
regression estimation, addresses this problem.  
 
                                                 
41 To test for significant differences, we estimate a regression using the full sample of bonds and including subperiod dummy 
variables and interaction terms of these dummy variables with all coefficients in our model, complete results are available from the 
authors.  
42 Previous studies such as Cummins and Weiss (2009), Gürtler, Hibbeln and Winkelvos (2016), and Braun (2016) have 
documented a constantly decreasing trend in the price of EL risk. We acknowledge the fact that these previous studies used a 
smaller sample size and/or different data sets. 
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Table 3-2: Pricing Model by Sub-Periods 
We estimate an OLS model for pricing Cat bonds in the primary markets for sub-periods: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖 
where all variables are defined as in Table 3-1. The periodic subsamples are divided into 2 years intervals except for the 1999-2005 
due to small number of bonds issued and the 2014-2016 whose length is 2 years and 3 months (ending in March 2016). The Full 
sample column (7) is the period from March 1999 till March 2016.P-values are in parenthesis and *, **, *** represent significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 1999-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 2010-2011 2012-2013 2014-2016 Full 
        
EL 231.86*** 224.73*** 157.33*** 171.69*** 205.77*** 135.13*** 181.87*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK 13.47 357.14*** -45.14 191.33 228.27** 46.41** 81.54*** 
 (0.65) (0.00) (0.69) (0.46) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
SR -68.99 -32.50 -315.40*** -100.93 65.86  -47.83** 
 (0.12) (0.58) (0.00) (0.11) (0.27)  (0.04) 
IG -138.81*** -270.55*** -88.73    -184.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.48)    (0.00) 
ROL 324.46*** 244.29*** 612.95*** 64.72 350.03* 224.41*** 352.81*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.70) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR -2.95 -73.21*** 36.04* 91.17*** 24.95 32.30*** 23.54*** 
 (0.79) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.15 -0.36** -1.10*** -0.21** -0.18 0.09* -0.26** 
 (0.47) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.33) (0.05) (0.01) 
MATURITY 1.29 -1.61 -7.22* -2.06 -7.32*** -2.02** -2.87*** 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.06) (0.31) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
WIND -84.70** 176.55*** -134.05 -159.89 23.34 -147.98*** -123.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.39) (0.51) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) 
EQ -89.01** -59.44 23.70 -267.06*** -116.49 -57.24*** -143.58*** 
 (0.01) (0.35) (0.78) (0.00) (0.15) (0.01) (0.00) 
PEAK x WIND 53.17 -39.54 173.90 88.43 -104.55 113.74*** 126.05*** 
 (0.24) (0.59) (0.26) (0.72) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) 
        
N 68 105 52 68 79 77 449 
adjusted R2 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.96 
 
The idea of rolling regressions is that an investor interested in pricing a Cat bond in month 
t, would use all information available up to month t in her estimation. However, if the investor 
uses all information available up to time t, it is likely that the estimate will be inaccurate since it 
will include irrelevant information from the past. In the effort to use more updated recent 
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information and eliminate stale data, the length of the period used in the estimation process 
becomes critical. However, a sufficiently large representative sample is also necessary in order to 
obtain reliable regression results. This trade-off is common in asset pricing.  Given the 
characteristics of our sample, we use an estimation period that includes market information from 
the last two or three years with at least 30 observations (bond tranches) for each regression.  Using 
one year of data is not feasible given the small number of observations in some years. Using more 
than three years in our rolling regression window would reduce the importance (weight) of the 
information embedded in the latest months. As a consequence, it would be difficult to assess the 
short-term changes in regression parameters.43 Specifically, for every month t in our sample the 
model in Equation (1) is estimated using all bond tranches issued during the prior 24 months. 
Given these constraints, the estimation process starts with July 2003, and uses an average of 66 
bond tranches for each estimation, with a maximum of 118 (in June 2008). For robustness, we also 
estimate risk prices using all bond tranches issued in the last 36 months starting in July 2003, with 
an average of 93 bond tranches per estimation and a maximum of 142 tranches (also June 2008). 
Rolling regressions estimation results are presented in Figure 3-1.  The top panel depicts 
the behavior of the estimated price of EL risk using the 24- and 36-month estimation windows. 
Estimated EL coefficients under these two estimation windows are highly correlated. In the bottom 
panel, we report the price of EL risk estimations under the 24-month rolling window along with 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval. As reported in Table 3-3, the price of EL risk is 
significant during our entire sample of 153 months with an average of 198.82 bps. It has a 
                                                 
43 We also estimate the rolling regressions using the last 50 bonds issued until month t and using a 48-month window. The estimated 
risk prices are highly correlated with the ones reported and our main conclusions are the same. Results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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decreasing tendency similar to the one reported in Table 3-2. The highest estimate of 295.55 bps 
is observed in July 2003 and the lowest estimate of 135 bps observed in March 2016 (Figure 3-1).   
Figure 3-1: Price of EL risk from Rolling Regressions Estimations 
Figure shows price of EL risk from rolling regressions estimations of the following model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖 
For every month in our sample, the equation is estimated using all bond tranches issued in the prior 24(36) months. The process 
starts with July 2003. The top panel includes estimated price of EL risk using the 24- and 36-months estimation windows. The 
vertical lines in the top panel correspond to Jun. 2006, Oct. 2007, Nov. 2011, and Nov. 2013, respectively from left to right.  The 
bottom panel shows the price of EL risk under the 24-month window with the corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
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However, it is evident from the figure that this decreasing trend is not constant and two 
significant increasing periods are observable. The first one starting  in June  2006, (after the EL 
rolling coefficient reaches 207.5 bps in May 2006) and ending around October 2007 with a 
coefficient of 239.41, an increase of  15%. The second starts at the end of 2011 (after rolling 
coefficient reaches 152.01 bps in October 2011) and ends in November of 2013 with a coefficient 
of 221.95, an increase of 46%. Each increasing period is followed by a decreasing period of longer 
duration.  The duration of the increasing periods is 17 months for the first one and 26 for the second 
one.44 
Table 3-3: Significant Periods of Cat Bonds Pricing Model Coefficients 
We estimate 24-months rolling regressions using Equation 1 model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖 
where all variables are defined as in Table 3-1. For every month in our sample, equation 1 is estimated using all bond tranches 
issued in the prior 24 months. The process starts in July 2003. We report the periods when the coefficients for EL, ROL and BBSPR 
are significant, then calculate the number of months and the average coefficient during those periods. EL is the expected loss of the 
Cat bond tranche issued (in basis points), ROL is the Lane Financial LLC Synthetic Rate on Line Index published on a quarterly 
basis, it is a simple measure of reinsurance pricing in the secondary market. BBSPR is the spread of BB rated corporate bonds we 
use it in order to measure possible contagion effects with financial markets. 
 Dates Coefficient  
Coefficient  Begins Ends  Months   Average  
     
EL Jul-03 Mar-16 153 198.82 
     
ROL Sep-03 Mar-10 79 296.40 
 May-10 Mar-11 11 289.41 
 May-11 Nov-11 7 318.63 
 Feb-12 Mar-14 26 298.06 
 Dec-14 Mar-16 16 299.05 
     
BBSPR Feb-06 Feb-06 1 -125.97 
 Jun-06 May-07 12 -133.56 
 Dec-07 Jun-08 7 -46.03 
 Feb-09 May-11 28 52.28 
 Jul-11 Jul-11 1 54.03 
 Nov-11 Apr-12 6 46.44 
      
                                                 
44 We also analyze for what periods the rolling EL coefficients are above the 12 month moving average for more than one period, 
and find the same time series patterns.  
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In summary, our results show an overall decreasing trend in the price of EL risk, and two 
significant increasing periods from 2006 to 2007 and from the end of 2011 to 2013. These observed 
time series trends are only indicative of time variation in the EL coefficient.  In the following 
sections we try to identify the economic channels driving such time series variation, so we can 
properly test its significance and magnitude and estimate its length. 
 
3.3.2 Economic explanations for the time patterns of the price of EL risk 
 In this section, we analyze possible economic channels that can explain the time patterns 
documented in the previous section.  The decreasing trend in the price of expected loss risk (and, 
as a result, in the overall expected loss premium) previously studied was documented in the 
literature as an initial novelty effect and a subsequent maturation effect reflecting the increasing 
investor experience and learning in the Cat bond markets.  At the origin of the market, Cat bonds 
were significantly more expensive than other reinsurance products. The novelty premium 
disappeared, or reduced significantly, as the market matured and became “mainstream”.  Froot 
(2001) suggests that the large expected loss premiums observed during the early stages of the Cat 
bond market were due to supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections and 
market power exerted by traditional reinsurers.45  Froot and O’Connell (2008) and Cummins and 
Mahul (2008) explain that the large Cat bond expected loss premiums observed until 2001,46 have 
declined steadily and were aligned with other traditional reinsurance products by the time of 
Hurricane Katrina. More recently, Braun et al. (2013) survey results show that investor propensity 
                                                 
45 Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000) use behavioral economics to explain the reluctance of investment managers to invest in Cat 
bonds. 
46 Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (2004) and Froot (2001). 
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to invest in Cat bonds is directly linked to investors’ level of expertise and experience on the 
product. Our results in the previous section confirm the previously documented results. 
In the remainder of this section we focus on the economic motivations for the documented 
deviations from the decreasing trend, that is, the two significant increasing periods (2006-2007 
and 2011-2013) and the decreasing periods that followed.  We focus on two main explanations 
proposed in the literature for the increase in the price of EL risk observed after major catastrophes 
(such as Katrina): i) changes in investors’ preferences towards risk and consequences on the Cat 
bond market, and ii) changes in investors’ trust in the EL model estimates.  Below we discuss and 
test each one of these possible explanations. 
 
3.3.2.1 Changes in investor preferences towards risk 
EL is the average loss that investors can expect to incur over the course of a period per dollar 
invested. Thus, the EL coefficient can be interpreted as the additional spread required by an 
investor to accept an additional unit of EL. Highly risk averse investors will require a higher price 
of risk for the same level of EL (ceteris paribus). As a result, changes in average investors’ level 
of risk aversion should affect this spread.  
In an attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle, changes in risk attitudes have been widely 
analyzed within the asset pricing literature. Specifically, in habit formation models rational 
consumers have time-varying relative risk aversion and hence they require a time-varying risk 
premium.47 Under these models, when agents’ consumption approaches their habit levels, the fear 
of further negative shocks is exacerbated. In the context of Cat bond investors, Dieckmann (2010), 
                                                 
47 For example, see Campbell and Cochrane (1999).  
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in a theoretical setting, shows that large catastrophic events may trigger changes in Cat bond 
investors’ effective risk aversion if the event brings them close to their habit consumption levels. 
Basically, if individual investors measure happiness with respect to a subsistence level of 
consumption, large catastrophic events like hurricane Katrina bring them closer to their subsistence 
level and, as a result, they command a significantly higher price to provide insurance compared to 
the pre-event state.  
The effects of changes in effective risk aversion have been studied for reinsurance markets. 
Cummins and Trainar (2009) extensively discuss reinsurance pricing models and the role of 
effective risk aversion in explaining the swings in reinsurance prices and supply of coverage 
documented in the literature (e.g. Cummins and Weiss, 2009).  When they sustain a capital shock 
due to a large catastrophe or unusual investment loss, reinsurers’ effective risk aversion rises, 
leading to higher prices and a hard reinsurance market environment. This channel documented in 
the reinsurance markets may be also affecting the Cat bond market.  
Our first test involves analyzing the behavior of the price of EL risk in our benchmark pricing 
models around catastrophic events that triggered Cat bond losses. It includes Hurricanes Katrina 
in August 2005, Wilma in October 2005, Tohoku Earthquake in March 2011 and the 2011 U.S. 
windstorm season.  Hurricane Katrina, Tohoku earthquake and the 2011 U.S. windstorm season 
resulted in USD 145 million (75% of investment), USD 300 million (100% of initial investment), 
and USD 100 million (100% of investment) losses to Cat bond investors respectively (data taken 
from Artemis Deal Directory48). We start by observing the behavior of the price of EL risk, 
estimated by the rolling regression approach, before and after the events. Notice that each rolling 
regressions for period t incorporates all bonds issued 24 months before t. Thus, the bonds issued 
                                                 
48  “Catastrophe bond losses: cat bonds defaulted, triggered or at risk”, retrieved from: https://www.artemis.bm/cat-bond-losses/ 
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after Katrina and Wilma will start to be included in the sample after 𝑡 = October 2005, and by 
October 2007 the sample will include only bonds issued after these events. In fact, the first bond 
in our sample issued after these events was in November 2005.  As depicted in Figure 1, we can 
observe that as more bonds issued after the catastrophe start to be incorporated in the sample the 
price of EL risk increases. Interestingly, this effect only seems to last for two years, ending in 
October 2007. Subsequently the price of EL risk starts to decrease, but then a second increasing 
period, coinciding with the Tohoku Earthquake in March 2011, seems to take effect. Again, as 
more bonds issued after the event are included in the sample the price of EL risk increases. As it 
happened in the previous event, the increasing period lasts for approximately 2 years.  These 
patterns seem to be in agreement with the predictions of a habit formation model. Relative risk 
aversion increases with large catastrophic shocks, however the effect is temporary since investors 
eventually return to their habit consumption levels.   
In order to explore this argument formally, we estimate the following model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽4(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 ) + 𝑖   (2) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 = [𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖,  𝑆𝑅𝑖,  𝐼𝐺𝑖, 𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡, 𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖, 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖, 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖,
𝐸𝑄𝑖,  (𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖] are the control variables in equation (1), and 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for bonds issued after an event that triggered Cat bond losses. Thus, to 
capture effects associated with Katrina and Wilma, Trig takes the value of zero prior to August 
2005 and 1 after October 2005 (there are no bonds issued from August to October 2005 in our 
sample). Similarly, to capture effects associated with the Tohoku Earthquake and U.S. windstorms 
season, Trig takes the value of zero prior to March 2011 and 1 after April 2011. We include an 
interaction term 𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖  in order to capture possible changes in the 𝐸𝐿𝑖 coefficient due to 
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events that triggered Cat bond losses.  We estimate the model using three different sample sizes: 
bonds issued one, two, and three year(s) prior to and after the event, as well as a sample using 50 
bonds issued prior and 50 bonds issued after each event. 
Table 3-4: Effects of Catastrophes Triggering Cat Bond Losses 
To understand the effect of catastrophes triggering Cat bond losses we estimate the model below: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽4(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖  ) + 𝑖  
where 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bonds issued after an event that triggered Cat bond losses and all 
other variables are defined as in Table 3-1.  The triggering events tested in panel A are Katrina and Wilma storms (August 2005 
and October 2005) and in panel B are Tohoku earthquake and U.S windstorms (March and April 2011). We estimate this model 
using four different samples: using bonds issued 1, 2 and 3 years before and after the event, and a sample using 50 bonds issued 
prior and 50 bonds issued after each event. P-values are in parenthesis and *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
Panel A: Katrina and Wilma 
VARIABLES 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 50 bonds 
     
EL 151.78*** 186.26*** 196.24*** 202.09*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK 499.62*** 291.16*** 250.74*** 225.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SR 116.03 -28.86 -66.66* 16.75 
 (0.17) (0.61) (0.10) (0.80) 
IG -256.38** -169.11*** -172.37*** -151.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROL 347.57*** 258.80*** 312.62*** 169.60** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
BBSPR -164.00*** -20.21 -19.10** -35.01** 
 (0.00) (0.55) (0.05) (0.02) 
SIZE 0.03 -0.30* -0.32** -0.05 
 (0.94) (0.07) (0.04) (0.88) 
MATURITY 1.40 0.40 -0.26 2.87** 
 (0.56) (0.74) (0.79) (0.02) 
WIND 93.12 70.60 68.31 5.36 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.15) (0.94) 
EQ -105.75* -81.06 -62.53 -127.57* 
 (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) 
PEAK x WIND -60.41 73.24 74.88 186.84** 
 (0.51) (0.29) (0.22) (0.03) 
TRIG -161.38 -208.91** -167.97*** -82.94 
 (0.14) (0.02) (0.00) (0.34) 
TRIG x EL 88.45*** 68.31*** 30.01 60.42** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.02) 
     
N 50 123 187 100 
adjusted R2 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.97 
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Table 3-4. continued 
Panel B: Tohoku and U.S. windstorms 
VARIABLES 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 50 bonds 
     
EL 156.07*** 143.08*** 150.98*** 139.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK -42.51 203.31** 90.66 405.15*** 
 (0.49) (0.03) (0.21) (0.00) 
SR -19.71 -36.04 -41.03 -30.57 
 (0.67) (0.39) (0.25) (0.36) 
IG   -307.89***  
   (0.00)  
ROL 447.11*** 236.77*** 305.66*** 272.56*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR 33.80 55.45*** 55.19*** 1.72 
 (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94) 
SIZE -0.18 -0.37*** -0.30*** -0.17 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12) 
MATURITY -4.07** -3.73** -4.33*** -4.34*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
WIND -397.15*** -81.73 -163.51** 35.86 
 (0.00) (0.48) (0.05) (0.76) 
EQ -327.74*** -87.31 -124.61** -197.36*** 
 (0.00) (0.19) (0.01) (0.00) 
PEAK x WIND 264.64*** -2.77 99.21 -140.00 
 (0.00) (0.98) (0.23) (0.27) 
TRIG 72.86 -22.63 -20.95 13.74 
 (0.19) (0.64) (0.57) (0.80) 
TRIG x EL 51.81** 67.44*** 53.55*** 73.00*** 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
N 75 129 200 100 
adjusted R2 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 
 Table 3-4, Panel A depicts results associated with Katrina and Wilma, while Panel B depicts 
results related to the Tohoku and U.S. windstorm events. We find a positive and significant 
coefficient 𝛽4 for the 1- and 2-year regressions, for both events. The effects seem to disappear after 
three years in the case of the Katrina and Wilma but remain for the Tohoku and U.S. windstorm 
events. The regressions with 50 bonds before and after the event also confirm these results. The 
relative effect after two years for the two analysed events is of similar magnitude. For the Katrina 
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and Wilma, the price of EL risk increases by 68.31 points over and above a price of risk of 186.26 
observed prior to the event, an increase of 36.68%. For the Tohoku Earthquake and U.S. 
windstorms events the increase is 67.44 points over and above a value of 143.08 observed prior to 
the event, an increase of 47.13%. These results are consistent with the argument that periods of 
increasing price of EL risk are the result of catastrophic events triggering Cat bond losses. 49 
In the previous section, we also documented an overall decreasing trend on EL coefficient 
that can be linked to an initial novelty effect and a subsequent maturation effect in the Cat bond 
markets, as previously documented in the literature. Thus, a relevant question is if the increases in 
the EL risk after catastrophic events triggering Cat bond losses remain significant after controlling 
for such trend, and vice versa. To test for such effects, using our full sample we estimate the 
regression model as follows: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 ) +
                                    + 𝛽6(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 ) + 𝑖  (3) 
where  𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bonds issued after 2, 4 or 6 years of 
an event that triggered Cat bond losses.  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a monthly trend variable. As before, 𝛽5 will 
capture changes in the EL coefficient due to events that triggered Cat bond losses, and 𝛽6 will 
capture the its trend.  The results are reported in Table 3-5 in columns 1, 2 and 3 for bonds issued 
two, four and six years after the event respectively.  Estimation results confirm our predictions, 
first 𝛽5 is positive and significant in all regressions. After two years of the event, the EL coefficient 
increases on average by 69.75 bps over the mean, a 34% average increase. We also confirm a 
significant negative trend in the price of EL risk, as 𝛽6 is significant and negative. Our most 
                                                 
49 It is possible that the occurrence of Hurricane Sandy (October 2012) may have affected our results for the 2- and 3- years before 
and after samples. As a robustness test, we included a dummy variable for bonds issued after Sandy Hurricane and its interaction 
with EL. We find non-significant contamination effects. Results are available from the authors.  
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conservative estimate implies that the price of EL risk has decreased on average 0.62 bps for every 
month in our sample. 50 
Table 3-5: Effects of Catastrophes Triggering Cat Bond Losses and Time Trends  
We report estimation results controlling for trends in 𝐸𝐿 coefficient following the model as follows: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖  ) + 𝛽6(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  ) + 𝑖 
where Trig is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bonds issued 2, 4 and 6 years after an event that triggered Cat bond 
losses, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a monthly trend variable and all other variables are defined as in Table 3-1.  The triggering events tested are 
described in Table 3-4. P-values are in parenthesis and *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
VARIABLES 2 years 4 years 6 years 
EL 205.03*** 209.31*** 200.48*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK 145.33*** 119.05*** 124.90*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SR -110.58*** -102.24*** -119.63*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IG -187.85*** -194.70*** -220.79*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROL 271.73*** 317.23*** 405.24*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR 34.32*** 29.23*** 22.63*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.12 -0.16* -0.16* 
 (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) 
MATURITY -1.66*** -1.83*** -2.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
WIND -87.94** -103.92*** -87.18** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
EQ -94.19*** -104.89*** -104.58*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK x WIND 98.12** 120.53*** 110.72*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
TRIG -66.19** -65.66** -209.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
TREND -0.94*** -0.47 0.67 
 (0.01) (0.24) (0.23) 
TRIG x EL 69.75*** 44.39*** 55.64** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
TREND x EL -0.62*** -0.82*** -1.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 449 449 449 
adjusted R2 0.97 0.96 0.96 
                                                 
50 In unreported experiments we also test the effect of events with relatively smaller investors’ losses. For example, the default of 
four Cat bonds for which Lehman Brothers served as a total return swap counterparty, with aggregate loss from all four bonds of 
only 21% of initial investment and Hurricane Patricia, which triggered one Cat bond and resulted in just a $50 million loss to the 
investors. Our test shows no significant increase in the price of EL risk after these events.  
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As a robustness check, we test for alternative reasons (other than changes in effective risk 
aversion) for changes in investors’ preferences towards catastrophic risk, and the subsequent 
impact on the price of EL risk. Specifically, we focus on the effects of economic conditions on 
investors’ sentiment towards risk (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2018; Brown, Jaeger, and 
Steinorth, 2015; and Cohn et al., 2015).  All our tests show that financial events or changes in 
market sentiment do not seem to affect investors’ preferences towards catastrophe risk in a 
significant and consistent way.51  
The evidence presented in this section supports the Dieckmann (2010) argument that major 
catastrophic events that triggered Cat bond losses bring investors close to their habit consumption 
levels.  In such cases, investors are willing to pay a significantly larger price for insurance which, 
in turn, results in increased price of EL risk.   
3.3.2.2 Changes in investors’ trust in EL model estimates 
 A competing explanation for our results is that the behaviour of the price of EL risk is not 
driven by changes in relative risk aversion, but by changes in the level of investors’ trust on the 
estimated event probabilities and expected losses predicted by modeling companies. Expected loss 
values for each bond are estimated by third-party modelling agencies and are based on catastrophe 
risk models. The three main Cat risk modeling companies are AIR (created in 1987), RMS (created 
in 1988), and EQECAT (created in 1994). Each company is using a different modeling approach 
and the estimated EL values are subject to estimation error, as is the case with any modeling 
exercise. Thus, investors face uncertainty with respect to the accuracy of the estimated expected 
loss and, as a result, it is possible that the price of EL risk also captures this model uncertainty risk.   
                                                 
51 Results of robustness tests are available from the authors. 
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Measuring investors’ uncertainty in Cat risk models is a complicated task. Gürtler, Hibbeln 
and Winkelvos (2016), propose to measure investors’ reliance on the calculated EL by the 
proportion of the total variation on Cat bond spreads explained by EL in the pricing model 
regressions. If investors trust the estimated EL, then the proportion of total variation explained by 
EL will be large.  Under this argument, they report that after hurricane Katrina the proportion of 
variation explained by EL drops from 79% to 57%. They conclude that such increase in uncertainty 
is likely to explain the increase in the price of EL risk observed after Katrina.  This intuitive 
argument, however, is not a direct test of the hypothesis that changes in investors’ trust on the 
estimated expected losses are the main driver of the observed increase in price of EL risk. In fact, 
as we show below, it may lead to contradictions. 
 Let’s assume a simple univariate model where all variables are standardized to mean zero, 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝑖. 
 
The OLS estimator of 𝛽1 is defined as: 
𝛽1̂ =
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐸𝐿, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠)
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐸𝐿)
 
 
Thus, the fraction of the variance explained (FVE) by EL can be defined as: 
𝐹𝑉𝐸 = 1 −
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)
=
𝑆𝑆𝑅
𝑆𝑆𝑇
=
∑ (𝛽1̂𝐸𝐿𝑖)
2𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)2𝑁𝑖=1
=
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝐿, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)2
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐸𝐿)
 
Where, SSR is the regression sum of squares and SST is the total sum of squares. Now suppose that 
a big catastrophe like Katrina occurs, increasing investor mistrust in estimated expected losses. 
Then it is expected that the level of co-movement between spreads and expected losses will 
decrease, thus the 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐸𝐿, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) should decrease and, as a consequence, 𝐹𝑉𝐸 should 
140 
 
also decrease. However, a decrease in the 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝐸𝐿, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) will lead to a decrease in 
𝛽1̂, contradicting the argument that investor mistrust in the models lead to an increase in the price 
of EL risk, 𝛽1̂.  Alternatively, the decrease in 𝐹𝑉𝐸 may be the result of an increase in 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐸𝐿) 
after the event. However, this will also lead to a decrease in the price of EL risk,  𝛽1̂ .  Thus, the 
only alternative is that the observed decrease in 𝐹𝑉𝐸 is likely caused by an increase in  
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑). However, this increase is not necessarily associated with an increase in 
investor’ mistrust of the estimated EL, especially after a large catastrophic event.  Given these 
confounding effects, a cleaner test of the hypothesis that the behaviour of the price of EL risk is 
related to changes in investors’ trust in EL model estimates is necessary.  
Table 3-6: Main Model Changes 
Presented below are changes or updates to the models used by modeling companies (EQECAT, RMS, and AIR). They are extracted 
from news reports available in Artemis since June 2008 (earliest news available on Artemis) by selecting all news with the word 
“model” and then extracting the news that reports the changes or updates, complemented by all news containing the phrases “Risk 
Management Solutions”, “RMS”, “AIR”, “EQECAT”, “Model” in Lexis and from news on AIR, RMS and EQECAT websites. 
Major model changes are marked with *, and are defined as changes that affect the majority of Cat bonds issued (either covering 
U.S., multi-territory, wind or multi-peril catastrophes not limited to a non U.S. or multi-territory geographic region).  
Date Model Change 
Jun-15* AIR updates its U.S. hurricane model, expanded European inland flood model, update to 
the hazard and engineering components of the Canada severe thunderstorm model; new 
tropical cyclone and winter storm models for Canada; an expanded global 
pandemic model, update to the South America earthquake models,  (through the new 
platform version) 
Apr-15 Update to version 15.0 RMS Europe Windstorm Models and RMS North Atlantic 
Hurricane Models 
Aug-14 Reduce uncertainty in China typhoon risk model 
Jul-14 AIR has released an updated version of its Severe Thunderstorm Model for the U.S. 
Apr-14* RMS lifts number of risk models available on RMS (one) to nearly 300 giving its users the 
most extensive catastrophe modelling coverage available in the market today. Gaining 
access to this extensive list of models enables companies to build a more complete and 
robust view of risk. 
Aug-13 EQECAT releases RQE® Version 14 resulting in the North Atlantic Hurricane Model, The 
German Flood Model, and U.S. earthquake model being updated.  
Jul-13 RMS has launched a new version of its North Atlantic hurricane model suite 
Jan-13* release of RQE v. 13 by EQECAT includes the update of 178 country/peril models 
including vulnerability, hazard, and correlation/simulation updates 
Oct-12 RMS updates Japan earthquake model 
Sep-11 AIR Worldwide has announced that launch of updated versions of their European 
windstorm and European earthquake catastrophe risk models 
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Table 3-6. continued 
Date Model Change 
Jul-11 RMS expands and upgrades Europe Windstorm Model 
Jul-11* AIR Worldwide expands tropical cyclone models to include Central America 
Jul-11* New and updated version of AIR hurricane model 
Jun-11 RMS has launched a new risk model covering both mainland China and Hong Kong 
typhoon risks. 
Jun-11 RMS U.S. hurricane model approved for use in Florida 
Feb-11* RMS releases new U.S. hurricane risk model 
Sep-10 AIR Worldwide have announced a major update to their European wind risk model. 
Aug-09 Air Worldwide Updates Earthquake Model 
Dec-08 AIR Worldwide Updates Earthquake and Typhoon Models for Japan 
Aug-08 AIR Worldwide Releases Updates to its Catastrophe Risk Modeling Systems 
Jun-08 RMS provides model review for multi-peril securitization Valais Re 
Apr-08 AIR Worldwide Releases Tropical Cyclone Model for Mexico 
Nov-07* AIR Worldwide Enhances Performance of Catastrophe Risk Modeling Systems 
Oct-07 AIR Worldwide Releases New Typhoon Model for China 
Oct-07* EQECAT updates storm modeling software 
Jun-07 New AIR Hurricane Model Enhanced To Measure Business Interruption Losses 
Jan-07 RMS launches cat model for quakes in India 
Sep-06 AIR Worldwide Releases New Model to Better Estimate Wildfire Losses 
Jun-06 RMS expands model to cover European windstorm risks 
May-06 AIR Worldwide Releases Third Generation NWP-based European Extratropical Cyclone 
Model 
May-06 RMS Releases Comprehensive Europe Windstorm Model for Underwriting and Portfolio 
Risk Management Parametric Windfield Modeling 
May-06* RMS launched its anxiously awaited latest version of the RMS U.S. Hurricane Model 
Jan-06* AIR Worldwide Releases Winter Storm Model for the U.S. 
Dec-04 EQECAT Issues First Probabilistic Catastrophe Model for U.S. Winter Storms 
Nov-04 EQECAT Releases First Probabilistic U.S. Wildfire and Flood Models  
Aug-04 AIR Updates 2004 U.S. Peril Model  
Sep-03 AIR Worldwide Releases New Model to Better Estimate Wildfire Losses 
Jul-03 AIR Worldwide Releases 2003 European Extratropical Cyclone Model 
Jun-03* AIR Releases New Models and New Features in 2003 Version of CLASIC 
Feb-03* RMS Launches First Hurricane Model to Include Effects of Extratropical Transition 
Nov-02 AIR Releases New Models for the Asia-Pacific Region 
Aug-02* RMS Expands Geographical Coverage of Catastrophe Models 
Feb-02 AIR Releases 2002 Models for Asia-Pacific Region; Extends Fire-Following to Japan 
Earthquake Model 
Nov-01 RMS released an upgraded version of its U.S. and Canada Tornado/Hail models 
Jun-00 New AIR Technology Forges Way for Fundamental Change in Earthquake Loss Estimation 
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Factors that may affect investors’ trust in Cat risk models are improvements in the 
modeling technology, assumptions, and data used by modeling companies. Cat risk models are 
regularly refined as new science emerges or as new data becomes available. Reinsurance 
companies have tracked the performance of different Cat models by comparing modeled loss 
estimates to actual losses. For example, Aon Benfield provides reports on a regular basis (see for 
example Aon Benfield, 2013). In 2009, using RMS model version 9.0, they reported that actual 
losses were approximately 1.4 times model estimates for personal lines and small commercial lines 
business and over two times for large commercial business lines. To account for losses caused by 
Hurricane Ike model losses needed to be increased by factors of 1.80 to 2.05. In response to such 
reports, modeling companies adapt and change their models. For example, in February 2011, Risk 
Management Solutions (RMS) released version 11.0 of its RiskLink North Atlantic hurricane 
European windstorm models. The updated model claimed to have important improvements, 
including more wind-speed data points and updated losses. It is important to note however, that 
errors on estimated losses when compared to reported ones only account for the difference between 
estimated and actual insured losses. They do not account for losses to Cat bond investors. In fact, 
according to the 2013 report by Lane Financial, modeling companies do a very good job estimating 
Cat bond losses. According to Lane calculations, expected losses up to June 2012 where estimated 
between 622 to 669 million dollars, and actual losses for the same period were 644 million dollars. 
In order to test if model changes affect investors’ uncertainty with respect to Cat risk models, we 
survey all news reports available in Artemis by selecting all news with the word “model” and then 
extract the news that report changes or updates to the models used by modeling companies. We 
further, search Lexis for all news containing phrases “Risk Management Solutions”, “RMS”, 
“AIR”, “EQECAT”, “Model” and news on AIR, RMS and EQECAT websites and extract those 
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which mention model changes or updates. We find 45 model changes or updates which are reported 
in Table 3-6.52 We create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for all bonds issued the month 
of or within one, two or three months after the model change.  Not all model changes in Table 3-
6 can be considered major model changes, since some of them do not affect a large proportion of 
Cat bonds issued. In order to avoid possible bias for the inclusion of non-major model changes, 
we estimate our regression using two versions of the dummy variable for model changes, one 
including only major model changes (Table 3-7, columns 1 to 3) and one using all model changes 
(columns 4 to 6). We define major model changes as the ones with more comprehensive and larger 
coverages. Specifically, major changes selected are those affecting the majority of Cat bonds 
issued, covering U.S. or multi-territory geographically or Wind or Multi-peril related catastrophes 
not limited to a non U.S. or multi-territory geographic region. Cat bonds covering U.S. constitute 
54% of all Cat bond tranches issued in our sample, while those covering multi-territory constitute 
24% (Table 3-A1). Multi-peril covering Cat bonds constitute 47% while wind around 33% of all 
tranches in our sample.  In order to avoid the effect of the major catastrophes, we exclude all model 
changes within one year after Katrina and Wilma storms (August 2005 and October 2005) and 
Tohoku earthquake and U.S windstorms (March and April 2011). Consequently, we estimate the 
following model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒+𝛽4(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) + 𝑖      (4) 
Coefficient 𝛽4 captures the effect of a model change on the price of EL risk. Our results, 
reported in Table 3-7, show no significant changes in the price of EL risk as a result of model 
changes and updates.  
 
                                                 
52 These model changes also include all model changes available from news on Artemis since 2008. 
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Table 3-7: Effects of Model Change 
We test the effect of model changes that are independent to the occurrence of a catastrophic event. In order to avoid the effect of 
the major catastrophes, we exclude all model changes one year after Katrina and Wilma storms (August 2005 and October 2005) 
and Tohoku earthquake and U.S windstorms (March and April 2011).  Model Change in the model below is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the bond is issued within a certain period after a model change. We run the model under three scenarios:  a) 
Model Change = 1 for all bonds issued on the month of the change and one month after; b) Model Change = 1 for all bonds issued 
the month of the change and within two months after;  c) Model Change = 1 for all bonds issued the month of the change and within 
3 months after.  Columns 1, 2 and 3 include only major model changes, columns 4,5 and 6 all model changes as described in Table 
3-6. All other variables are defined as in Table 3-1. P-values are in parenthesis and *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒+𝛽4(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) + 𝑖 
 Major Model Changes All Model Changes 
  Event Event Event Event Event Event 
VARIABLES Month+1 Month+2 Month+3 Month+1  Month+2  Month+3  
       
EL 182.10*** 182.20*** 182.13*** 179.93*** 179.79*** 181.53*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK 84.00*** 84.27*** 84.47*** 93.74*** 89.13*** 86.55*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SR -42.74* -42.34* -42.80* -33.49 -36.38 -40.37* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) 
IG -182.31*** -181.75*** -180.77*** -165.95*** -168.34*** -175.27*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROL 346.55*** 345.54*** 345.54*** 342.80*** 345.72*** 347.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR 24.05*** 24.13*** 24.26*** 23.64*** 24.57*** 24.25*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.25** -0.25** -0.25** -0.24** -0.23** -0.24** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
MATURITY -2.78*** -2.77*** -2.79*** -2.58*** -2.66*** -2.69*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
WIND -117.68*** -117.06*** -116.02*** -113.84*** -116.50*** -119.23*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EQ -140.70*** -139.96*** -139.22*** -139.89*** -140.13*** -141.34*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK x WIND 120.15*** 120.22*** 119.11*** 117.68*** 119.77*** 122.43*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Model Change -19.77 -22.68 -22.40 -55.25** -49.63* -27.99 
 (0.47) (0.39) (0.38) (0.03) (0.05) (0.28) 
EL x Model Change -2.93 -3.21 -2.74 3.98 5.43 0.44 
 (0.80) (0.78) (0.81) (0.75) (0.67) (0.97) 
       
N 449 449 449 449 449 449 
adjusted R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Another possible factor that can affect the level of trust that investors have on Cat risk 
models is the occurrence of a large catastrophic event. However, the direction of this effect is not 
obvious. On one hand, investors’ confidence on the models may increase since all bonds issued 
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after the main event will have estimations of EL that have incorporated more data and, in theory, 
will be more reliable. On the other hand, an increased level of mistrust may appear with a new 
catastrophe given the evidence of prior model failure.53 However, as it was shown earlier in this 
paper, major catastrophes may also affect investors relative risk aversion due to habit persistence. 
In order to disentangle these effects, we propose an alternative test. As described earlier in the 
paper, the only catastrophes triggering Cat bond losses were Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma, the 
Tohoku Earthquake and U.S. windstorms. However, there have been other major catastrophes not 
triggering Cat bond losses. Thus, testing the effect of catastrophes not triggering losses will be a 
cleaner measure of the effects of model mistrust not related to investor’s changes in relative risk 
aversion due to habit persistence. If in fact, investors’ trust in the models changes after 
catastrophes, then we should observe this effect even after catastrophes not triggering Cat bond 
losses.   
For our test we choose the Haiti earthquake of January 2010, the largest catastrophes 
measured by the number of victims (222,570 victims), which had no or minimal insured losses.  
Given the minimum relation with major insurance markets, any possible contagion effects to the 
reinsurance markets is also unlikely in this case. 54   We also choose Hurricane Sandy, which hit 
U.S, Caribbean and Canada in October 2012, as the third largest catastrophe by insured losses but 
with no Cat bond losses, and in this case with important correlation with large insurance markets.  
  
                                                 
53 For example, Gürtler, Hibbeln and Winkelvos (2016) show that the price of EL risk in the secondary market of Cat bonds changed 
after hurricane Katrina and they attribute the change to changes in investors’ trust on catastrophe models. However, their results 
may differ in our primary market set up especially because their aim is to test for long-term effects of large catastrophic events. 
54 We also test for another large non-insured (minimally insured) catastrophe which is Heatwave in Russia and Czech Republic of 
June 2010 (55,630 victims), and do not find any significant change in EL. Results available upon request. 
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Table 3-8: Non-Triggering Catastrophes 
We test the effect of catastrophes not triggering Cat bond losses by choosing Haiti earthquake which is the largest catastrophes measured 
by the number of victims with minimal or none insured losses. And Hurricane Sandy which is the third largest catastrophe by insured 
losses, but which did not trigger any Cat bonds. We estimate a modified benchmark model below: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡  +𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽4(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑁𝐼𝐿 ) + 𝑖  
NIL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bonds issued after an event that did not trigger Cat bond losses. All other variables 
are defined as in Table 3-1. We estimate this model using four different samples: using bonds issued one, two, and three years prior 
and after the event, and a sample using 100 bonds issued prior and 100 bonds issued after each event. Panel A has Haiti earthquake 
(January 2010) as the catastrophe event. Panel B presents Hurricane Sandy (October 2012) as catastrophe event. P-values are in 
parenthesis and *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Haiti     
VARIABLES 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 50 bonds 
     
EL 145.68*** 176.77*** 187.25*** 153.79*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK -38.15 -49.07 153.80*** -21.13 
 (0.59) (0.40) (0.00) (0.76) 
SR -149.40** -129.22*** -124.63*** -124.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IG  -174.03*** -314.63*** -262.65*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROL 333.93** 258.72*** 327.99*** 378.99*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR 54.37*** 63.82*** 27.44*** 46.47*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.45** -0.27*** -0.38*** -0.59*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
MATURITY 0.01 -1.27 -3.49*** -1.49 
 (0.99) (0.33) (0.00) (0.31) 
WIND -124.45 -316.13*** -57.11 -181.79* 
 (0.23) (0.00) (0.37) (0.07) 
EQ -82.45 -145.99*** -107.28** -106.87* 
 (0.26) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
PEAK x WIND -12.42 281.46*** 97.07 114.13 
 (0.90) (0.00) (0.16) (0.23) 
NIL -96.80 29.79 -15.24 -43.68 
 (0.21) (0.56) (0.72) (0.46) 
NIL x EL 30.84* 7.22 5.98 15.91 
 (0.05) (0.67) (0.75) (0.33) 
     
N 65 134 224 100 
adjusted R2 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 
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Table 3-8. continued 
Panel B: Hurricane Sandy 
VARIABLES 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 50 bonds 
     
EL 252.08*** 194.27*** 176.40*** 228.39*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK 202.31** 55.37 35.58 137.20 
 (0.03) (0.37) (0.32) (0.17) 
SR -44.81 -70.41 -78.76* -7.54 
 (0.47) (0.16) (0.08) (0.89) 
ROL 375.53*** 347.97*** 326.08*** 389.44*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BBSPR -23.47 38.64 30.82 10.67 
 (0.44) (0.15) (0.13) (0.71) 
SIZE 0.30* -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.59) (0.54) (0.96) 
MATURITY -3.02 -3.43** -1.08 -4.21* 
 (0.26) (0.02) (0.32) (0.06) 
WIND -57.56 -219.60*** -229.05*** -185.54* 
 (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) 
EQ -178.49*** -137.49*** -144.05*** -217.43*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PEAK x WIND -14.10 201.69*** 190.85*** 102.95 
 (0.90) (0.01) (0.00) (0.35) 
NIL -201.06*** -71.63* -65.09** -79.80 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.17) 
NIL x EL -12.05 -6.11 -20.57 -21.13 
 (0.70) (0.76) (0.27) (0.38) 
     
N 73 134 210 100 
adjusted R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 
The following regression is employed: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡  +𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽4(𝐸𝐿𝑖 × 𝑁𝐼𝐿 ) + 𝑖               (5) 
 
𝑁𝐼𝐿 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for bonds issued after the event. Coefficient 
𝛽4 captures changes in the price of EL risk related to these events. We estimate this model using 
four different samples: bonds issued one, two and three years before and after the event, and a 
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sample using 100 bonds issued prior and 100 bonds issued after each event. Results are reported 
in Table 3-8. In most cases, the coefficient of interest, 𝛽4,  is not significantly different from zero. 
The only exception is the 1 year before and after sample for the Haiti earthquake, however the 
magnitude of the change is relatively small and the significance is marginal.55  
In summary, given the results of our tests in this section, we do not find support for the 
argument that changes in investors’ trust in Cat risk models is the main driver for changes in the 
price of EL risk observed in the data.  
  
3.4 CONTAGION EFFECTS  
Our benchmark model in Equation 1, includes possible contagion effects from both the 
reinsurance market and the corporate bond market as determinants of Cat bond spreads. In this 
section, we analyse the time dynamics of the risk prices driven by these contagion effects. We 
perform an analysis similar to the expected loss case, that is, subsample multivariate analysis and 
rolling regressions. Results can be observed in Figures 3-2 and 3-3.56  For the case of the 
reinsurance market contagion measured by the ROL index, our results show that the ROL 
coefficient experiences a large increase from May 2005 to April 2006, followed by a decreasing 
trend that continues until the coefficient becomes insignificant in February 2009. Thus the ROL 
coefficient is significant only after Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma, lasting approximately 12 
months. These results are in line with Froot (2001) who proposed such contagion effects are due 
                                                 
55 We acknowledge the fact the post-Haiti earthquake period may include possible effects of the Tohoku earthquake or Hurricane 
Sandy. However, these effects may lead to a larger EL coefficient, thus our reported results of no significant effects of the Haiti 
earthquake can be seen as conservative ones. Similarly, the results for the period prior to Hurricane Sandy may have been affected 
by the Tohoku earthquake. Thus, our results in Table 3-8 for one year before and one year after should be interpreted as Hurricane 
Sandy not having an additional effect on the EL coefficient. For the case of two and three years before and after, this contamination 
effect will be weighted down, thus our interpretation of not significant effects of Hurricane Sandy are robust. 
56 Detailed results are available from the authors. 
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to the lack of reinsurance capital immediately after an event and the abundance of capital after 
several months of no-occurrence of any event.  
Figure 3-2: ROL Coefficient Values 
Figure shows ROL coefficient values from rolling regressions estimations of the following model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖 
For every month in our sample, the equation is estimated using all bond tranches issued in the prior 24(36) months. The process 
starts with July 2003.  The top panel includes estimated coefficient values using the 24- and 36-months estimation windows. The 
vertical lines in the top panel correspond to Nov.2005 and Mar. 2010, respectively from left to right. The bottom panel shows the 
ROL coefficient values under the 24-month window with the corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
 
It is possible that shocks to the reinsurance markets may also have an indirect effect on Cat 
bond spreads. Hard reinsurance market environments may lead Cat bond investors’ effective risk 
aversion to rise, which will be reflected on an increased EL coefficient. However, we dot not find 
strong empirical evidence of this indirect effect, since, as shown in Table 3-8 Panel B, an event 
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with large reinsurance losses as Hurricane Sandy, has had a non significant effect on the EL 
coefficient.  
Figure 3-3: BBSPR Coefficient Values 
Figure shows BBSPR coefficient values from rolling regressions estimations of the following model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝑖
+ 𝛽11(𝑃𝐸𝐴𝐾 × 𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐷)𝑖 + 𝑖 
For every month in our sample, the model is estimated using all bond tranches issued in the prior 24(36) months. The process starts 
with July 2003.  The top panel includes estimated coefficient values using the 24- and 36-months estimation windows. The vertical 
lines in the top panel correspond to Oct.2005 and Jun. 2008, respectively from left to right. The bottom panel shows the BBSPR 
coefficient under the 24-month window with the corresponding 95% confidence interval.  
 
 
For the corporate bond markets contagion, measured by the BBSPR coefficient, the 
coefficient is positive and significant in the aftermath of the subprime financial crisis from March 
2009 until May 2011, negative and significant from February 2006 until June 2008, the aftermath 
of major catastrophe events such as the Katrina and Wilma Hurricanes; there are no contagion 
effects outside of these periods. These results are in line with the findings of Carayannopoulos and 
Perez (2015), who show that, during the financial crisis, Cat bonds were not immune to financial 
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market risk. They argue that this result was triggered by both the composition of the assets in the 
collateral account and the poor oversight of the collateral accounts. These contagion effects are 
also in line with results reported by Gürtler et al. (2016) and Drobetz, Schroder and Tegtmeier 
(2020). 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Over time, Cat bonds received increased attention by market participants. The idea of an 
asset class that provides insurers and reinsurers access to considerable amounts of capital, while it 
provides investors with diversification opportunities, is extremely appealing. Given the rising 
popularity of Cat bonds, it is very important that we understand not only the factors affecting the 
pricing but also the evolution of the impact of these factors over time. In this paper, we examine 
the evolution of these factors and discuss the potential pricing repercussions. 
Our findings suggest that, while the impact of the expected loss on Cat bond spreads 
increases after major catastrophic events, the effect is temporary and unlikely to be caused by 
previously documented behavioral changes in investors’ perception with respect to changes in 
catastrophic risk. We provide evidence that the changes in the impact of the expected loss on Cat 
bond spreads is likely due to changes in investors’ effective risk aversion initiated by investors 
reaching habit consumption levels after a major catastrophic event. Overall, the expected loss 
spread experienced a decreasing trend over time, something indicative of the maturation process 
for this asset class. 
We believe the paper makes a significant contribution to the existing literature. We hope 
our findings will enhance our understanding of this important asset class and instill more 
confidence in the particular market.    
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3.6 APPENDIX 
3.6.1 Changes in the Cat Bond Market Characteristics from 1999 to 2016 
In this appendix we analyze the evolution of some of the main characteristics of the primary 
Cat bond market during our sample period. First, we focus on the time variation of the size of the 
Cat bond market, measured by the number of issues and amount issued per period, as well as 
changes in bond-specific characteristics such as issue size, rating, tenure, sponsor, covered 
territory and reference peril. Subsequently, we analyze the main changes in Cat bond spreads, 
average expected loss, and the influence of other markets such as the reinsurance and the corporate 
bond markets. 
We start by dividing our main sample into the same 6 sub-samples used in the paper, 1999-
2005, 2006-2007, 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013, and 2014-2016. All sub-samples include 
two years of data with the exception of the first and last ones. We choose to perform the analysis 
in two-year intervals, instead of annual intervals, since some years in our sample have very few 
observations, something that could bias our estimation results and conclusions especially in a 
multivariate set up.  The first sub-sample, 1999-2005, is longer in length given the small number 
of bonds issued during this period. Since our sample ends in March 2016, the last sub-sample 
period consists of 2 years and 3 months. Results are summarized in Table 3-A1. 
The size of the Cat bond market sharply increases until the end of 2007. The total value of 
bonds issued in the period 1999-2005 (USD 4,450 million) more than doubles in only two years, 
2006-2007, reaching USD 10,871 million. However, this increasing trend was disrupted by the 
sub-prime financial crisis, with only USD 6,052 million issued in the 2007-2008 period. 
Nevertheless, the increasing trend continued after the crisis, with USD 16,115 million issued in 
the 2014-2016 period. The number of bonds issued also followed a similar pattern. 
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Table 3-A1: Evolution of the Cat Bond Market 
The first panel “All categories” reports the variation in the value of cat bonds issued in millions of USD in each period and in the 
entire period “Full Sample” (1999-2016), number of bonds issued (N), average tenure (in months), and average size (in millions 
USD).The rest of the panels present the percentage of total size of Cat bonds issued in specific periods per different categories: 
sponsor, S&P rating, territory and peril. The periodic subsamples are divided into 2 year intervals except for the 1999-2005 due to 
small number of bonds issued and 2014-2016 is 2 years and 3 months (ending in March 2016). 
Periods 
1999-
2005 
2006-
2007 
2008-
2009 
2010-
2011 
2012-
2013 
2014-
2016 
Full 
Sample 
All categories 
Total Value 
4,450 10,871 6,052 9,113 11,719 16,115 58,320 
N 
68 105 52 68 79 77 449 
Average Tenure 
42.13 29.46 33.10 38.65 39.86 42.51 37.26 
Average Size 
65.44 103.54 116.38 134.02 148.34 209.29 129.89 
Sponsor 
Swiss Re 
21.63% 31.60% 18.53% 11.79% 8.90% 0.00% 13.10% 
Top 5 sponsors 
36.50% 55.36% 44.26% 40.24% 30.80% 19.08% 35.45% 
Number of  sponsors 
17 23 17 21 34 34 83 
Number of issues per 
sponsor 
4.00 4.57 3.06 3.24 2.32 2.26 5.41 
S&P rating 
Investment gr. 
24.17% 4.10% 0.72% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.68% 
High yield 
75.83% 95.90% 99.28% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 97.32% 
Territory 
US 
25.70% 50.57% 57.65% 58.24% 52.55% 59.87% 53.57% 
EU 
12.83% 11.00% 10.25% 24.71% 12.27% 3.03% 11.26% 
JP 
18.20% 7.67% 4.96% 0.00% 6.23% 12.58% 8.06% 
Multi-territory 
43.28% 26.99% 22.35% 17.04% 22.85% 23.59% 24.43% 
Other 
0.00% 3.77% 4.79% 0.00% 6.10% 0.93% 2.68% 
Peak 
68.97% 77.56% 80.00% 75.29% 75.40% 83.46% 78.00% 
Peril 
Earthquake 
16.68% 19.01% 15.95% 7.68% 15.57% 31.73% 19.57% 
Wind 
11.73% 34.67% 33.05% 39.83% 36.04% 32.65% 33.28% 
Multi-peril 
71.59% 46.31% 51.00% 52.49% 48.38% 35.62% 47.15% 
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The overall time to maturity (tenure) of the bonds issued for the entire sample was 37.26 
months. We observe an increasing trend since 2006 that starts with 29.46 months and reaches 
42.51 months at the end of our sample. It appears that the appetite for 5-year bonds has increased 
in the last years. The average issue size has also an increasing pattern since the beginning of the 
sample, reaching more than 200 million during the 2014-2016 period. Larger tenure and issue sizes 
are evidence of a higher level of investor confidence in Cat bonds. 
With respect to sponsor, Swiss Re was the sole major dominant sponsor in the Cat bond 
market prior to the financial crisis. For example, Swiss Re has sponsored 21.63% and 31.60% of 
all the issues during the 1999-2005 and 2006-2007 periods respectively. However, it appears that 
the presence of Swiss Re as a sponsor has decreased over time. None of the Cat bonds issued 
during the last sub-sample (2014-2016) were sponsored by Swiss Re.  This was the result of the 
increased participation and importance of other sponsors and a fragmentation of the market. As 
shown in the table, the average market share of the top five sponsors was only 19% at the end of 
the sample.   
Bond rating has also experienced significant changes over time. Almost one of every four 
bonds issued during the 1999-2005 period was given an investment grade. However, no bonds 
issued since 2010 have an investment grade rating. This could reflect the fact that the various rating 
agencies have recently moved toward a view that securities must require multiple events before 
occurrence of a loss in order to receive an investment grade rating. 
Territory covered has experienced some changes over time as well. Prior to 2006, 25.70% 
(USD 1.1 billion) of the total bonds issued were covering U.S. Since 2006, between 50% to 60% 
of the issued bonds covered U.S. catastrophes. This increase may possibly be attributed to a 
Hurricane Katrina effect. Multi-territory bonds, second in importance constituting 24% of the 
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bonds in the sample, exhibited no identifiable special time trend. Bonds covering Japan have two 
peaks, one in the 1999-2005 period with 18.20% of the total issuance and one in the 2014-2016 
period with 12.58%, reaching almost 3 billion dollars.  We also document a large drop in the bonds 
covering European catastrophes in the last period of our sample, 2014-2016, to less than half 
billion USD. Our benchmark pricing model groups U.S. and multi-territory bonds under one 
category, PEAK, since bonds covering United States may require larger spreads.  The proportion 
of bonds covering PEAK territories has remained stable over time, fluctuating around the 78% 
average, with no major changes.  
Finally, we analyze the composition of the Cat bond market by peril. Multi-peril bonds 
represent the largest proportion in our sample consistently over time. Around half of all bonds are 
multi-peril from 2006 to 2013. At the end of our sample 2014-2016, multi-peril bonds have 
maintained their absolute importance with issuance of almost 6 billion USD. However, they have 
lost relative importance (only 35.62%) due to the increase in the issuance of earthquake related 
bonds that reached USD 5.813 million during the period. This represents a dramatic increase in 
earthquake related bonds.  Never before had earthquake related bond issuance surpassed the USD 
2.5 billion barrier. This increase is driven by the increase in bonds covering Japanese earthquakes, 
but also in the increase on U.S. earthquake coverage. 
In summary, the Cat bond market and its characteristics have experienced significant time 
variation since 1999. We observe an increasing trend in the dollar value of bonds issued, altered 
only by the financial crisis. The importance of Swiss Re as sponsor has decreased over time. There 
are no investment grade rated Cat bonds issued after the financial crisis. Bonds covering Japan 
have increased in the last part of our sample, while the ones covering Europe have experienced a 
156 
 
decrease. The proportion of bonds covering PEAK territories has remained stable over time. 
Finally, the importance of bonds covering earthquakes has increase in the 2014-2016 period.  
Next, we focus on the time variability of Cat bond spreads and the main factors influencing 
them. Specifically, we focus on the time variability of EL, ROL and BBSPR.  In Table 3-A2, we 
summarize the time evolution of mean, median and standard deviations of these variables.  
Table 3-9: Determinants of Cat Bond Spreads over Time 
We report the mean, median (in brackets), and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the Spread, EL (in basis points), ROL, and 
BBSPR. The periodic subsamples are divided into 2 year intervals except for the 1999-2005 due to small number of bonds issued 
and 2014-2016 is 2 years and 3 months (ending in March 2016).  
Spread  EL  ROL BBSPR 
Full 
Sample 
745.43 
[639.00] 
(424.00) 
194.93 
[133.00] 
(166.35) 
123.32 
[120.96] 
(28.67) 
388.19 
[374.00] 
(159.72) 
1999-2005 
592.97 
[532.00] 
(372.21) 
146.08 
[127.00] 
(139.73) 
91.30 
[91.57] 
(8.54) 
402.82 
[357.00] 
(160.82) 
2006-2007 
789.60 
[684.00] 
(505.01) 
195.20 
[129.00] 
(186.05) 
146.24 
[141.07] 
(21.18) 
258.85 
[235.00] 
(89.16) 
2008-2009 
941.06 
[977.00] 
(390.77) 
209.27 
[146.00] 
(188.87) 
144.13 
[142.20] 
(19.27) 
627.67 
[544.50] 
(213.85) 
2010-2011 
917.22 
[874.50] 
(373.24) 
236.38 
[167.00] 
(169.94) 
139.58 
[132.23] 
(14.50) 
467.62 
[467.50] 
(74.26) 
2012-2013 
784.81 
[750.00] 
(400.01) 
200.72 
[161.00] 
(149.46) 
124.48 
[120.35] 
(21.28) 
379.77 
[390.00] 
(61.83) 
2014-2016 
(March) 
495.62 
[456.00] 
(241.16) 
185.48 
[138.00] 
(149.26) 
90.78 
[93.10] 
(4.10) 
328.43 
[308.00] 
(73.13) 
 
 The average spread in our complete sample is 745.43 basis points, around 10% smaller 
than the one reported by Braun (2016) for the period 1997-2009.  When we examine the sub-
sample periods, it is evident that the average spread has an inverted U shape, which reaches its 
highest point (941.06 bps) during the 2008-2009 period. Interestingly, the lowest mean spread 
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(495.62 bps) is observed during the 2014-2016 period. This represents a 46% decrease from peak 
to trough. According to our benchmark pricing model, a possible explanation for this decreasing 
trend may be a similar decreasing (increasing) trend in the explanatory variables that positively 
(negatively) explain spreads.  For example, if Cat bonds issued in a given period carry on average 
a smaller EL, then it is expected that the average spread will also be smaller. Interestingly, EL also 
has an inverted U shape pattern. However, the peak occurs in the 2010-2011 period (average 
236.38 bps) and not in the 2008-2009 period as is the case with the spreads.  We observe a decrease 
in EL from peak-to-trough from 236.38 bps during the 2010-2011 periods to 185.48 bps during 
the 2014-2016 period, a decrease of 21.5%. As a result, approximately only half of the decrease in 
spreads may be attributed to the issuance of Cat bonds with a smaller EL. However, EL is not the 
only variable explaining spreads since other variables in the model have also experienced 
important time changes. Catastrophe reinsurance market prices, measured by ROL, decreased from 
146.24 bps during the 2006-2007 period to 90.78 bps during the 2014-2016 period, a 38% 
decrease. Similarly, BBSPR experienced a decrease of more than 50% after the financial crisis, 
from a peak of 627.67 bps during the 2008-2009 period to 328.43 bps during the 2014-2016 period. 
Given these results, it is difficult to identify the possible drivers of the Cat bond spread time series 
patterns within a simple univariate analysis setting.  
In summary, we document a decreasing trend in Cat bond spreads. Average EL, ROL and 
BBSPR have also experienced important time variation, but these changes are different in 
magnitude, slope and shape, thus, they may only partially explain the trends in spreads. 
Furthermore, the univariate relation between spreads and their pricing variables is not stable over 
time, something that can be viewed as preliminary evidence of time varying coefficients.   
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